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The Overlooked French Influence on the 
Intellectual Property Clause 
Sean M. O’Connor†  
The Intellectual Property Clause (“IP Clause”) of the US Constitution has 
long been a puzzle for courts and commentators. It authorizes Congress to secure 
exclusive property rights for authors and inventors, but it does not use the terms 
“patent” or “copyright,” and its objects of “Science” and “useful Arts” do not cleanly 
map onto the subject matter of current patent and copyright systems. As the Su-
preme Court has noted, under popular usage of the terms “arts” and “science,” one 
would expect patents to promote science and copyrights to promote arts, yet we 
know from the historical record that exactly the opposite is the case. Other terms, 
such as “progress” and “discoveries,” remain contested. IP Clause interpretations to 
date rely exclusively on British legal and intellectual antecedents. I argue that the 
great French Encyclopédie project—a landmark of the mid-eighteenth-century En-
lightenment—provides crucial context to the IP Clause. James Madison, a drafter 
of the IP Clause, owned and approvingly cited the work. Founding Fathers Thom-
as Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were enthusiastic advocates of the Ency-
clopédie. The Encyclopédie has as its twin goals the promotion of progress in sci-
ence and in mechanical (useful) arts. I argue that the reliance of early courts and 
commentators on British antecedents to interpret the federal patent and copyright 
statutes led to an improperly narrow sense of the context of the IP Clause. Using 
entries from the Encyclopédie on “art,” “science,” “discoveries,” “inventions,” 
“writers/authors,” and other relevant topics, I propose a new interpretation of the 
IP Clause that is more coherent and compelling than existing accounts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries. 
  US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8  
 
The IP Clause1 remains a puzzle for courts and commenta-
tors.2 It authorizes Congress to enact legislation securing exclu-
sive rights for authors and inventors to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” and is invoked to justify passage of 
 
 1 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 2 See, for example, Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Proper-
ty Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective 212 (Hein 2002) (“It may well be that [the 
Framers] perceived no comment to be necessary in that the [IP Clause] was considered 
on its face to be self-explanatory. If so, this was most unfortunate because of the ambigu-
ity inherent in several of its key terms.”); Edward C. Walterscheid, Authors and Their 
Writings, 48 J Copyright Society USA 729, 773 (2001) (criticizing the Framers for creat-
ing “significant interpretational problems” by choosing terms such as “discoveries” and 
“writings”). 
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copyright and patent laws.3 But the IP Clause does not specifical-
ly refer to copyrights or patents, even though the Framers were 
well aware of these systems.4 Further, terms such as “useful 
Arts” seem obscure, while others, such as “Science,” appear to 
have very different meanings from our modern usage, as the 
Supreme Court recently noted.5 Other key terms such as “Pro-
gress” remain hotly contested. A troublesome term under all ac-
counts is “Discoveries.”6 While generally held by courts to be 
what inventors produce—because authors must be producing 
the “writings” named in the Clause7—most people tend to think 
of discoveries as something made by scientists or explorers. But 
those discoveries—in the form of laws of nature, abstract ideas, 
naturally occurring phenomena, or other facts about the world—
are exactly the sorts of things that have always been excluded 
from patent protection in the United States.8 Accordingly, no ex-
isting interpretation of the IP Clause is satisfactory. 
The problem may be that these interpretations rely exclu-
sively on British legal and intellectual precedents, with some 
references to contemporaneous American dictionaries. This 
seems intuitively correct insofar as the new United States was 
comprised of former British colonies. But after the Revolution, 
significant parts of British law were rejected by both the federal 
government and the states. The Constitution was drafted to create 
 
 3 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 4 See Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause at 13 (cited in 
note 2) (“There is little question that the Framers were cognizant of the extant English 
patent custom and copyright practice.”). 
 5 See Golan v Holder, 132 S Ct 873, 888 (2012). The casual modern observer might 
assume that the objects of copyright protection would be the “useful Arts”—even though 
objects with practical functions are not copyrightable. See 17 USC § 102 (“In no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”). One might also 
assume that “Science” is the object of patent protection—even though laws of nature and 
naturally occurring phenomena are not patentable. See Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 
185 (1981). Many legal historians instead correctly hold that “useful Arts” covers inven-
tions (as a variant on the old “mechanical arts”), but these scholars are less persuasive 
when forced to interpret “Science” as all modern copyrightable content (that is, as an in-
coherently broad sense of “knowledge”). See Part II. 
 6 See, for example, Walterscheid, 48 J Copyright Society USA at 773 (cited in note 2). 
 7 See, for example, Bilski v Kappos, 561 US 593, 621 (2010) (assuming that the IP 
Clause places the term “inventors” in apposition to the term “discoveries”); United States 
v Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 US 178, 186 (1933) (same). See also Feist Publications, 
Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340, 346 (1991) (citing Supreme Court prece-
dent holding that the IP Clause places the term “authors” in apposition to the term 
“writings”). 
 8 See Diamond, 450 US at 185. 
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a new form of government, not to replicate the British  
system. 
Thus, there is no reason to assume that the IP Clause au-
thorizes Congress to pass laws modeled solely on British ante-
cedents. Nor is there anything in the text of the IP Clause (or 
the Constitution generally) leading to this Anglocentric ap-
proach. Rather, Congress could pass any number of statutes, in-
cluding British-influenced ones, as well as simply issue direct 
grants of exclusive rights under private laws to individual au-
thors or inventors.9 Further, contrary to what some may believe, 
Congress is not required to grant any exclusive rights: it may re-
frain from exercising its power under the IP Clause altogether.10 
Accordingly, the IP Clause is a more interesting grant of power 
than is normally perceived. 
So where did the Anglocentric interpretations come from? 
First, early courts cited British patent and copyright law.11 But 
they did so only when they were interpreting American patent 
and copyright statutes, which courts understandably believed 
were modeled after the British patent and copyright laws. 12 
When courts discussed the IP Clause, on the other hand, they 
made no definitive connections to British antecedents. Second, 
nineteenth-century patent and copyright treatises also cited 
British cases to illuminate the new US patent and copyright 
statutes, according to the same logic used by judges.13 These 
texts rarely interpreted the IP Clause directly. Finally, later 
commentators seemed to assume that references to British law 
 
 9 See Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 222 (2003) (“As we read the Framers’ instruc-
tion, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property 
regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”). 
 10 See Goldstein v California, 412 US 546, 562 (1973) (“While the area in which Con-
gress may act is broad, the enabling provision of Clause 8 does not require that Congress 
act in regard to all categories of materials which meet the constitutional definitions.”). 
 11 See, for example, Clayton v Stone, 5 F Cases 999, 1001–02 (CC SDNY 1829) (cit-
ing British copyright cases); Ewer v Coxe, 8 F Cases 917, 919 (CC ED Pa 1824) (same); 
Whittemore v Cutter, 29 F Cases 1120, 1121 (CCD Mass 1813) (citing a British patent 
case).  
 12 See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress” 
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Pro-
gress Clause, 80 Neb L Rev 754, 782–83 (2001) (referring to the English 1624 Statute of 
Monopolies as the “recognized ancestor” of American utility patents and to the English 
Statute of Anne as the “acknowledged ancestor” of American copyright statutes). 
 13 See, for example, Thomas G. Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of Patents for New 
Inventions 59 (D Mallory 1810), citing Boulton and Watt v Bull, 2 H Bl 463 (1795), and 
Hornblower and Maberly v Boulton and Watt, 8 Term Rep 95 (KB 1799). See also George 
Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright 26, 29 (Little, Brown 1847). 
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in early American cases and treatises must mean that these 
sources expressed the view that the IP Clause itself should be 
interpreted only in light of British antecedents. Thus, as the IP 
Clause literature developed, it assumed and then entrenched a 
dogma of exclusively British legal and intellectual antecedents. 
In the later twentieth century, this dogma blended seamlessly 
with the emerging orthodoxy of Lockean labor theory as a major 
justification for property rights, including IP rights.14 While oth-
er justifications for IP rights—such as Hegelian personhood  
theory15—should point to Continental influences as well, there 
has been surprisingly little interest among American IP Clause 
historians in looking beyond British influences. 
Once we remove this artificial impediment of Anglocentric 
thinking, any number of possible alternative influences can be 
considered. I do not argue that the French Encyclopédie influ-
ence is the sole influence, nor that this view should completely 
displace ideas about British influence. But one should not ignore 
the work that “became almost synonymous with Enlighten-
ment” 16  and “is generally agreed [to be] the most influential 
work published in the eighteenth century”17 and described as 
“the epitome of the [French Enlightenment] philosophes’ 
achievement.” 18  The great French Encyclopédie project was a 
 
 14 See Karen I. Vaughn, John Locke and the Labor Theory of Value, 2 J Libertarian 
Stud 311, 312 (1978) (describing Lockean labor theory as a “justification for private own-
ership of goods and land on the basis of the effort or labor which individuals expend to 
produce goods or to cause the land to produce goods of value to human beings”). 
 15 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L 
Rev 531, 542 (2005) (describing Hegelian personhood theory as a justification for proper-
ty ownership because it “provides the mechanism by which humans achieve self-
actualization”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L 
J 287, 330–65 (1988) (arguing for a Hegelian justification of IP as a powerful alternative 
to the Lockean justification, given the complexities of modern life). 
 16 Richard Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment 
Culture xii (Cambridge 2001). 
 17 Abraham Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eight-
eenth Century 38–39 (MacMillan 1939). Another commentator states:  
The Encyclopédie was also an arsenal of philosophic thought in the Age of Rea-
son. This great work, wrote Ira Wade, “organized definitely the knowledge of 
the eighteenth century; it created a close organization of the more liberal 
thinkers of the century; and lastly, it welded the political, social and religious 
doctrines and theories into a compact whole.”  
Paul Merrill Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America: Essays on the Times of the 
Founding Fathers 108 (Georgia 1984), quoting Ira Wade, Introduction, in P.A. Chapman, 
et al, eds, An Anthology of Eighteenth Century French Literature i, xliv (Princeton 1930). 
 18 James Hannam, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Founda-
tions of Modern Science 3 (Icon 2009). 
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“Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Trades” intend-
ed as a comprehensive system to “set forth . . . the order and 
connection of the parts of human knowledge.”19 As an Enlight-
enment project, the Encyclopédie had a major focus on the sort 
of codifiable factual knowledge that we think of today as science. 
But it was equally important to its editors, Jean d’Alembert and 
Denis Diderot, to follow Francis Bacon’s call for an investigation 
of the (practical) “arts”—by which they meant the ancient catego-
ry of mechanical or manual arts (and not the fine arts).20 They un-
derstood that much of the arts consist of noncodifiable methods21 
(the kind of trained muscle memory that today we call “procedural 
knowledge”)22 and called for a new “grammar of the arts” that 
could provide a system of proxy symbols for these techniques.23 
Thus, the Encyclopédie was not what we think of as an ency-
clopedia today, which focuses on only codifiable knowledge and in-
cludes biographical and historical entries. 24  While the Ency-
clopédie shares with later encyclopedias an alphabetized 
organization, it fits each entry into a comprehensive Baconian 
“system” of human knowledge with complex, cross-referenced  
interconnections.25 
Later encyclopedias generally dropped any similar ambi-
tions.26 Further, d’Alembert and Diderot were quite intent on 
developing a holistic vision of the phrase “Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.” Following one of the core insights of the earlier 
Querelle des Anciens et Modernes (Quarrel of the Ancients and 
Moderns), they considered “progress” to be achievable only in fields 
whose outputs could be quantitatively measured.27 These included 
science and practical (or “useful”) arts, such as metalworking, but 
 
 19 Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot 4 
(Chicago 1995) (Richard N. Schwab, trans). See also Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Prelimi-
nary Discourse (Discourse Préliminaire), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Col-
laborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2009) (Richard N. Schwab, trans), archived at 
http://perma.cc/948L-FKGL. 
 20 See d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 24–25 (cited in note 19). 
 21 See id (recognizing the difficulty of “reduc[ing] each particular science or art to a 
small number of rules or general notions”). 
 22 Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art” of the Patent System, 2015 U Ill L Rev *29 
(forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 23 Denis Diderot, Art (Art), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative 
Translation Project (Michigan, 2003) (Nelly S. Hoyt and Thomas Cassirer, trans), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/W4Q9-WQ7Q. 
 24 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at xii–xvi (cited in note 16). 
 25 See id at 27–29. 
 26 See id at 191–92. 
 27 See notes 322–32 and accompanying text. 
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excluded the fine arts and other fields primarily assessed by 
qualitative senses of “taste” or “sentiment.” The  
authors of the Encyclopédie ascribed a special and unusual 
meaning to “discoveries” as the most important inventions, ra-
ther than the uncovering of existing facts such as laws of na-
ture28—which I argue explains the vexing use of this term in the 
IP Clause. They also distinguished between “authors” and “writ-
ers.” The former focus on conveying substantive content in their 
writings, without particular regard for style. The latter focus 
almost exclusively on style and were also known as belletrists.29 
Equally important was the publication of such a work itself, as 
publication would follow Bacon’s admonition that the sciences 
and practical arts could not truly advance unless their truths 
and methods could be subjected to adequate public criticism and 
confirmation.30 
Together with other perspectives from the Encyclopédie, the 
foregoing gives a sense of how my argument will proceed. In the 
remainder of this Article, I argue for a new interpretation of the 
IP Clause, especially for the most troubling terms: “useful Arts” 
and “Discoveries.” In part, the troubling interpretations of these 
terms are due to the significant changes in key terms such as 
“science,” “(useful) arts,” and “discoveries” since the constitu-
tional convention. Beginning especially in the late nineteenth 
century, courts and commentators have at times flipped their in-
terpretations of “Science” and “useful Arts” in the IP Clause, con-
necting one or the other to “Writings” or “Discoveries.”31 A prob-
lem with those interpretations is that they still do not cover the 
fine arts (unless one improperly reads out the word “useful”). 
Perhaps most importantly, presentist accounts of the IP Clause 
lead to the most confusion, as neither modern basic science re-
search results nor discoveries (contemporarily thought of as 
 
 28 See Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Discovery (Découverte), The Encyclopedia of Diderot 
& d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2012) (Dena Goodman, 
trans), archived at http://perma.cc/G4LZ-TY9X (emphasis added): 
In general this name [discovery] can be given to everything that is newly found 
in the Arts and the Sciences; however, it is scarcely applied, and ought not to 
be applied, except to that which is not only new, but also curious, useful, and 
difficult to find, and which, consequently has a certain degree of importance. 
The less important discoveries are simply called inventions.  
 29 See Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Writer, Author (Ecrivain, Auteur), The Encyclope-
dia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2011) (Erik 
Anspach, trans), archived at http://perma.cc/T78S-N8C8.  
 30 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at xvi (cited in note 16). 
 31 See, for example, Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201, 207–09 (1954).  
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scientific or geographic) are covered by either patents or copy-
rights.32 Write-ups of results or discoveries can be protected un-
der copyright, of course, which should hint at the connection be-
tween the terms “Science,” “Authors,” and “Writings” under the 
widespread “balanced sentence” interpretation of the IP Clause.33 
James Madison and other Founding Fathers owned and ap-
provingly cited the Encyclopédie.34 Madison, in particular, cited 
the work in an article that he produced in 1787, the year of the 
convention.35 While some religious men denounced the apparent-
ly atheistic and antiestablishment tenor of many Encyclopédie 
entries, they had a grudging respect for the information about 
arts and sciences contained in others.36 Further, Diderot’s and 
other philosophes’ positions on literary property seemed to be 
echoed in American state copyright statutes and constitutions 
adopted before the convention. These scholars’ views on useful 
arts also matched the emerging focus on useful arts in the 
states. 
The coherent and compelling interpretation that results 
from using the Encyclopédie’s versions of key terms seems to 
confirm or corroborate that it is, at the very least, a useful addi-
tion to the IP Clause literature. I do not claim that the Ency-
clopédie should be seen as the sole influence on the Framers—
this would make no more sense than an exclusively Anglocentric 
account. Indeed, the interpretation that I develop can be con-
sistent with different strains of Anglocentric accounts. 
My interpretation retains the twin threads of the balanced-
sentence (really the parallel-construction) account because of the 
important distinction between “science” and “(useful) arts” in 
the Encyclopédie. At the same time, my interpretation is con-
sistent with a unitary preamble, as both writings and discover-
ies can advance both science and useful arts. My interpretation 
also incorporates the important division between “progress” 
fields (based on quantifiable advancement) and “nonprogress” 
fields (based on nonquantifiable taste or sentiment), which orig-
inated in the Querelle.37 Thus, the scope of Congress’s authority 
 
 32 See text accompanying notes 346–48, 471–81.  
 33 See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the 
US Constitution, 18 Geo Wash L Rev 50, 51 (1949).  
 34 See Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 45–48, 117 (cited in note 17). 
 35 See id at 117. 
 36 See id, citing John Adams, 2 The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 437 
(Harvard 1961) (L.H. Butterfield, ed). 
 37 See notes 322–32 and accompanying text. 
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under the IP Clause is bounded mainly by fields in which de-
monstrable progress can be shown. This does not include the  
fine arts and therefore presents a challenge to modern copyright 
that seems to cover primarily works of subjective, creative ex-
pression. At the same time, the Encyclopédie definition of “dis-
coveries” as the most important inventions (those that are “curi-
ous, useful, and difficult to find”) supports those who have 
argued for a standard of “invention” higher than mere novelty in 
the IP Clause. This all indicates a coherent federal “Progress 
project”38—if Congress chooses to exercise its power—that se-
cures existing or newly created rights through federal statutory 
grants only for demonstrable advances in declarative or proce-
dural knowledge. Because of concern over the reach of this pow-
er, especially within the then-untested federal system of gov-
ernment, the Framers restricted such federal grants to limited 
time periods.39 
This coherent-yet-restrictive power under the IP Clause 
should not be seen as a prohibition on, or an argument against, 
IP rights for other sorts of things or for longer periods of time. 
The point at the Framing was simply that the new federal gov-
ernment’s powers should be limited, with powers beyond this 
left to the states. Indeed, the IP Clause has long been interpret-
ed to allow concurrent federal and state patent and copyright 
systems (provided, of course, that the state systems do not re-
strict other important federal powers, such as the power to regu-
late interstate commerce).40 While Congress expressly preempt-
ed the field for copyright under the Copyright Act of 1976,41 it 
could amend the statute to allow concurrent copyrights with the 
states again. Thus, creative expressive works, which appear to 
sit outside the “Progress project” and congressional authority, 
could be protected under state common or positive law. This 
would match well with the sense of literary property as a com-
mon-law right at the time of the Framing (although the actual 
 
 38 See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and 
Patent Power, 43 DePaul L Rev 97, 102 (1993) (characterizing a “Progress project” as 
“shorthand [for the] concept of a public trust over a commons of information resources”). 
 39 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 40 In the early 1970s, a divided Court in Goldstein ruled that the states had not re-
linquished all power to grant exclusive rights to authors under the US Constitution and 
found no impediment to concurrent state and federal copyrights. Goldstein, 412 US at 
556–67. 
 41 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified as amended at 17 USC § 101 et seq. 
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history of such common-law rights is contested). 42 It would also 
match well with an implicit theme that there are common-law 
privacy, equity, and tort rights that provide remedies if un-
published works or undisclosed inventions are appropriated and 
used or distributed without permission.43 
This is an academic project in the best sense of that term. I 
do not expect Congress or the courts to dramatically change the 
scope of copyright or patents on the basis of my progress-project 
account of the IP Clause. The world has changed much since the 
convention, and it may not make sense to limit our modern IP 
systems according to the Framers’ vision. If we were to restrict 
federal copyright and patents to the contours of the IP Clause 
authority that I argue for here, I would also hope that the states 
would immediately fill in some of the ceded subject matter, es-
pecially for the creative arts. Thus, I am hardly “anti-IP.” In 
fact, I intend in future works to explore the argument—only 
hinted at here—that robust IP rights can be based on common-
law privacy, equity, tort, and property principles. Thus, a roll-
back of positive law IP rights should not remove their common-
law roots. 
This being an academic project, I do expect it to illuminate 
current practical debates over IP law and the IP Clause. Know-
ing what congressional power the IP Clause sets out—no matter 
how antiquated or politically impractical it may be today—
allows one to move forward with discussions about what to do 
with our IP laws. It could be that we actually should amend 
them to fit within the apparent scope of authority provided by 
the IP Clause under my interpretation. Or it may be that the IP 
Clause merits amendment. Again, I do not realistically expect 
either of these things to happen. But one can craft a coherent 
and compelling account of the IP Clause so that this important 
part of the Constitution does not continue to be an enigmatic  
cipher that can be twisted to fit any pro- or anti-IP argument. 
This Article does not seek to be the last word on the matter, 
but rather the first. If my argument is correct, then the conse-
quences could be far-reaching. For example, we might consider 
whether our federal copyright system’s coverage of “creative 
 
 42 See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at Common Law in 1774, 47 Conn L 
Rev 1, 3–4 (2014). 
 43 See, for example, Prince Albert v Strange, 47 Eng Rep 1302, 1310, 1312 (Ch 
1849) (upholding an injunction on the ground that an unauthorized publication and sale 
of drawings and etchings is an invasion of an author’s right to privacy). 
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expression” (measurable only by qualitative taste or sentiment) 
is actually constitutional.44 The early copyright acts hewed more 
closely to the “science” sense of the Encyclopédie than to either 
the modern sense of “science” or the sense of “learning in gen-
eral” that courts, Congress, and commentators have favored. 
The fact that our current copyrightable subject matter is broad-
er than the Encyclopédie sense of “science” does not undercut my 
argument that the Encyclopédie helps contextualize the IP 
Clause. It instead raises the questions of how and why the copy-
right system expanded away from its scientific orientation from 
the mid-nineteenth through the twentieth centuries. I provide 
some account of this, in line with the scholarship of others, be-
low. Additionally, the Encyclopédie sense of “useful arts” can 
frame debates over the scope of patentable subject matter, espe-
cially as a way out of the dead end of “technological arts” tests. 
This Article proceeds by laying out the conventional Anglo-
centric account of the IP Clause in Part I, and then by showing 
the development of different interpretations of the terms and 
structures of the IP Clause. This development is divided into 
three different historical waves of commentary. Part II details 
the nature and impact of the Encyclopédie generally, as well as 
background on the historical development of key terms and con-
cepts such as “science” and “(useful) arts.” Part III documents 
the influence of the Encyclopédie, as well as the historical senses 
of “science” and “(useful) arts,” on Madison and other Founding 
Fathers. Finally, Part IV shows how the use of Encyclopédie def-
initions of key terms in the IP Clause leads to a much more co-
herent and compelling understanding of the structures that the 
Clause empowers Congress to create. 
I.  THE CONVENTIONAL ANGLOCENTRIC ACCOUNT OF THE IP 
CLAUSE AND INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS KEY TERMS AND 
STRUCTURE 
The Anglocentric account of the IP Clause has failed to gen-
erate a compelling interpretation. Key terms are still disputed, 
and there is no consensus on whether the Clause’s structure is uni-
tary or distributive.45 Courts and commentators have substituted 
 
 44 But all is not lost for creative artists. As I argue below, states could protect 
works of creative expression in a concurrent federal-state regulatory system. 
 45 See notes 103–07 and accompanying text. This Part is summarized from my 
more detailed intellectual history of the IP Clause literature elsewhere. See generally 
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alternate terms to make sense of the Clause, on the basis that 
“what the Framers really meant was x.” But many of these al-
ternate terms were well-known to the Framers, so it violates 
canons of construction to substitute these terms for what the 
Framers actually wrote.46 
A major problem is that courts and commentators to date 
have relied on one kind of dictionary: the ordinary-language dic-
tionary, which was of mixed reputation in the eighteenth centu-
ry.47 Ordinary-language variants had arisen from “hard-word” 
dictionaries, which sought to define only difficult words, often of 
Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or French origin.48 Professor Richard Yeo 
presents a critique of these dictionaries in his excellent book on 
encyclopedias from the Enlightenment. 49  He quotes Gottfried 
Leibniz’s observation that “one cannot explain words without 
making incursions into the sciences themselves, as is evident 
from dictionaries; and, conversely, one cannot present a science 
without at the same time defining its terms.”50 The Reverend 
John Harris, author of an early encyclopedia published in 1704, 
 
Sean M. O’Connor, An Intellectual History of IP Clause Interpretation (working paper, 
Sept 2014) (on file with author). 
 46 For example, the claim that “science” really meant “knowledge” is problematic 
because individuals during the convention period used the term “scientific knowledge.” 
Similarly, “learning in general” cannot substitute for “science” because the former is un-
defined and goes beyond any conventional, broad sense of science as “systematic study” 
at that time. And, again, “learning” was in the Statute of Anne and some state constitu-
tions and copyright statutes. For example, when Parliament enacted the Statute of 
Anne, “[i]t bore [in part] the title: ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning.’” Golan v 
Holder, 132 S Ct 873, 901 (2012) (Breyer dissenting). Defining “useful arts” as simply 
“technology” seems better justified at first blush because the latter term was just coming 
into use at the time of the convention. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal 
Professions, 40 BC L Rev 1139, 1166–67 (1999). But it is too restrictive to limit “useful 
arts” to science-based practical applications, which were demonstrably not the sole con-
tent of either contemporary patent systems or usages of the term “useful arts.” “Discov-
eries” seems most challenging for commentators, who at best try to substitute “inven-
tions” for it. See, for example, Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New 
Reading, 57 UCLA L Rev 421, 457 & n 139, 458 (2009). But if this was all that the 
Framers meant, why did they not use this term, with which they were familiar? 
 47 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 20–21 (cited in note 16) (discussing the recep-
tion of general-language dictionaries as they began adopting some characteristics of sci-
entific dictionaries). For a critical guide to Founding-era dictionaries, see generally 
Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to De-
termine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 358 (2014).  
 48 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 18–21 (cited in note 16). Hard-word dictionar-
ies followed from simple bilingual translation guides published in the sixteenth century. 
See id. 
 49 See id at 20–21. 
 50 Id at 20, quoting Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understand-
ing 522 (Cambridge 1982) (Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, eds and trans). 
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expressly criticized hard-word dictionaries on two grounds: (1) 
they were not expansive enough in each entry to give the full 
sense of the defined term (following Leibniz), and (2) they con-
tained too many common words.51 But the issue goes even further, 
because terms are embedded in systems and intellectual frame-
works. So even if a short language-dictionary definition offers a 
reasonable technical definition of a term, the role that the term 
plays in knowledge systems may be inadequately conveyed. 
Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language,52 cited by 
courts and commentators interpreting the IP Clause, was a lan-
guage dictionary and thus was not necessarily seen as authori-
tative in its time.53 
Yeo contrasts language dictionaries with the “historical dic-
tionaries” and “dictionaries of arts and sciences” that arose from 
a much older “encyclopaedia” tradition dating back to Greco-
Roman times.54 Originally, this was the “round of learning” or 
“circle of sciences.”55 Marcus Terentius Varro set out an early 
version of what would become the seven liberal arts in the first 
century BCE.56 In the early fifth century CE, Martianus Capella 
wrote what became the standard handbook for teaching the lib-
eral arts throughout the Middle Ages.57 Up through the early 
modern period, it was expected that an individual could master 
not only these liberal arts but also all the important learning of 
his or her era. From the Etymologiae, completed around 636 AD, 
to the Speculum maius, completed around 1250, all worthwhile 
knowledge could be fit into a few volumes.58 This was based on 
the technical sense of “knowledge” as only that which is divine 
and unchanging. 59  Accordingly, these encyclopedias looked 
 
 51 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 20 (cited in note 16). 
 52 See generally Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (Strahan 
1755) (2 vols). 
 53 See Pollack, 80 Neb L Rev at 794–95 (cited in note 12). 
 54 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at xi–xiii, 16 (cited in note 16). 
 55 Id at xi. 
 56 See id at 6 & n 19 (referencing Varro’s Disciplinarum libri novem). 
 57 See generally Martianus Capella, The Marriage of Philology and Mercury (De 
nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii). See also Henry Osborn Taylor, The Classical Heritage of 
the Middle Ages 49 (Columbia 1901) (describing Capella’s text as “[p]erhaps the most 
widely used school book of the Middle Ages”). Capella’s book may have been influenced 
by Varro’s Disciplinarum libri novem, which discussed the seven liberal arts—the trivi-
um (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, 
and music). See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 42–43 (cited in note 16). 
 58 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 5 (cited in note 16). 
 59 See id. See also Sean M. O’Connor, Method+ology: Art, Science, Technology, Law, 
and the Means of Innovation *5, 7–10 (forthcoming Oxford 2015) (on file with author). 
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backward more than forward, collecting timeless knowledge of 
the ancients.60 
Using the term “encyclopaedia” to denote such compendi-
ums of knowledge began only in the sixteenth century. 61  It 
matched the term “encyclopedy,” which signified the range of 
subjects that an educated person should know.62 The Reverend 
Johann Heinrich Alsted’s 1620 Cursus Philosophici Encyclopae-
dia may have been the last work purporting to present the 
“methodological understanding of everything than [sic] man 
must learn in this life.”63 The flood of new knowledge emerging 
from the scientific revolution, as well as Bacon’s critiques of 
scholastic philosophy, challenged the very premise of a stable 
encyclopedia.64 
Notwithstanding the challenges to the traditional encyclo-
pedia, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment became the “age of 
encyclopaedias.” 65  But now encyclopedias looked forward and 
represented an effort to record new knowledge. 66  They also 
moved from Latin to the vernacular, furthering the Enlighten-
ment efforts to make knowledge accessible to the general public 
and facilitate dialogue.67 New “dictionaries of arts and sciences,” 
or, as they were sometimes referred to, “scientific dictionaries,” 
followed. 68  Distinguishing themselves from hard-word or lan-
guage dictionaries, these dictionaries of arts and sciences sought 
to both define terms and explain the arts and sciences.69 In par-
ticular, dictionaries of arts and sciences aspired to cover not only 
facts and theories of the physical and natural sciences but also 
 
 60 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 6 (cited in note 16) (noting that these encyclo-
pedias were “not intended to report new findings but rather to collect, arrange and 
transmit old knowledge”). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id at 7–9 (noting that, beyond the trivium and quadrivium of the liberal arts, 
natural and moral philosophy, mechanics and the mechanical arts, theology, law, and 
medicine were sometimes added). Gregor Reisch’s Margarita Philosophica in 1496 was 
published in twelve books. A course of lectures given at Cambridge in 1707 was pub-
lished as Encyclopeadia; Or a Method of Instructing Pupils. Id at 7. 
 63 Id at 9 & n 27, quoting Neil Kenny, The Palace of Secrets: Béroalde de Verville 
and Renaissance Conceptions of Knowledge 15 (Clarendon 1991) (quoting from Alsted’s 
Encylopaedia). Alsted’s work was comprised of seven books. 
 64 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 9–10 (cited in note 16). 
 65 Id at 11. 
 66 See id at 12. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 12–13 (cited in note 16). 
 69 See id at 15–16. For example, an early leading work by Harris noted on its title 
page that it was engaged in “[e]xplaining not only the Terms of ART, but the ARTS 
Themselves.” Id at 14. 
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explanations of crafts and trades (the “manual” or “mechanical” 
arts).70 Dictionaries of arts and sciences excluded historical and 
biographical entries. Those subjects were left to another offshoot 
of the earlier encyclopedia tradition, the historical dictionary.71 
Later, the content of scientific and historical dictionaries would 
be combined into the modern encyclopedias of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.72 
Thus, the dictionaries of arts and sciences were the locus of 
credible knowledge about important terms and concepts. 73  In 
fact, they were recommended by early US Patent Office officials 
for inventors to “ascertain if the invention is new” before apply-
ing for a patent.74 These dictionaries were to be comprehensive, 
even if that required going beyond what any one person could 
ever hope to internalize. 75  By contrast, language dictionaries 
were simply used to look up hard or unusual words that one did 
not know in order to obtain a rough-and-ready understanding of 
them.76 Of the dictionaries of arts and sciences, the French En-
cyclopédie was the most ambitious and well-known. It has been 
described as “almost synonymous with Enlightenment,”77 while 
another commentator has said that “[i]t is generally agreed that 
the most influential work published in the eighteenth century 
was the French Encyclopédie.”78 
Notwithstanding this currently well-documented develop-
ment and the role of encyclopedias—or dictionaries of arts and 
sciences—the IP Clause literature has seemed to largely ig-
nore these sources. This is especially odd with regard to the 
 
 70 Id at 15. 
 71 See id at 17 (noting that the first such work was arguably Louis Moreri’s Grand 
dictionnaire historique, published in 1674). 
 72 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 282 (cited in note 16) (noting that, by the early 
nineteenth century, encyclopedias no longer classified knowledge and instead attempted 
to provide total, exhaustive coverage). 
 73 See id at 280 (noting that dictionaries of arts and sciences were promoted as “re-
liable summar[ies] of a wider body of knowledge”). 
 74 William Thornton, head of the US Patent Office in the early nineteenth century, 
admonished applicants to consult “the dictionaries of Arts and Sciences, the Repertory of 
the Arts, and other publications that treat of the mechanic[al] arts, to endeavor to ascer-
tain if the invention [is] new.” William Thornton, Patents, 6 J Patent Office Society 98, 
98 (1923). 
 75 But see Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 281 (cited in note 16) (noting that earlier 
dictionaries of arts and sciences “did not seek exhaustive and comprehensive coverage, 
but rather sought to reduce knowledge to manageable essentials”). 
 76 See id at 18–19. 
 77 Id at xii.  
 78 Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century 
at 38 (cited in note 17). 
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Encyclopédie, which looms so large in any intellectual history of 
the eighteenth century that one may be aware of it without 
knowing of the relatively obscure current research on dictionar-
ies of arts and science by Yeo and others. I argue that it is a 
deep-seated Anglocentrism in the IP Clause literature that has 
caused this glaring oversight of the Encyclopédie as an influence 
on the Framers. 
I further contend that this narrow focus stems from two fac-
tors. First, the courts interpreting the new federal patent and 
copyright systems of the early Republic used British cases and 
principles to illuminate the new American statutes because they 
believed that Congress largely copied American IP statutes from 
existing British laws.79 While this may be true, the courts did 
not claim that these British laws were the primary influence for 
the IP Clause itself. But the Anglocentric approach of the courts 
seems to have led commentators and later courts to conflate 
British influence on the IP statutes with influence on the IP 
Clause itself. Once the Anglocentric narrative was established 
early on, no scholar seemed to seriously question it. Second, 
some commentators—especially in later waves of the IP Clause 
literature—seriously underestimated the linguistic abilities of 
the Founders, namely by believing that those educated gentle-
men could not read French.80 Not only could key Framers such 
as Madison read French, but other Founding Fathers were flu-
ent enough that they could both converse in it and translate 
French works into English.81 
This Part summarizes my work elsewhere on the IP Clause 
literature to show both how the Anglocentric focus developed 
and how interpretations of key terms changed over time.82 This 
Part separates the literature into three distinct waves. Preceding 
these were cases and commentary that discussed the IP Clause 
but did not constitute an organized scholarly dialogue. The First 
Wave occurred in the early to mid-twentieth century.83 It estab-
lished the balanced-sentence interpretation, which found two sim-
ilar but separate powers in the Clause—one for patents and one 
 
 79 See note 11. 
 80 See, for example, Pollack, 80 Neb L Rev at 790–803 (cited in note 12). 
 81 See Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 45–48 (cited in note 17). 
 82 See generally O’Connor, An Intellectual History of IP Clause Interpretation (cited 
in note 45). 
 83 See, for example, Lutz, 18 Geo Wash L Rev at 51 (cited in note 33); Richard C. De 
Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law 15 (Luce 1925). 
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for copyright. 84  The Second Wave began in the mid-twentieth  
century, largely with copyright scholars engaging the protracted 
legislative process culminating in the Copyright Act of 1976.85 
The Third Wave emerged at the end of the twentieth century, as 
IP became a mainstream policy issue, and technology-driven is-
sues such as IP protection for software, databases, and business 
methods, as well as concerns over copyright-term extension, 
made scholars look back to how these subject matters might fit, 
if at all, under the powers granted to Congress under the IP 
Clause.86 
A. Nineteenth-Century Antecedents 
Madison’s discussion of the IP Clause in Federalist 43 as 
part of the effort to secure ratification of the Constitution was 
the first major interpretation of the IP Clause. Madison provid-
ed that: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The 
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great 
Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful in-
ventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. 
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims 
of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual 
provision for either of the cases, and most of them have an-
ticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the in-
stance of Congress.87 
 
 84 Invoking the standard eighteenth-century linguistic device of the “balanced sen-
tence,” this interpretation sets forth two powers granted to Congress. Congress shall 
have, first, the “power . . . to promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing . . . to Au-
thors . . . the exclusive Right to their [ ] Writings;” and second, the “power . . . to promote 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts, . . . by securing [to] Inventors . . . the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.” US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. Thus, copyright-type systems are author-
ized to promote the progress of science, while patent-type systems are authorized to 
promote the progress of the useful arts. 
 85 See, for example, Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 200–
01 (Vanderbilt 1968) (detailing the evolution of the copyright statute). 
 86 See, for example, Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business 
Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional Histo-
ry, 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 61, 62 (2002) (arguing that business-method pa-
tents do not promote progress, which is a limit on Congress’s patent power under the IP 
Clause). 
 87 Federalist 43 (Madison), in The Federalist 288, 288 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). Madison was a member of the Confederation Congress committee that had 
recommended that states pass IP laws. See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 Georgetown L J 109, 114–15 (1929). 
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Madison had in fact submitted the proposed powers that formed 
the basis of the final IP Clause, ultimately considered by the 
drafting committee along with both of Charles Pinckney’s pro-
posals.88 Thus, Madison’s views have significant weight. But in 
the passage above, he seems to simply use copyright law in 
Great Britain as an example of why the IP Clause is justified. 
He is not suggesting that the IP Clause is derived from, or lim-
ited by, British law. 
Early American patent law treatises did not directly ad-
dress the IP Clause.89 Rather, they used British cases solely to 
illuminate American statutory patent law. But these secondary 
sources also discuss the French patent system.90 Justice Joseph 
Story discussed the IP Clause in his Commentaries on the Con-
stitution, but he largely tracked Federalist 43 and made no claim 
that the IP Clause was derived from British law.91 
Early US patent cases cited British cases for common-law 
patent principles,92 even while evincing conflict over the pream-
ble of the IP Clause. Thus, Pennock v Dialogue93 referenced the 
IP Clause to imply that “science and useful arts” acted as a uni-
tary object that Congress was to promote. 94  But McClurg v 
 
 88 See Fenning, 17 Georgetown L J at 112 (cited in note 87). 
 89 Thomas Fessenden published the first such treatise in 1810. See Fessenden, An 
Essay on the Law of Patents for New Inventions at 59 (cited in note 13). Fessenden’s use 
of relevant terms illustrates their contemporaneous meaning. He referred to “authors” of 
discoveries, inventions, and improvements in the arts in the older sense of the authority 
under which a project is undertaken. See, for example, id at ix–x. “Reflection” and “phil-
osophical study” meant scientific inquiry. See id at xxix. “Useful arts,” “arts,” and “me-
chanical arts” were used interchangeably but excluded the fine arts. See generally id. He 
may have set the roots of the technological-arts test when he suggested that patent-
eligible inventions be restricted to practical application of scientific principles. Willard 
Phillips published the second treatise in 1837. See generally Willard Phillips, The Law of 
Patents for Inventions (American Stationers’ 1837). 
 90 See Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of Patents for New Inventions at 207–13 
(cited in note 13). Fessenden mentioned the French Patent Act of 1791. See id at 214. 
Phillips cited a French treatise for the principle that inventors have a right to the prop-
erty in their invention even if it is not an inherent, natural, and exclusive right. See 
Phillips, The Laws of Patents for Invention at 4 (cited in note 89), citing Augustin-
Charles Renouard, Traité des Brevets d’Invention, de Perfectionnement et d’Importation 
(A.A. Renouard 1825). 
 91 See Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 48–51 
(Rothman 2d reprint ed 1999). 
 92 See, for example, Whittemore v Cutter, 29 F Cases 1120, 1121 (CCD Mass 1813), 
citing Boulton and Watt v Bull, 2 H Bl 463 (1795). 
 93 27 US 1 (1829). 
 94 Id at 19 (noting that the main object of the IP Clause was to promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts, which “could be done best[ ] by giving the public at large 
a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented . . . having a due regard to 
rights of the inventor”). However, when deciding circuit cases, the Supreme Court justices 
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Kingsland95 held that Congress’s power was plenary and unre-
strained by the IP Clause.96 Meanwhile, the Pennock Court’s ref-
erences to British patent practices were limited to a discussion 
of those practices’ influence on the American patent statute at 
issue, not on the IP Clause itself.97 
Early US copyright cases followed a similar path. Courts 
cited British cases for interpretations of the Statute of Anne and 
common-law copyright doctrines in construing the US Copyright 
Act.98 Wheaton v Peters,99  for example, cited British cases for 
both purposes.100 But it did not interpret the IP Clause by refer-
ence to such cases. Dissenting in Wheaton, Justice Smith 
Thompson gave what appears to be the first articulation of the 
IP Clause as comprised of two separate powers.101 
Later IP treatises deepened the Anglocentric account of Amer-
ican IP generally,102 while also exploring key terms used in the IP 
 
were not consistent on this point. Compare Whitney v Emmett, 29 F Cases 1074, 1082 
(CC ED Pa 1831) (Baldwin) (declaring that Congress intended the law “to promote the 
progress of useful arts” by the benefits granted to inventors, not by those benefits accru-
ing to the public after the patent had expired), with Ames v Howard, 1 F Cases 755, 756 
(CCD Mass 1833) (Story) (using the phrase “to promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts”); Blanchard v Sprague, 3 F Cases 648, 650 (CCD Mass 1839) (Story) (same). 
 95 42 US 202 (1843). 
 96 Id at 206. This further distanced analysis of the patent statutes from analysis of 
the IP Clause, as the Clause was simply a broad enabling grant authorizing Congress to 
implement any number of exclusive-rights systems. 
 97 Pennock, 27 US at 12–13. 
 98 See, for example, Ewer v Coxe, 8 F Cases 917, 919 (CC ED Pa 1824); Clayton v 
Stone, 5 F Cases 999, 1001–02 (CC SDNY 1829). 
 99 33 US 591 (1834). 
 100 See id at 596. The original question was whether Wheaton had complied with the 
technical requirements of the federal Copyright Act. See id at 592–93. A secondary ques-
tion was whether, even if he could not claim a federal copyright, he could enforce a com-
mon-law copyright. See id. Thus, the Court needed to address questions of American 
statutory and common-law copyright law. See id at 597–98. 
 101 See id at 684–85 (Thompson dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s power under 
the IP Clause was not unitary just because both science and the useful arts are con-
tained within the same provision, but rather that the “article is to be construed distribu-
tively,” and that this interpretation was borne out when Congress passed separate stat-
utes for useful arts (patents) and science (copyright)). 
 102 See Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright at 4 n 1, 16 n 1 (cited in note 13) 
(citing Grotius and Puffendorf); George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents 
for Useful Inventions in the United States of America xxiii (Little & Brown 1849) (charac-
terizing both English and American patent law as being mutually grounded in “a bar-
gain . . . between the public and the patentee”); Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of 
Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the United States 3–5 (Little & 
Brown 1879) (citing Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, and Titius); Albert H. Walker, Text-
Book of the Patent Laws of the United States of America 100–01 (Strouse 1883) (discuss-
ing the contrasting bases of patent law in the United States and the British common 
law); Henry Childs Merwin, The Patentability of Inventions 4 & n 3 (Little & Brown 
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Clause. For example, the attorney Albert Walker distinguished 
the “useful arts” from both “science” and “fine arts.”103 The term 
“discoveries” was simply synonymous with “inventions.”104 Henry 
Merwin suggested that “discoveries” were either practical appli-
cations of newly discovered scientific principles or “great ad-
vance[s] in the arts.”105 Professor William Robinson used “art” and 
“arts” only for the useful arts (or, as he called them, the “industri-
al” arts), not the “fine” arts.106 Authors varied as to whether the 
Clause was unitary or distributive.107 At the same time, Robinson 
rejected both the IP Clause and the Patent Act108 as the original 
or exclusive sources of patent law, favoring an elaborate “legal 
science” of fundamental axioms, principles, and deducible theo-
rems rooted in the English monopoly-patent/privilege system.109 
Late nineteenth-century cases expanded discussion of the IP 
Clause and generally advanced the Anglocentric narrative. 
 
1883) (discussing the use of the terms “invention” and “discovery” in the IP Clause). See 
also generally William C. Robinson, 1 The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (Little & 
Brown 1890). While George Ticknor Curtis and Eaton Drone cited Continental thinkers 
such as Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, and Titius for property-law theories, they made 
no claim that these writers influenced the Framers. 
 103 In line with centuries of use, Walker used “art” to mean any practical application 
of natural materials or forces for human benefit. See Walker, Textbook of the Patent 
Laws of the United States of America at 2–4 (cited in note 102). 
 104 Id at 2–3. 
 105 Merwin, The Patentability of Inventions at 8 (cited in note 102). Merwin further 
stated, “Sometimes it is said that the difference between discovery and invention is one of 
degree simply; that a discovery is a great advance in the arts, an invention, a slight ad-
vance; and therefore, it is said, the patent for a discovery includes a great deal, but that for 
an invention very little.” Id. The latter seems to echo the Encyclopédie definition (the “most 
important inventions”), even as Merwin seemed unaware of this origin. See id. Ultimately, 
Merwin did not put much stock in the Framers’ choice of words and disregarded the “im-
possible proposition that inventions and discoveries are the same.” Id at 4 n 3. 
 106 See Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions at 43–44 & n 1 (cited in 
note 102). 
 107 Walker was ambiguous on whether the IP Clause preamble was unitary or dis-
tributive. Compare Walker, Text-Book of the Patent Laws of the United States of America 
at 1 (cited in note 102) (“Congress has power to promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts, by securing for limited times to inventors, the exclusive right to their respective 
discoveries.”); id at 184 (citing the IP Clause and stating that its purpose is to “promote 
the progress of science and useful arts”), with id at 52 (“It is the useful arts that Con-
gress is authorized by the Constitution to promote.”). Robinson adopted a unitary ap-
proach. See, for example, Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions at 35 (cited 
in note 102) (“[T]he progress of science and art is promoted by securing to inventors 
these exclusive privileges.”). He also believed Congress’s power under the IP Clause to be 
plenary, in line with McClurg. See id at 70. See also McClurg, 42 US at 206. 
 108 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat 117. 
 109 See Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions at v–vi, 15 n 8 (cited in 
note 102). Robinson believed that the United States should adopt a common-law patent 
regime. See id at 15 n 8. 
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McKeever v United States110 suggested a strong British influence 
on the Framers, even though there were important differences 
between the British and American systems.111 Baker v Selden112 
distinguished between useful arts and sciences: the former are 
methods to be practiced, while the latter are contemplative 
truths about the world.113 The Baker Court also expressly adopt-
ed Thompson’s distributive interpretation of the IP Clause.114 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Sarony115 marked a key transi-
tion point for the terms “author,” “science,” and “arts” in the way 
that both courts and the public used them.116 Finally, United 
States v Perry 117  undertook a much-criticized effort to define  
“fine art.”118 
B. The First Wave: Patent-Practitioner IP Histories and the 
“Standard of Invention” 
What I call the First Wave of IP Clause scholarship ran 
from the late 1910s to the early 1960s. 119  Similar to the  
 
 110 14 Cl Ct 396 (1878). 
 111 See id at 421. For example, in the United States, patents were granted as of 
right, not by the “grace and favor” of the Crown, as in England. Moreover, the United 
States had no “Crown Rights” such as those that allowed the British sovereign to prac-
tice patented inventions without permission from, or payments to, the patent holders. 
See id at 420–21. 
 112 101 US 99 (1879). 
 113 See id at 100–05. The Court also distinguished the useful arts from taste-based 
arts, implicitly referencing the old Aristotelian category of arts of pleasure: “[T]hese ob-
servations [that copyrighted matter cannot preclude practice of the underlying system] 
are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to 
the taste. Of these it may be said, that their form is their essence, and their object, the 
production of pleasure in their contemplation.” Id at 103–04. 
 114 Id at 105–06, quoting Clayton, 5 F Cases at 1003 (Thompson). The Baker Court 
also cited British cases—not as influences on the IP Clause but to craft the standard that 
it sought in the case—which likely further entrenched the Anglocentric narrative. Baker, 
101 US at 106–07.  
 115 111 US 53 (1884). 
 116 Id at 56–58, 60–61. “Art” was used for both mechanical arts and fine arts. See id 
at 60–61. “Author” was used in both its Romantic sense of creative self-expression (“ge-
nius”) and the older Worcester’s sense of “authority.” See id. While the Court recognized 
“authors” and “inventors” as distinct classes under the IP Clause, it frequently used the 
term “invention” in its older, broader sense to mean any creation, including utilitarian 
inventions and fine art. For example, the Burrow-Giles Court referred to authors and 
their “inventions.” Id at 56, 60. 
 117 146 US 71 (1892). 
 118 Id at 74. However, the Court was compelled to do this because, at the time, the 
Copyright Act distinguished between fine art and commercial art for tariff purposes. See 
Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201, 211–13 (1954). 
 119 Two important cases and the 1909 Copyright Act set the stage for the First 
Wave. Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co, 188 US 239 (1903), held that litho-
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nineteenth-century commentary, the First Wave of scholarship 
was written largely by judges and practitioners. Using nine-
teenth-century treatises and cases as starting points, few ques-
tioned the Anglocentric narrative, but these scholars also implic-
itly expanded it to cover the IP Clause. 
The first twenty years of the First Wave established the ma-
jor foundations of the IP Clause literature. Some scholars intro-
duced the argument that constitutional convention delegate 
Charles Pinckney deserved equal credit with Madison for the 
various proposals that led to the IP Clause.120 The balanced-
sentence grammatical justification was introduced for a distrib-
utive interpretation of the Clause.121 “Science” meant “learning 
in general,” while the dual senses of “art” as the mechanical arts 
and the fine arts led to some confusion.122 
 
graphed circus-advertisement posters were works of (fine) art within the subject matter 
of the pre-1909 Copyright Act, even as the Court evinced confusion caused by the chang-
ing sense of “art” and expanded copyrightable subject matter to include the “useful arts.” 
Id at 249–51. Continental Paper Bag Co v Eastern Paper Bag Co, 210 US 405 (1908), 
considered whether the intentional nonuse of a patent promoted the progress of science 
and useful arts. See id at 422–25. The Court seemed undecided as to whether the IP 
Clause preamble was unitary or distributive. Compare id at 422–23 (noting that it exe-
cutes “the purpose of the [IP Clause] to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their respective discover-
ies”) (emphasis added), with id at 423 (stating that “it is urged that non-use of an inven-
tion . . . is not to promote the progress of the useful arts”) (emphasis added); id at 424 
(mentioning “a number of cases which bring out clearly the services rendered by an in-
ventor to the arts and sciences”) (emphasis added). The House report on the 1909 Copy-
right Act treated the IP Clause preamble as unitary—even as the subject matter of copy-
right was much of the fine arts, with no mention of “science”—and thus as limiting 
Congress’s power to enact legislation that promotes both the progress of science and use-
ful arts. See HR Rep No 2222, 60th Cong, 2d Sess 6–7, 14 (1909). The Court used the 
same definitions of “writings” and “authors” as in Burrow-Giles. See id at 2–3.  
 120 See, for example, George Ramsey, Scope of United States Patent Protection, 1 J 
Patent Office Society 373, 375–76 (1919). It is not clear whether Ramsey was familiar 
with Judge Charles Nott’s obscure book from a decade earlier, which alleged a conspira-
cy whereby Madison and his supporters actively suppressed Pinckney’s contribution. See 
Charles C. Nott, The Mystery of the Pinckney Draught 4–5, 12 (Century 1908). See also 
Fenning, 17 Georgetown L J at 112 (cited in note 87) (discussing the relative statutory 
contributions of Pinckney and Madison). 
 121 Richard De Wolf explained it as a form of grammatical parallel construction “so 
much used in the days of the colonial worthies,” which led to the two intertwined 
grants—copyright and patent rights—that we think of today. De Wolf, Outline of Copy-
right Law at 15 (cited in note 83). But he provided no support for his claim of its popular-
ity in colonial times. 
 122 De Wolf described the problem nicely: 
Lawyers, textbook writers and even judges sometimes seem to have the im-
pression that the proposition is the other way about—that science is to be pro-
moted through patent protection and useful arts through copyright. But when 
the Constitution was adopted, the word science did not have the specific meaning 
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But Anglocentrism still dominated. Richard De Wolf intro-
duced the Venetian origins of copyright to the IP Clause litera-
ture but otherwise maintained the Anglocentric narrative.123 P.J. 
Federico acknowledged Continental precedents for patents gen-
erally but focused on the British system as the only formal ante-
cedent for the American system.124 The attorney Frank Prager 
introduced details on Italian and French IP precedents and de-
scribed French philosophe and Encyclopédie editor Denis Dide-
rot as a staunch supporter of publishers’ property rights. 125 
However, Prager still viewed British antecedents as central to 
the American system.126 
In the midcentury, the term “technology” began entering the 
IP Clause literature as courts and commentators grappled with 
the debate over a constitutional “standard of invention” (higher 
than mere novelty) and the changed senses of “art” and “sci-
ence.”127 “Technology” began to be substituted for “art,” both to 
provide a new term for the mechanical (useful) arts, now that 
“art” had become restricted in common use to the fine arts, 
and in order to underscore a growing belief that patent-
eligible inventions should be based on scientific principles or 
 
which it has today—that of natural science. It meant learning in general. And 
on the other hand, the word art was not so closely associated as it now is with the 
fine arts. One occasionally finds references to the useful arts as being within the 
scope of copyright protection on account of their having been mentioned in the 
Constitutional provision referred to. It is doubtful, however, whether the fram-
ers of the Constitution had any such idea. 
Id at 15–16. 
 123 See id at 2 (citing the development of printers’ privileges in Renaissance Venice). 
 124 See P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J Patent Office Society 292, 
295 (1929) (discussing the practice of granting patents in certain Continental countries). 
 125 See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J 
Patent Office Society 711, 733–34, 736 (1944). Reprinting a translation of Diderot’s Let-
ter on the Publishing Trade, Prager praised it as a key turning point in IP history. See id 
at 733, 754. He linked it to the preambles of four of the pre-Constitution state copyright 
acts. See id at 738–39. However, the language in those preambles seemed to flow more di-
rectly from the Encyclopédie entry for “copyright.” See generally Michel-Antoine David, 
Copyright (Droit de copie), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Trans-
lation Project (Michigan, 2010) (IML Donaldson, trans), archived at http://perma.cc/Y7M4 
-FJKZ. Diderot’s success, according to Prager, was establishing IP rights within the other 
Enlightenment human rights necessary for a free and just society. See Prager, 26 J Patent 
Office Society at 732 (opining that Diderot’s famous Great Encyclopedia “takes for granted 
the justice of religious tolerance and speculative freedom[;] [i]t asserts . . . the democratic 
doctrine”). He further cited Quesnay, Turgot, and the Physiocrats as friends of IP because 
they were also attacking mercantilism. See id at 732–33.  
 126 See Prager, 26 J Patent Office Society at 711 (cited in note 125). 
 127 See, for example, Cuno Engineering Corp v Automatic Devices Corp, 314 US 84, 
90–91 (1941) (instituting the “flash of [ ] genius” test).  
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laws.128 An extreme view of the latter was given by Justices Wil-
liam Douglas and Hugo Black in their concurrence in Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co v Supermarket Equipment Corp:129 pa-
tents should be granted only for inventions that “push back the 
frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like” and that make “a 
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge.”130 Many com-
mentators resisted this contention, arguing that, while great in-
ventions applied scientific advances, they did not need to them-
selves represent a major scientific advance.131 
Also during the midcentury, courts continued to grapple with 
the copyright subject matter challenge raised by mass-produced 
 
 128 Prager displayed the perhaps initially unconscious transition from “art” to “tech-
nology” in the patent literature, as he used the terms interchangeably without explicat-
ing either. See, for example, Prager, 26 J Patent Office Society at 713–20 (cited in note 
125) (using “art” for mechanical arts in the first two cited pages but using “technology” in 
the latter two). For more on this transition, see generally O’Connor, 2015 U Ill L Rev 
(cited in note 22). The attorney Karl Lutz then expressly defined “useful arts” as “tech-
nology.” Lutz, 18 Geo Wash L Rev at 54 (cited in note 33). But he did not explain why the 
“useful arts” were simply “technology.” Lutz also cemented the “balanced-sentence” and 
“science . . . [as] learning in general” interpretations in the modern patent literature. Id 
at 51. The attorney Robert Coulter also expounded the useful-arts-as-technological-arts 
position in a three-part article. See Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful 
Arts, Part I, 34 J Patent Office Society 417, 417–18 (1952) (“The technological arts—the 
‘useful’ arts—are clearly distinguishable from the cultural arts and from other disparate 
arts, such as those of business, teaching, politics, etc.”); Robert. I. Coulter, The Field of 
the Statutory Useful Arts, Part II, 34 J Patent Office Society 487, 498 (1952) (stating that 
the “technological arts are the ‘useful arts’”) (emphasis omitted); Robert I. Coulter, The 
Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part III, 34 J Patent Office Society 718, 734 (1952). 
While trying to cabin “science” to copyrights and “useful arts” (“technological arts”) to 
patents, he acknowledged blurred boundaries: books and illustrations could advance the 
useful arts by providing instructive material; similarly, patented inventions could ad-
vance science (even in its narrow sense) by providing instruments for experimentation 
and observation. See id at Part II at 492–94, 498. He also seemed aware of the challeng-
es of copyright promoting “science” when it also covered entertainment and fine arts. See 
id at Part II at 492. Likewise, the modern sense of “art” contained more than the me-
chanical or practical or useful arts. Id at Part I at 417, 428–29; id at Part II at 494,  
498–500. 
 129 340 US 147 (1950). 
 130 Id at 154 (Douglas concurring). Douglas and Black also admonished that the IP 
Clause never sanctioned the patenting of mere “gadgets.” Id at 155 (Douglas concurring). 
The majority did not mention the IP Clause in rejecting the combination patent at issue 
for failing to meet the invention standard. See id at 151–53 (majority). 
 131 See, for example, Lutz, 18 Geo Wash L Rev at 55 (cited in note 33) (arguing that 
this heightened patentability standard would “result[ ] in the rejection of practically every 
patent that has been presented to the court, and, if strictly adhered to, will completely 
emasculate the patent system”); Coulter, 34 J Patent Office Society at Part II at 493 (cit-
ed in note 128); Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J 
Patent Office Society 5, 5 (1966) (arguing that, to “[s]uppress protection of creative ef-
forts, by imposing a high standard few inventions attain . . . [, would lead to] a depriva-
tion of ownership inimical to free individuals working competitively with one another”). 
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decorative objects. Mazer v Stein 132  abandoned the balanced-
sentence interpretation in order to allow such works  
under some penumbral reading of “science and useful arts.”133 
The Court effectively initiated the practice of reading the word 
“useful” out of “useful arts” and then flipping the objects of pa-
tents and copyrights such that “science” went with patents and 
“(useful) arts” went with copyright.134 Douglas and Black dis-
sented on constitutional grounds because these objects did not 
seem to be “writings.”135 
The standard-of-invention question was addressed when 
Congress added § 103 to the Patent Act as part of its major 1952 
revision.136 This revision also replaced “art” with “process” in 
§ 101.137 The House and Senate reports on the bill both expressly 
adopted the balanced-sentence interpretation and understood 
the object of patents as promoting the progress of the useful 
 
 132 347 US 201 (1954). 
 133 Id at 217–19. 
 134 While ostensibly denying the need to review the constitutional power for Con-
gress to create copyright statutes under the IP Clause, the Court gave an extended re-
view of just this kind in a footnote. See id at 206 n 5, 218. 
 135 Echoing their clear disdain for “gadgets” in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 340 
US at 155 (Douglas concurring), Douglas and Black derided the idea of viewing commer-
cial or popular art as “writings” under the IP Clause:  
The Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of [works of art] which 
have been copyrighted—statuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, 
candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper 
shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays. Perhaps these are all “writings” 
in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obviously so. 
Mazer, 347 US at 220–21 (Douglas dissenting). 
 136 35 USC § 103. 
 137 35 USC § 101. The change was curious, though, as it attributed different mean-
ings to “art” in different parts of the statute. As explained in the House and Senate  
reports: 
“Art” in [§ 101] has a different meaning than the words “useful art” in the Con-
stitution, and a different meaning than the use of the word “art” in other places 
in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous 
with process or method. The word “process” has been used to avoid the necessi-
ty of explanation that the word “art” as used in this place means “process or 
method,” and that it does not mean the same thing as the word “art” in other 
places. 
HR Rep No 1923, 82nd Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1952); S Rep No 1979, 82nd Cong, 2d Sess 5 
(1952). This is fine as far as it goes—Congress has the right to be its own lexicographer—
but then what does “useful arts” mean in the Constitution? And what about “art” in dif-
ferent parts of the statute?  
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arts.138 “Science” was learning in general, and its promotion was 
the object of copyrights.139 
Despite enactment of the new § 103, some commentators 
were concerned that courts were still using a heightened stand-
ard of invention. Judge Giles Rich sought to define “science,” 
“discoveries,” and “inventions” to show that “science” was not 
the object of the patent system.140 Oddly, he did not explore the 
term “useful arts” but simply used it as if readers knew what it 
meant. 141  He also adopted the balanced-sentence interpreta-
tion—criticizing those who took the unitary approach—and im-
plicitly accepted the Anglocentric account. 142  The attorney  
Arthur Seidel likewise sought to analyze all IP Clause terms in 
order to argue against a heightened standard of invention.143 
 
 138 HR Rep No 1923 at 4 (cited in note 137); S Rep No 1979 at 3 (cited in note 137). 
 139 See De Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law at 13 (cited in note 84) (“If it can be 
demonstrated that any particular copyright statute does not, in fact, promote the pro-
gress of science . . . such statute is invalid.”). See also id at 15. 
 140 Rich adopted the “learning in general” definition of “science” from Johnson’s Dic-
tionary. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo Wash L Rev 393, 396–97 
(1960). Rich claimed that the natural sciences that we think of as “science” today were 
instead part of natural philosophy at the time of the Framing. See id. “Invention” and 
“discovery” were used interchangeably, Rich claimed (without any support), but he then 
proceeded to read “discovery” out of the Constitution altogether. See id at 403–05. 
 141 Rich used the term “technology” only once in the article, using “art” or “useful 
art” everywhere else. Id at 402. Yet he also used the term “art” in its fine-art sense, 
without appearing to notice its ambiguity. See id at 401. 
 142 Oddly, Rich stated, “If the promotion of both ‘Science and useful Arts’ be ascribed 
as the object of the patent system, then the copyright system would have no stated ob-
ject.” Id at 397. But no one was suggesting that. Rather, under the unitary-preamble 
view, both patents and copyrights had as their object the promotion of science and the 
useful arts. See note 94 and accompanying text. 
 143 See Seidel, 48 J Patent Office Society at 9–17 (cited in note 131). There was also 
a concern that the Supreme Court might hold that the heightened invention standard 
was a constitutional requirement, thus reinstating it in addition to, or in place of, § 103’s 
nonobviousness requirement. See id at 5–8. Seidel adopted the balanced-sentence inter-
pretation but conceived of the preamble as simply the “overall objective” of the power, 
not a limit on that power. See id at 9–10. He did not directly define “useful arts” but ra-
ther juxtaposed Johnson’s Dictionary definitions for “useful” and “art.” See id at 10 n 11. 
This suggested that “useful arts” was not a unitary categorical term but rather a term 
that encompassed any arts that happened to have practical uses. He also subscribed to 
the “learning-in-general” definition of “science.” See id at 11–12. In an interesting twist, 
he used Johnson’s definition of “inventors” as the basis for the novelty-only patentability 
standard that he advocated: “inventors” create something new, but not necessarily some-
thing important or genius. See id at 13–14 & n 17, 16. Inventors can also make “discov-
eries” as a subclass of the new things that they create. See id at 15. But following John-
son’s definition of “discover”—“[t]he act of finding anything hidden” or “[t]he act of 
revealing or disclosing any secret”—Seidel had to engage in some semantic contortions to 
argue that it also meant creating new things. See id at 13, 15 n 19. 
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The Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Graham v John Deere 
Co144 likely explains the downturn in IP Clause scholarship in 
the mid-1960s, which I mark as the end of the First Wave. The 
Court decisively adopted the balanced-sentence structure (with 
“useful arts” as the subject matter of the patent system) and  
declared that § 103’s nonobviousness standard is the constitu-
tional standard of invention.145 This comported with what most 
First Wave scholars had advocated, so there was limited imme-
diate criticism. 146  However, the Court did not define “useful 
arts.” Enshrining Thomas Jefferson, the Court spent more than 
two pages endorsing his ideas—even as it made clear that  
Jefferson had no direct hand in the IP Clause.147 
 
 144 383 US 1 (1966). 
 145 Id at 6, 17–19. The Court salvaged part of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co—even 
as it effectively rejected most of its troubling language—by saying that “it is in this light 
that patent validity ‘requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.’” Id 
at 6, quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 340 US at 154 (Douglas concurring). At the 
same time, the Court asserted that it had never changed the standard of patentability—
explaining Cuno Engineering Corp as a misinterpreted decision. See Graham, 383 US  
at 15–17. 
 146 There were, unsurprisingly, at least a few critiques. See, for example, Note, The 
1966 Patent Cases: Creation of a Constitutional Standard, 54 Georgetown L J 1320, 
1331–33 (1966) (criticizing the Court for using Jefferson’s views on the patent system 
with regard to the IP Clause when Jefferson had no direct role in drafting the IP 
Clause); Albert B. Kimball Jr, Note, An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Assertions Re-
garding a Constitutional Standard of Invention, 1 APLA Q J 204, 206 (1973) (criticizing 
the Court for confusing a “statement of purpose” with a “restraint” in construing the IP 
Clause preamble). Some commentators were generally favorable to Graham. See, for ex-
ample, Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q J 26, 
26, 37–38 (1972) (favoring Graham’s interpretation of § 103 and that case’s assessment 
that the constitutional standard of invention was coextensive with that interpretation); 
Joel Rosenblatt, The Constitutional Standard for “Ordinary Skill in the Art”, 54 J Patent 
Office Society 435, 439 (1972) (mistakenly implying that Graham adopted Douglas’s con-
currence in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co as “the” constitutional standard of inven-
tion). Edward Irons and Mary Helen Sears’s article supporting Graham’s affirmance of a 
constitutional standard of invention represents an indeterminate middle ground: it criti-
cizes the Court’s adoption of the balanced-sentence interpretation and supports Doug-
las’s and others’ high standard of patentability. See Edward S. Irons and Mary Helen 
Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention—The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 
1973 Utah L Rev 653, 656, 678–79. Notably, Irons and Sears refer to traditional mechan-
ical arts from the Middle Ages as “technology,” showing the continuing displacement of 
“arts.” Id at 659–60. 
 147 See Graham, 383 US at 7–11. In fact, the Court unintentionally revealed at least 
one reason why Jefferson’s views should not hold too much weight: He wanted a com-
plete ban on monopolies and continued to push for this when the Bill of Rights was being 
debated in 1788. But his views were rejected by the convention, both in 1787 when the 
body of the Constitution was adopted, and in 1788 when the Bill of Rights was adopted. 
See id at 7–8. This misplaced reliance on Jefferson would prompt a few authors to seek 
to correct the historical record. See generally, for example, Adam Mossoff, Who Cares 
What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in 
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C. The Second Wave: Responses to Legislative Process and 
Cases Leading to the Copyright Act of 1976 
Even as the debates over the standard of invention wound 
down in the aftermath of Graham, Congress was gearing up for 
the first major overhaul of the Copyright Act since 1909. Aca-
demics as well as practitioners were keenly interested, and thus 
what I call the Second Wave of scholarship began among a dif-
ferent set of commentators. Two major IP history books in the 
late 1960s formed the locus of this next wave.148 Both gave high-
ly Anglocentric accounts of IP in America.149 
In the early 1970s, a divided Court in Goldstein v Califor-
nia150 ruled that states had not relinquished all power to grant 
exclusive rights to authors under the Constitution, stating that 
it could ascertain no impediment to concurrent state and federal 
copyrights.151 The Court asserted a unitary reading of the IP 
Clause preamble that underscored the changed popular sense of 
“art” and the reversed roles of “science” and “useful arts.”152 The 
Court also adopted Burrow-Giles’s definitions of “author” and 
“writings.”153 
The Copyright Act of 1976 expressly preempted the field for 
state copyright statutes, effectively mooting Goldstein’s central 
holding.154  Nevertheless, the House and Senate reports noted 
 
Historical Context, 92 Cornell L Rev 953 (2007). See also Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising 
the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional Construction, 2 Harv J L & 
Tech 155, 209–17 (1989). 
 148 See generally Bruce W. Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 
(Public Affairs 1967); Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (cited in note 85). 
Professor Lyman Patterson’s book argued that copyright’s origins as a limited economic 
right for publishers in Britain made it ill-suited as a vehicle for the full range of authors’ 
rights. See Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 8 (cited in note 85). 
 149 See Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law at 56 (cited in note 
148) (“English precedent, far more than that of any other European state, [left] its mark 
upon the law of intellectual property in early America.”); Patterson, Copyright in Histor-
ical Perspective at 180 (cited in note 85) (“[A]ll of the ideas [of American copyright] origi-
nated in the English history of copyright.”). 
 150 412 US 546 (1973). 
 151 Id at 556–67. 
 152 See id at 555 (“The objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 153 See id at 561–62.  
 154 See HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 129–33 (1976). However, the ques-
tion whether the text of § 301 truly did preempt all state common law with regard to lit-
erary, musical, or creative property remains open. See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright § 1.01(B) at 1-9 (Bender 1978) (stating that “it may [ ] be doubted whether 
Congress achieved its professed objectives of using ‘the clearest and most unequivocal 
language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation . . . and to avoid 
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that Congress did not intend for the scope of statutory subject 
matter to be coextensive with the IP Clause’s grant of power.155 
Congress also invoked the IP Clause’s restriction to “limited 
times” to set term limits for even unpublished works, which 
were now brought into the federal copyright system.156 Beyond 
this, neither the Act nor its accompanying House and Senate re-
ports discussed the meaning of the IP Clause to any great  
extent. 
The remaining Second Wave articles exhibited no unifying 
theme, other than possibly the expanding interest in IP. The at-
torney Gary Kauffmann argued for copyright as property in-
stead of monopoly by explaining that the modern sense of the 
public’s primacy in copyright policy is based on five historical 
accidents, including a misreading of the IP Clause.157 Professor 
Robert Hauhart briefly reviewed the historical literature on IP 
to argue for unifying principles for patent and copyright law. 158 
Professor Morgan Sherwood discussed the origins of the Ameri-
can patent system in the context of how well it has served de-
mocracy. 159  Finally, the attorney Donald Banner synthesized 
now-conventional readings of the IP Clause to praise the genius 
of the American patent system that the IP Clause enables. 160  
Rounding out the 1980s, the Supreme Court continued to fo-
cus on copyright, deciding two major cases. In Sony Corp of 
America v Universal City Studios, Inc,161 the Court considered 
the IP Clause in the context of a contributory infringement 
claim based on the sale of home video recorders that facilitated 
 
the development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection’”). 
Similarly, the attempt to expressly preempt indicates that Congress accepted Goldstein’s 
interpretation of the IP Clause on this point. 
 155 This comment was directed at a change in § 4’s text from “all the writings of an 
author” to “original works of authorship.” See HR Rep No 94-1476 at 51 (cited in note 
154). The Senate report is essentially the same. See S Rep No 94-473, 9th Cong, 1st Sess 
116 (1975). 
 156 HR Rep No 94-1476 at 24 (cited in note 154). 
 157 See Gary Kauffmann, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society’s Primacy 
in Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 Colum J L & Arts 381, 386–87 (1986). 
 158 See generally Robert C. Hauhart, The Origin and Development of the British and 
American Patent and Copyright Laws, 5 Whittier L Rev 539 (1983). 
 159 See generally Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American 
Patent System, 71 Am Sci 500 (1983). 
 160 See generally Donald W. Banner, An Unanticipated, Nonobvious, Enabling Por-
tion of the Constitution: The Patent Provision—The Best Mode, 69 J Patent & Trademark 
Office Society 631 (1987). 
 161 464 US 417 (1984). 
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unauthorized recordings of copyrighted broadcasts.162 Limiting 
its interpretation to the IP Clause’s grant of power, the Court 
determined that Congress could create “monopoly privileges”  
only for general public benefit, and not for the private benefit of 
authors or publishers.163 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v Nation 
Enterprises164 acknowledged Sony’s “public purpose” interpreta-
tion of the IP Clause but reemphasized the critical role that the 
“monopoly” grant to authors served in generating the material 
in the first place.165 
D. The Third Wave: Responses to Business-Method Patents, 
the Copyright Term Extension Act, and Beyond 
Important precursors to what I call the Third Wave oc-
curred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While they did not 
form a coherent trend themselves, they each had a strong im-
pact on later scholars and themes. The attorney Kenneth Burch-
fiel published a belated yet scathing critique of the Supreme 
Court’s “revisionist history” that served as the impetus for major 
Third Wave scholar Edward Walterscheid’s work.166  Professor 
Jane Ginsburg raised the possibility of French influence on the 
Framers.167 While not citing the encyclopédistes’ roles in literary-
property debates, she did discuss the marquis de Condorcet’s 
views. 168  Amid growing concerns over the protection of data-
bases, the Supreme Court decided that there is a constitutional 
requirement of originality for copyrightable works under the IP 
 
 162 Id at 417–18. 
 163 Id at 429. 
 164 471 US 539 (1985). 
 165 Id at 546, quoting Sony, 464 US at 429. Notably, the dissent seemed to reveal the 
near invisibility of the qualifier “useful” in the IP Clause by this time. In one place, Jus-
tice William Brennan stated, “[t]he ‘promotion of science and the useful arts,’” while in 
another he said, “[t]o ensure the progress of arts and sciences.” Id at 582, 589 (Brennan 
dissenting). When Brennan actually quoted the IP Clause, he did of course include the 
term “useful,” but when he paraphrased it, he dropped the term. This suggests that 
Brennan effectively read it out of the IP Clause.  
 166 Burchfiel, 2 Harv J L & Tech at 209–17 (cited in note 147). 
 167 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolu-
tionary France and America, 64 Tulane L Rev 991, 1012 (1990). Ginsburg was engaged 
in a comparative study, however, that was not directly aimed at arguing for such an in-
fluence. The main theme of her article is that the conventional views of French copyright 
law (as based on authors’ rights) and Anglo-American copyright law (as focused on utili-
tarian public goods) are not so stark in reality. She shows that the practical focus of both 
early French and American copyright systems was on works of public instruction 
(whether styled as “knowledge” or “science”). See id at 991–96. 
 168 See id at 1013–14. 
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Clause.169 And finally, Professor Margaret Chon gave a postmod-
ernist critique of standard accounts of the IP Clause, advocating 
a public domain–oriented “progress project” on behalf of  
Madison and Jefferson.170 The encyclopédistes get mentioned in a 
footnote that correctly emphasizes their interest in practical arts 
over purely speculative, theoretical knowledge, but Chon makes 
no explicit reference to their possible influence on the Framers.171 
Walterscheid began the Third Wave in earnest during the 
mid-1990s.172 Expanding on Burchfiel’s positions, he was also 
sympathetic to Prager’s quest to open up American IP history 
beyond England. 173  But, aside from a limited exception for 
French patent practice, Walterscheid felt that the British focus 
was proper.174 “Useful arts” were entire industries, not specific 
processes within an industry. 175  “Invention” originally meant 
 
 169 Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340, 347 (1991). 
 170 See Chon, 43 DePaul L Rev at 134–44 (cited in note 38). Arguing that the fine 
arts had effectively been folded into the useful arts (even based on an “applied-science-
or-technology” interpretation), Chon adopted a unitary reading of the IP Clause pream-
ble that sought solely to promote the progress of knowledge. See id at 115 & n 92, citing 
Bleistein, 188 US at 249. She also cited Twentieth Century Music Corp v Aiken, 422 US 
151, 156 (1975), and Feist, 499 US at 346–47, to show that the Supreme Court was by 
then interpreting “science” and “(useful) arts” in their modern, popular senses. See Chon, 
43 DePaul L Rev at 115 n 92 (cited in note 38). 
 171 See Chon, 43 DePaul L Rev at 121 n 113 (cited in note 38), quoting Donald H. 
Meyer, The Democratic Enlightenment 109 (Putnam 1976). 
 172 See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: 
American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (Rothman 1998); Edward C. Wal-
terscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 
Hamline L Rev 81 (1995). 
 173 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent 
Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J Patent & Trademark Office Society 697, 698 n 9 (1994). 
 174 See id at 698 n 9 (“[E]ssentially no other European patent practices or law were 
known to those responsible for creating the first patent law in the United States.”). Wal-
terscheid acknowledged arguments for the Dutch system as a major precursor to the 
British system, as well as a possible influence on the Anglo-American tradition. See, for 
example, Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: 
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J Patent & Trademark Office Society 849, 854 n 15 (1994), citing 
William Searle Holdsworth 4 A History of English Law 345 (Sweet & Maxwell 1936). 
While arguing that the specification requirement came directly from English law, he al-
lowed that French and Dutch specification requirements may have antedated the British 
one. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: 
Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J Patent & Trademark Office Society 771, 777 (1995). He cited 
the faster development of patent case law in Britain as another reason that American 
courts looked to Britain. See Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts at 4–5 
(cited in note 172). 
 175 See Walterscheid, 76 J Patent & Trademark Office Society at Part 1 at 706 & n 
30 (cited in note 173). 
03 O'CONNOR_ART_FINAL (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:16 AM 
764  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:733 
   
“importation” and was used interchangeably with “discovery.”176 
However, by 1615, “discovery” came to mean the modern notion 
of “invention.”177 Awkwardly, Walterscheid claimed that the con-
stitutional convention committee substituted “science” for 
“knowledge” in the IP Clause proposals because the former was 
both “shorter” (and works better with “useful arts”) and more 
“aesthetically pleasing” for the balanced sentence structure.178 
Professor Malla Pollack made a major contribution in arguing 
across numerous articles for a new sense of “progress” and for con-
gressional limits on interpreting “limited times.”179 According to 
Pollack, “progress” meant dissemination or diffusion of knowledge, 
rather than advances or increases in it.180 She also looked at the 
 
 176 See id at Part 2 at 856 & n 25 (cited in note 174). See also Rich, 28 Geo Wash L 
Rev at 403 (cited in note 140). 
 177 See Walterscheid, 76 J Patent & Trademark Office Society at Part 2 at 870 (cited 
in note 174) (noting that “invention” came to mean both “importation” and the “estab-
lishment of a new trade or industry . . . through actual discovery of new technology”). 
This was because “to invent” meant “to originate, to bring into use formally or by author-
ity, to found, establish or appoint.” Id at Part 2 at 870, quoting E. Wyndham Hulme, On 
the History of the Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L Q Rev 
280, 280–81 (1902). Walterscheid also unearthed an intriguing alternate use of “discov-
ery” from the proceedings of the first Congress as “to disclose to another”:  
[I]f an Inventor discovers [i.e., discloses] his Secret to any second Person, it is 
the power of him [i.e., the second person] to prevent a Patent issuing by enter-
ing a Caveat in the Attorney General’s Office, when if two Persons appear to 
have discovered the same thing, it is held not to be new within the meaning of 
the Statute. 
Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty in Historical Perspective (Part 1), 75 J Patent & 
Trademark Office Society 689, 703 n 67 (1993), quoting Senate Report of Mar 29, 1790, 
reprinted in Proceedings in Congress during the Years 1789 and 1790 Relating to the 
First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J Patent Office Society 352, 363 (1940). However, 
he did not suggest this as the meaning of “discover” in the IP Clause. Instead, he assert-
ed that it was part of the old caveat practice, and the quote itself uses the term in two 
different ways.  
 178 See Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts at 50–51 (cited in note 
172). But “science” is only two letters shorter than “knowledge.” And “useful arts” is al-
ready longer than “knowledge.” So the substitution of “science” for “knowledge” actually 
puts the two terms used in the final IP Clause at greater odds with each other. As to 
“aesthetically pleasing,” who knows what to make of that? 
 179 See generally, for example, Pollack, 80 Neb L Rev 754 (cited in note 12); Malla 
Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property 
and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp., 18 Seattle U L Rev 259 (1995). 
 180 See Pollack, 80 Neb L Rev at 758 (cited in note 12). She relied on contemporane-
ous newspapers and dictionaries to support this usage with examples, including “the 
progress of a fire.” Id at 799. 
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“Idea of Progress” literature but somehow missed the Encyclopédie 
as the major intellectual event of the Enlightenment.181 
Professor I. Bernard Cohen offered an alternative reading of 
the IP Clause, in which the Framers authorized Congress to 
promote the progress of “science” as “those theoretical or general 
principles of practice that are associated directly with useful in-
ventions or that lead to economic benefits or financial re-
wards.”182 He was baffled by what copyright has to do with either 
science or the useful arts, which is surprising given the im-
portance of publications in science. Cohen equated “discoveries” 
with patentable inventions, but he cited Chambers’s Encyclope-
dia and Johnson’s Dictionary, not Diderot’s Encyclopédie.183 He 
collapsed “discoveries” into “inventions” based on Latin roots, 
showing that both authors and inventors produce the former, 
but his interpretation left no role for “writings.”184 Disappoint-
ingly, he was skeptical of fixing a meaning of “arts.”185 Yet he did 
a nice job (re)establishing the broader, older senses of “science” 
and “art.”186 He astutely pointed out that the Framers “introduced 
 
 181 See id at 803–09. She cited Turgot and Condorcet but implied that they could not 
have been influences because English translations were not available until 1787. See id 
at 803–05 & n 237. This is irrelevant, however, as Madison, Jefferson, Franklin, and 
others were conversant in French and owned copies of French works. See Spurlin, The 
French Enlightenment in America at 45–48 (cited in note 17). 
 182 I. Bernard Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers 308 (Norton 1995). Note that 
this summary of the IP Clause’s purpose actually appears in Supplement 11 of the book. 
Cohen found two powers in the IP Clause, but they are not the standard ones. Rather, he 
disaggregated the preamble from the rest of the Clause: Congress has the powers (1) to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, and (2) to secure for limited times to au-
thors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See id 
at 241. While intriguing, and later echoed to some degree by Walterscheid, this reading 
makes no sense grammatically, as it ignores the connecting term “by.” 
 183 Id at 306. Cohen claimed that Chambers’s Encyclopedia was “the foremost scien-
tific dictionary in English at the time of the Constitution,” which may be technically 
true, but only based on the qualifier “in English.” Id. It was also a missed opportunity for 
Cohen, as the Encyclopédie entry on “discovery” supports an argument that he made: 
namely, that “discoveries” (really, the principles of practice associated with an invention) 
are a class of particularly important inventions. See text accompanying notes 346–48. 
 184 Inventor is itself a Latin term meaning “one who finds out, a contriver, author, 
discoverer.” The Latin noun inventor is derived from the Latin verb invenio, which 
means, in its strictest sense, “‘I come upon,’ ‘I find,’ ‘I discover.’” Cohen, Science and the 
Founding Fathers at 241 (cited in note 182). 
 185 Id at 306–07. Again, he ignored the dominant French Encyclopédie—with its ex-
tensive, highly influential, and separately published entry on “art”—in favor of Chamber’s 
anemic discussion in the English Encyclopedia: “[A]n ‘art and a science . . . only seem to 
differ as less and more pure.’” Id at 306. 
 186 “Science” could include any systematic treatment of the knowledge or skills re-
lated to a field of human endeavor. “Art” could include the ability to do any task requir-
ing skill and, perhaps, training. 
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‘practical [useful] arts’ rather than simply ‘arts’” so as to stress 
the practical (versus theoretical) nature of what they  
contemplated.187 
In 1998, in State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Finan-
cial Group, Inc,188 the Federal Circuit rejected the claim that 
there is a business-method exception to patent eligibility, 189 elic-
iting strong critiques from the academy. Professor John Thomas 
obliquely referenced the IP Clause by seeking to limit patentable 
subject matter to the “useful arts.”190 Pollack also responded to 
State Street with a multipronged approach against business-
method patents based both on her notion of “progress” as well as 
claims that they were historically disfavored.191 At the same time, 
her definition of “useful arts” was helpful in resurrecting the notion 
of art as skills or rules to manipulate physical materials.192 
That same year, Congress passed the Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act of 1998193 (CTEA), which extended the term of copy-
right by twenty years.194 Public domain advocates decried it as 
the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act” and sought relief under the 
IP Clause.195 CTEA backlash also brought to the fore a simmering 
debate over whether the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 196 
(URAA), which restored copyright protection for certain foreign 
works, was constitutional.197 Both Cardozo Law School and Loyola 
 
 187 Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers at 308 (cited in note 182). 
 188 149 F3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998). 
 189 Id at 1375–76. The business-method exception is the notion that business methods 
are categorically excluded from patentable subject matter. 
 190 See Thomas, 40 BC L Rev at 1142 (cited in note 46) (arguing that “the constitu-
tional directive that patents apply to the ‘useful Arts’ . . . cabin[s] the extent of patenta-
ble subject matter”). But other than equating the “useful arts” with the “technological 
arts,” as others had done, Thomas could not really give a working definition that includ-
ed “technology” and excluded aesthetic creations. See id at 1140 nn 11–12, 1163–75. 
 191 See Pollack, 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J at 66–69 (cited in note 86). In part, 
she argued that the “useful arts” did not include “commerce,” and thus business methods 
were not patent-eligible subject matter. See id at 119. 
 192 See id at 86–87. 
 193 Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827. 
 194 See CTEA § 102, 112 Stat at 2827 (changing the statutory copyright term from 
fifty to seventy years). 
 195 Critics claimed that Congress extended the term in great part due to lobbying by 
the Disney Company, which wanted to protect its foundational Mickey Mouse (Steamboat 
Willie) character, whose copyright term was coming to an end. See, for example, Paul M. 
Schwartz and William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension 
and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 Yale L J 2331, 2333 (2003). 
 196 Pub L No 103-465, 108 Stat 4809 (1994). 
 197 Others countered that the two acts were simply necessary to bring the United 
States into compliance with the Berne Convention. See, for example, Shira Perlmutter, 
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Los Angeles Law School each published a symposium on these 
constitutional questions.198 
In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the CTEA,199 prompting 
another set of scholarly responses.200 Staying within the Anglo-
centric narrative, the Court seemed careful to cite British ante-
cedents only for congressional acts and not for the IP Clause it-
self. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens reversed the 
progress goals, using “promote the useful arts” for copyright, 
 
Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress 
of Science and Useful Art, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 323, 333 & n 33 (2002). 
 198 See generally, for example, Jane C. Ginsburg, et al, The Constitutionality of Cop-
yright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 651 (2000); 
Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Con-
stitution, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 1 (2002). Notably, Professor Lawrence Solum analyzed the 
IP Clause afresh in the Loyola symposium. See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to 
Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 1, 12 & n 59, 37 
& n 112 (2002). Oddly, he seemed unaware of the details of the extensive IP Clause lit-
erature even though he mentioned reviewing it. While not citing Walterscheid, he fol-
lowed the latter by arguing that “progress” applies only to “science.” See id at 11–14. 
Employing what he called a “parallel construction” structure (really just the balanced-
sentence interpretation), Solum posited that “science” is “systematic or grounded 
knowledge of enduring value,” id at 51, while “writings” includes the information-based 
objects covered by the 1790, 1802, and 1831 Acts. See id at 43. Separately, a strand of 
literature developed around whether the IP Clause—and perhaps other parts of the Con-
stitution—were expressly designed as antimonopoly protections. Compare Tyler T. 
Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 
J Copyright Society 675, 694–95 (2002), with Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property 
and Constitutional Norms, 104 Colum L Rev 272, 328–49 (2004). 
 199 Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 221–22 (2003). 
 200 See, for example, Edward C. Walterscheid, Musings on the Copyright Power: A 
Critique of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 Albany L J Sci & Tech 309, 326 (2004) (arguing that 
the IP Clause preamble was both its own grant of power and a device that limited the 
exclusive rights that Congress could grant under the body of the Clause); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44 
IDEA 331, 379 (2004) (same); Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnect-
ing the Modern First Amendment and the Original Progress Clause (a.k.a. Copyright and 
Patent Clause), 45 Jurimetrics J 23, 28–30 (2004) (arguing again that “progress” meant 
only “diffusion” and that the IP Clause must be read in conjunction with the First 
Amendment). Pollack again mentioned the French philosophes Turgot and Condorcet to 
claim that their view of “progress” was in this knowledge-diffusion sense. See id at 30–
31. She then improperly applied this view to Enlightenment thinkers generally. See id at 
29–31. Some commentators supported the Supreme Court’s position. See, for example, 
Schwartz and Treanor, 112 Yale L J at 2414 (cited in note 195) (arguing that Eldred was 
properly decided on a rational-basis review). Schwartz and Treanor provided their own 
historical account of the IP Clause, rejecting the monolithic approach of some commenta-
tors, especially those advancing the antimonopoly argument. See id at 2378 n 271. They 
also underscored the gap between the concerns over copyright in Britain with the very 
different economic environment in America, which they argued likely led to the Framers 
having very different motivations and goals than Parliament. See id at 2332 n 3. 
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while attributing this result to the government as respondent.201 
Justice Breyer, dissenting on the ground that the term exten-
sions were tantamount to creating “perpetual” copyrights, en-
gaged in some dubious historicizing to support what was essen-
tially a policy argument.202 
In the wake of Eldred v Ashcroft,203 IP Clause scholarship 
seemed to give accounts of the Clause independent of any single 
contemporary hot topic. Professor Dotan Oliar has recently pro-
vided persuasive arguments supporting the idea that the IP 
Clause preamble limits the remainder of the Clause.204 But he 
makes the presentist error of relying on a modern definition of 
“discoveries.”205 He accepts a modified version of the “science as 
 
 201 Eldred, 537 US at 228 (Stevens dissenting). However, the government’s brief 
showed no such reversal or confusion. See generally Brief for Respondent, Eldred v  
Ashcroft, Docket No 01-618 (US filed Aug 5, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 
1836720).  
 202 Eldred, 537 US at 243 (Breyer dissenting). For example, he misleadingly juxta-
posed a British citation and the IP Clause’s purpose: “The Clause authorizes a ‘tax on 
readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.’” Id, quoting 56 Parl Deb (3d Ser) 
341, 350 (1841) (Lord Macaulay). But read in the original source, Lord Macaulay’s quote 
concerns British copyright law in 1841, not the American IP Clause. See Copyright Bill, 
56 Parl Deb (3d Ser) 341; A Speech Delivered on Serjeant Talfourd’s Copyright Bill, 56 
Parl Deb (3d Ser) 341, 344–57 (1841) (speech of Lord Macaulay). Breyer appears to have 
been fixated on this quote and its implied perspective on copyright ever since he made it 
the first sentence of his famous 1970 law review article. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy 
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 
84 Harv L Rev 281, 281 (1970). 
 203 537 US 186 (2003). 
 204 See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Georgetown L J 
1771, 1771 (2006) (refuting the widely held belief that the Framers intended the pream-
ble to be nonbinding); Oliar, 57 UCLA L Rev at 445 (cited in note 46). Oddly, Oliar blunt-
ly rejects the balanced-sentence interpretation as “doubtful” and regards the disjunctive-
preamble version of it as “[e]specially indefensible,” all without any compelling new  
evidence against it. Oliar, 94 Georgetown L J at 1823. 
 205 See Oliar, 94 Georgetown L J at 1798 (cited in note 204) (distinguishing “discov-
eries” from “inventions”). Thus, Oliar claims that “discoveries” cannot be synonymous 
with “useful arts,” as Walterscheid asserted. Id at 1809. But Oliar does not link “discov-
eries” to “authors” and “writings” either. So there are no protectable things linked to the 
useful arts, and inventors have no output except for writings and (scientific) discoveries. 
At the same time, he argues that, once the Framers decided not to authorize payments 
from the government (by rejecting the encouragements proposals), “useful arts” became 
something that could have market value to make the exclusive-rights approach work. 
See id at 1777, 1809. This hopelessly mixes up terms in the preamble and the body and, 
at any rate, means that “discoveries” should have appeared nowhere in the IP Clause 
(or, perhaps, should have been placed in the preamble). Further, he implies that the 
terms “science” and “arts” (without the qualifier “useful”) come from Pinckney’s educa-
tion proposal. See id at 1794. But Pinckney’s “arts and sciences” in the education context 
is really not the same as “science and useful arts” as used in the exclusive-rights context 
of the IP Clause. Further, Oliar takes the sometimes-blurred boundaries between “sciences” 
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learning/knowledge” thesis that “lean[s] more towards ‘useful’ 
knowledge and away from more abstract types of knowledge.”206 
Professors Craig Nard and Andrew Morriss consider the IP 
Clause in their historical look at “constitutionalizing patents” as a 
public-choice story.207 But while they canvass a number of Conti-
nental systems for influences, Nard and Morriss unfortunately 
rely on secondary sources that do not evince such connections.208 
Other recent articles do not expressly address the IP 
Clause, but they do show important historical connections be-
tween American and French patent law from the time of the 
Framing through the first American patent and copyright stat-
utes. For example, Professor Mario Biagioli argues that the in-
troduction of a formal enabling specification in American and 
French patent law at around the same time helped citizens of 
each country to reframe their relationship with their govern-
ments.209 Similarly, Professor John Duffy wrote an intriguing 
 
and “art” to claim that “there was no dichotomous distinction between ‘science’ and ‘use-
ful arts’ in 1787, just as there is none today.” Oliar, 57 UCLA L Rev at 466 (cited in note 
204). But this is a common misunderstanding of the reasonably clear historical relationship 
between “science” and “art” that is outlined in Part II of this Article. 
 206 Oliar, 94 Georgetown L J at 1809 (cited in note 204). This leads to another odd 
error. Oliar states that: “The Copyright Act of 1790 . . . listed maps as copyrightable sub-
ject matter, although to the extent that they are factual works they would not be pro-
tected today.” Id at 1809 n 188. This is an incorrect statement of current copyright law. 
But it is driven by Oliar’s other perplexing comment that “useful knowledge at the time 
of the Framing does not seem to have been limited to what is currently engulfed by copy-
rightable expression.” Id at 1809. He gives examples of the term “author” being used for 
“inventor,” but it is unclear how this helps his arguments. See Oliar, 57 UCLA L Rev at 
469 (cited in note 204). Arguably, this actually undercuts his position: if “author” includ-
ed “inventor” (which was in fact a historical use of “author”), then why were both terms 
used? The IP Clause could simply read, “To promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their writings and 
discoveries.” 
 207 Craig Allen Nard and Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Ven-
ice to Philadelphia, 2 Rev L & Econ 223, 312 (2006). Nard and Morriss use the term 
“constitutionalizing patents” to signify codification and bureaucratization of a patent 
system. Id at 224. 
 208 The authors appear to have considered the French, Dutch, German, and even 
later Italian experiences with patents and privileges, but the authors simply dismiss 
these experiences in the secondary sources that they rely on. See id at 260 n 147, citing 
Harold G. Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the Patent 
Monopoly 28 (Toronto 1947), William Hyde Price, The English Patents of Monopoly 4 
(Houghton Mifflin 1906). 
 209 See Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing 
Rights and Authors, 73 Soc Rsrch 1129, 1132 (2006). In essence, Biagioli links a move to 
textual representation of patented inventions in patent disclosure to the move to repre-
sentative government. He also emphasizes the temporary unity of France and America—
and disconnect from Britain—that resulted when France and America radically altered 
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history of the “invention” doctrine that traces part of the 1793 
amendments to the Patent Act to a provision of the French Pa-
tent Act of 1791.210 
A recent book with a promising title presents a confused 
take on the IP Clause.211 Copyright Law and the Progress of Sci-
ence and the Useful Arts uses the IP Clause as a springboard to 
create a socially just cultural-production theory of copyright.212 
But its interpretation of the IP Clause does not actually support 
its themes.213 Ultimately, the book simply does what many mod-
ern courts and commentators do: it ignores the word “useful” in 
order to reverse the original referents of the terms so that the 
preamble simply matches today’s senses of “science and the 
arts.”214 
 
their governments and patent systems. See id at 1137–38. But he does not make the 
connection to the Encyclopédie as a key impetus for codification of the arts and sciences. 
 210 Décret relatif aux brevets à accorder aux auteurs des découvertes (Decree concern-
ing Patents to be Granted to the Authors of Discoveries), in Collection générale des décrets 
rendus par l’Assemblée Nationale (General Collection of Decrees Rendered by the Nation-
al Assembly) 1464 (Baudoin 1791). See also generally John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: 
A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex L Rev 1 (2007). The French provision was an 
exception to patentability for purported inventions that simply changed the form or pro-
portions of an existing machine or manufacture. See id at 36. Duffy notes that, while 
French commentators have long been aware of this American derivation of their law, 
American commentators have “remained oblivious.” Id. 
 211 See generally Alina Ng, Copyright Law and the Progress of Science and the Use-
ful Arts (Elgar 2011). 
 212 See id at 32. 
 213 Starting from the dubious premise that “[t]he terms ‘science’ and ‘the useful arts’ 
in the clause have fairly settled meanings in the literature,” Ng explains that: 
While the colonial usage of the term “useful arts” referred to scientific inven-
tions that were to be protected by patent laws requiring proof of novelty, the 
word “science” was taken to mean an organised system of knowledge that was 
the product of authorship and was to be protected by copyright laws. 
Id at 24–25. To the extent that there is a majority position on these terms in the IP 
Clause literature, it does not match her definitions. “Useful arts” are most commonly 
equated with “technological arts,” not “scientific inventions” (whatever those are). Id at 
25 (introducing the term “scientific inventions”). See also Coulter, 34 J Patent Office So-
ciety at Part II at 498 (cited in note 128) (“The technological arts are the ‘useful arts.’”). 
“Science” is most commonly defined as “learning in general,” not Ng’s narrower author-
ship in “an organised system of knowledge.” Ng, Copyright Law and the Progress of Sci-
ence and the Useful Arts at 25 (cited in note 211). See also De Wolf, An Outline of Copy-
right Law at 15 (cited in note 84) (“[N]atural science [means] learning in general.”). Ng’s 
definition of “science” is better than that of “learning in general,” but it is not the majori-
ty position, let alone the consensus. Both of these terms, then, point away from the aes-
thetic sociocultural productions in the (fine) arts that she sought to advance through 
copyright law.  
 214 See, for example, Ng, Copyright Law and the Progress of Science and the Useful 
Arts at 38 (cited in note 211) (“In general terms, the progress of science and the arts can 
be taken to mean the advancement of culture and society.”) (emphasis added). It is true 
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In 2013, the Supreme Court again rejected an argument for 
a limitation on Congress’s IP Clause power in Golan v Holder.215 
Culminating litigation over the URAA, the Court upheld the Act 
and its restoration of copyright for foreign authors.216 The Court 
implicitly reaffirmed the full balanced-sentence interpretation, 
stating that, “[p]erhaps counter-intuitively for the contemporary 
reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of 
science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful 
arts.”217 Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito dissented on 
the ground that the IP Clause focuses only on incentives to cre-
ate, and the URAA would not lead to the creation of even one 
new work.218 However, they agreed with the majority’s embrace 
of the balanced-sentence interpretation, which aligns copyright 
with “science.”219 
Since 2013, two scholars have offered interesting new inter-
pretations of “science” and “useful arts.” Professor Ned Snow in-
troduces a more historically accurate sense of “science” than the 
modern “knowledge in general” interpretation, but he still views 
the historical evidence through a largely modern perspective on 
“science.”220 In particular, he seems to fall prey to the popular 
misconception that “science” can be defined as any activity that 
follows “the” scientific method (in Snow’s case, this appears to be 
an undefined combination of “reason and experience”).221 Inter-
preting the IP Clause, he also puts too much weight on the  
singular “science”—which he contrasts with the plural “useful 
arts”—to argue that the Framers must have meant “science” as 
 
that Ng sometimes toggles back to “science and useful arts,” but it is contextually clear 
that she still means “science and the arts.” See, for example, id at 55 (arguing that 
“whether [ ] property rights take the form of private or common property is not im-
portant as long as literary and artistic works are produced for society for the purposes of 
advancing science and the useful arts”). This allowed her to construe “progress” as “so-
cial and cultural progress.” Id. But this is likely not the “progress” that the Framers en-
visioned. Instead, Enlightenment “progress” was largely in the sense of objective, often 
quantifiable, progress in a particular field. See Part III. 
 215 132 S Ct 873, 894 (2012) (determining that the matter should be resolved by 
Congress, not the Court). 
 216 Id at 878. 
 217 Id at 888. 
 218 Id at 902–03 (Breyer dissenting). 
 219 See Golan, 132 S Ct at 899 (Breyer dissenting). 
 220 See generally Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 
BYU L Rev 259. 
 221 See id at 278. Modern history and philosophy of science have long since dis-
pensed with any notion of a singular “Scientific Method.” 
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a comprehensive system that includes all branches of learning.222 
While he is careful to make this broader than the modern  
natural or physical sciences—and thus includes the possibility of 
things such as a science of government or of morality223—he 
nonetheless seems to require these to be formal branches of 
study. In the end, he approaches but ultimately misses the more 
straightforward, long-standing meaning of “science” as external, 
systematic study of an activity or phenomenon.224 He also misses 
the fundamental roots of “to know” and “knowledge” as encom-
passing only statements that are certain or objectively true, as 
opposed to statements of mere belief or opinion.225 While Snow 
admirably seeks to inject some much-needed contextual intellec-
tual history into these debates, the only contemporary source 
other than dictionaries that he cites is Ephraim Chambers’s 
English-language Encyclopaedia;226 Snow fails to mention Dide-
rot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, which had eclipsed Cham-
bers’s work by the time of the Framing. Curiously, Snow’s real 
mission is to argue that obscene and other writings that do not 
merit First Amendment protection may not fall within the sub-
ject matter set forth in the IP Clause.227 But his arguments, like 
mine, have much larger implications and challenge all manner 
of creative works as IP Clause “writings.”228 
Professor Emily Michiko Morris does not seek to directly in-
terpret “useful arts” in the IP Clause, but rather she provides an 
interesting angle on the term in the course of defining “technol-
ogy.”229 Although she uncritically accepts the twentieth-century 
 
 222 See id at 296–300. 
 223 See id at 278. 
 224 Snow cites Solum for the idea of science as systematic study but minimizes So-
lum’s contribution because it was focused on a different end point. See Snow, 2013 BYU 
L Rev at 271 n 45 (cited in note 220). 
 225 Snow is in good company, as the many champions of “science” as “knowledge in 
general” implicitly rely on this definition to justify the inclusion of pretty much any ex-
pression as “science” and hence as copyrightable subject matter. See, for example, Oliar, 
94 Georgetown L J at 1809 (cited in note 204). But the classical origins of the term 
“knowledge” are best summarized by the long-standing—yet contested—construct of 
“justified true belief.” See Part III.A. See also Matthias Steup, Epistemology (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Dec 14, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/S4JB-H7E4. 
 226 See Snow, 2013 BYU L Rev at 295 n 132 (cited in note 220). 
 227 See id at 259. 
 228 Snow pushes this theme further in Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: 
Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 UC Davis L 
Rev 1 (2013). 
 229 See generally Emily Michiko Morris, What is “Technology”?, 20 BU J Sci & Tech 
L 24 (2014). 
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convention of equating “useful arts” with “technology” or “tech-
nological arts,” Morris nonetheless implicitly reconnects “tech-
nology” with the older sense of “art” when she defines the former 
as “artifice plus action.”230 The problem with her definition, how-
ever, is that it provides no real boundary between what she 
seeks to capture—the modern popular sense of “technology” as 
engineered gadgets or science-based practical methods or prod-
ucts—and works of modern art that use electronic or other ac-
tive components in such a way that “new operation[s] or activ-
it[ies]” result. 231  Further, Morris’s definition is intentionally 
modern, and she makes no real effort to ground it in history or 
an originalist interpretation of the IP Clause. Instead, she is 
content to assume that “technology” is what the Framers meant 
by “useful arts,” and thus we need only to define “technology” (in 
the present day). 
II.  THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE AS 
THE LEADING INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE LATE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WEST 
This Part232  first briefly overviews the historical develop-
ment of the terms and concepts “science” and “arts.” It then re-
views the origins and scope of the Enlightenment’s “progress 
project.” Finally, it examines the Encyclopédie and its treatment 
of key terms that appear in the IP Clause. 
A. Historical Development of “Science” and “Arts” 
While the roots for “art” are the Latin arti and ars,233 the 
latter were translations of the Greek techné.234 The meaning of 
 
 230 See id at 24. 
 231 See id at 25. For an example of modern art fitting this definition, see James 
Coupe and Juan Pampin, Sanctum (Henry Art Gallery), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
6H9C-DNVW. 
 232 Parts II.A through II.C are summarized from my discussions of “art” and “sci-
ence” elsewhere. See generally O’Connor, Method+ology (cited in note 59). 
 233 Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 155 (Merriam 
2d ed unabridged 1956). 
 234 Cicero is credited with translating techné as ars as part of his quest to introduce 
classic Greek philosophy to his fellow Romans by translating it into Latin. See John 
Dugan, Cicero’s Rhetorical Theory, in Catherine Steel, ed, The Cambridge Companion to 
Cicero 27, 27 (Cambridge 2013) (“Cicero emphasizes in De inventione that he is compos-
ing an ars, meaning both ‘art’ and ‘handbook’, . . . where ars is a Latin calque for the 
Greek techne.”). Techné, in turn, descended from the Indo-European root tek, meaning “to 
fit together the woodwork of . . . a house.” David Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s 
Understanding of Techne 19 (Penn State 1996). 
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techné was established by the time of the pre-Socratics (circa 
500 BCE).235 Each field of techné comprised a determinate area 
of expertise and telos (goal) at which it aimed. Techné was close-
ly associated with man’s control over his environment, playing a 
central role in Greek stories such as Prometheus Bound.236 The 
five criteria required of a techné emphasized its objective, ra-
tional, rule-based orientation: exactitude, control, reliability, 
teachability, and certifiability.237 While artisans were valued for 
their control of natural elements and “practical wisdom” (so-
phos), they were often low in the social order—in many cases 
even slaves.238 
Plato contrasted techné with the fuzzy, intuition-based ac-
tivities that we think of as the fine arts today.239 Such activities 
are the antithesis of techné: the inspired poet succumbs to “di-
vine madness” and “goes out of his mind and his intellect is no 
longer in him” as he channels spirits or muses.240 At the same 
time, Plato occasionally seemed to conflate techné, as practical 
methods or “know-how,” with epistemé, as theoretical knowledge 
about the world or “knowledge that.”241 
Aristotle clarified the telos that a techné must have by dis-
tinguishing those arts for which the means itself is the end (for 
example, flute playing) from “productive” arts in which the 
means produce something else (for example, brickmaking). 242 
Almost anything, including the practice of economics, could be a 
techné. 243  He was less concerned than Plato with the role of  
 
 235 See G.E.R. Lloyd, The Definition, Status and Methods of the Medical  in the 
Fifth and Fourth Centuries, in A.C. Bowen, ed, Science and Philosophy in Classical 
Greece 249, 256 (Garland 1991). 
 236 See Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom at 4 (cited in note 234). 
 237 See id at 5. 
 238 See Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History 
of Aesthetics Part I, 12 J Hist Ideas 496, 502–03 (1951). For example, Plutarch states 
that Archimedes would not write about his significant mechanical inventions because he 
regarded the “work of an engineer and every art that ministers to the needs of life as ig-
noble or vulgar.” Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives 479 (Cambridge 1917) (Bernadotte Perrin, 
trans). Additionally, many textile weavers were slaves. See Wesley Thompson, Weaving: 
A Man’s Work, 75 Classical World 217, 221 & n 13 (1982). 
 239 See Tom Angier, Techné in Aristotle’s Ethics: Crafting the Moral Life 13–19 
(Continuum 2010). 
 240 Id at 16–17. The masterful orator likewise is not a technité: “That’s not a techné 
you’ve mastered—speaking well about Homer; it’s a divine power that moves you.” Id. 
 241 See id at 17–18. 
 242 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics book I.i.1–3 at 3 (Harvard 1926) (H. Rackham, 
trans). 
 243 For example, Aristotle stated that, “as there are many . . . technai[,] . . . their 
ends are also many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, 
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divine madness and more concerned with that of chance.244 Aris-
totle distinguished “practical wisdom” (phrónésis), which was di-
rected to techné and all contingent and changeable things in the 
world, from “theoretical wisdom” (sophia), which was directed to 
epistemé and the strictly necessary and unchanging aspects of 
the world.245 Aristotle believed the contemplative life seeking so-
phia to be the highest calling and accordingly privileged “liberal 
arts” (activities of the mind fit for free [liberalis], high-status 
men) over “mechanical arts” (or “visceral arts”).246 Aristotle also 
developed his doctrine of “habituation” for training ethical indi-
viduals through a “learn by doing” approach by reference to arti-
san apprenticeships.247 
Sometimes, Plato and Aristotle appear to have conflated 
techné and epistemé. But this is because they likely were speak-
ing of two kinds of “knowledge.” Later philosophers would dis-
tinguish these as “knowledge how” or “know-how” (techné) and 
 
that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth.” Angier, Techné in Aristotle’s Ethics at 
37 (cited in note 239). 
 244 It is chance that undermines the claims of medicine as a techné. There are too 
many intervening contingencies to allow the physician to have the kind of determinate 
success in healing that a master carpenter would have in creating furniture. See Angier, 
Techné in Aristotle’s Ethics at 38 (cited in note 239) (“[I]nsofar as techné is genuinely 
present, it . . . exclude[s] chance, along with the unreliability and unpredictability  
associated with the latter.”). Aristotle’s solution was that a field is still a techné so long 
as the application of its systematic, rational rules allows the artisan to “aim at” (stochas-
tiké) the desired result with a greater probability of success than the amateur (who relies 
solely on chance). 
 245 Because only contingent things can be changed, one must know what is contin-
gent and what is necessary. Thus, all should seek sophia so as to avoid vainly trying to 
change the unchangeable. See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics book VI.v.3–4 at 337 (cit-
ed in note 242). In modern times, this is captured in Reinhold Niebuhr’s Serenity Prayer: 
“God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, / Courage to change the 
things I can change, / And the wisdom to know the difference.” Kent S., Darkest before 
the Dawn, 16 Utah Bar J 2d 16, 18 n 4 (2003) (attributing the prayer to Niebuhr but  
noting that Niebuhr may have attributed it to Friedrich Oetinger). 
 246 See Angier, Techné in Aristotle’s Ethics at 66–78 (cited in note 239). While hap-
piness (eudaimonia) results from individuals performing their appointed function (er-
gon), Aristotle may have been speaking only of technités qua technités, not as fully  
flourishing humans. Notwithstanding, this sense of satisfaction in fulfilling one’s func-
tion was given a modern gloss in the concept of “flow.” See generally Mihaly Csikszent-
mihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Harper & Row 1990). The debate 
over the relative values of sophia and phrónésis arguably continues in the tension be-
tween “pure” and “applied” science from the nineteenth century to the present. See Peter 
Dear, What Is the History of Science the History Of? Early Modern Roots of the Ideology 
of Modern Science, 96 Isis 390, 401–02 (2005). 
 247 See Angier, Techné in Aristotle’s Ethics at 106 (cited in note 239) (“[V]irtues we 
get by first exercising them . . . for the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn 
by doing.”). 
03 O'CONNOR_ART_FINAL (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:16 AM 
776  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:733 
   
“knowledge that” (epistemé).248 The distinction is critical for un-
derstanding the difference between “art” and “science” as well as 
for grasping how Francis Bacon and then the encyclopédistes 
sought to distinguish the kind of muscle memory that we can 
develop as we train our bodies to perform tasks from the kind of 
cognitive memory that we develop through purely reflective or 
mental activities. 
The distinction between and interaction of these two things 
may be explained by modern research on the relationship be-
tween “declarative” and “procedural” knowledge in neuroscience 
and experimental psychology. While philosophers have long 
tried to reduce knowledge-how to knowledge-that (and vice ver-
sa), the two may in fact be separate, but interacting, processes. 
Thus, philosopher Marcus Adams persuasively argues that the 
cognitive science functions of declarative knowledge and proce-
dural knowledge map onto knowledge-that and knowledge-how, 
respectively.249 Declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge 
arise in different parts of the brain, come about through differ-
ent processes, and are double dissociated.250 The former consists 
of abstract mental constructs that are plastic, can be generalized 
and combined, and can be conveyed entirely through language. 
The latter consists of “muscle memory” (such as the physical 
ability to ride a bicycle) that is rigid, cannot be generalized, and 
is impossible to convey through language alone—dependent in-
stead on demonstration and practice. Citing research on “repre-
sentational redescription”—which suggests that much declara-
tive knowledge starts as procedural knowledge—Adams argues 
 
 248 See, for example, Gilbert Ryle, Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presiden-
tial Address, 46 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1, 4–5 (1946); Ephraim Glick, 
Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism, 83 Phil & Phenomenological Rsrch 
398, 407–11 (2011). 
 249 See Marcus P. Adams, Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-
How Distinction, 170 Synthese 97, 111–12 (2009). 
 250 See id at 104–05. Declarative knowledge is stored in the hippocampus and relat-
ed structures in the medial temporal lobe. See id at 107. Procedural knowledge is dis-
tributed throughout other parts of the brain. See id. Evidence that these two types of 
knowledge are double dissociated comes from observations that individuals with im-
pairment in one type of knowledge can still fully engage in the other. See id. For exam-
ple, amnesiacs with damage to the hippocampus and related structures (which store de-
clarative knowledge) can still act on and improve their procedural knowledge. See id. 
Likewise, individuals with Parkinson’s or Huntington’s disease have difficulty acquiring 
or performing procedural knowledge, even as they are still fully able to acquire or recall 
declarative knowledge. See id at 108. 
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that the two memory systems work together.251 Rigid, particular 
procedural knowledge can be abstracted into declarative 
knowledge. 
It should be clear that “art” in antiquity bore little resem-
blance to how we use that term today.252 What we consider the 
five fine arts today—music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and ar-
chitecture—were not linked in antiquity.253 Rather, music and 
poetry were part of the liberal arts, while painting, sculpture, 
and architecture constituted the “visual arts” subset of the “me-
chanical arts.”254 Some ancients classified painting and sculpture 
within the “imitative arts” (except architecture).255 But this cate-
gory also contained sophistry, use of the mirror, magic tricks, 
and the imitation of animal voices.256 Parts of poetry, music, and 
dance shared the mysterious inspiration of Muses.257 However, 
much poetry was more closely associated with rhetoric and log-
ic.258 Music theory, in its Pythagorean mathematical aspect, was 
considered epistemé. Aristotle distinguished the “arts of necessi-
ty” and the “arts of pleasure,” but the latter do not map onto the 
modern fine arts.259 Some modern writers have committed the 
presentist error of imposing current definitions of “art” and 
 
 251 See id at 110, citing Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Beyond Modularity: A Develop-
mental Perspective on Cognitive Science 694 (MIT 1992), Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Précis 
of Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science, 17 Behavioral 
& Brain Sci 693, 693 (1994) (describing “representational redescription”). 
 252 Today it means the fine arts, minor or decorative arts, and other forms of crea-
tive expression. 
 253 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 506 (cited in note 238). 
 254 See id at 502, 505.  
 255 See id at 511 n 92. 
 256 See id at 504. 
 257 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 501 (cited in note 238). This included the im-
provisational or purely creative composition functions. “Music” is actually originally de-
rived from the Greek μονσικη and the Muses, and it was originally a much broader term 
encompassing poetry and dance as well. Interestingly, there were no Muses for the visu-
al arts in ancient times. See id at 506. The now-familiar–visual-arts Muses were created 
by the allegorists of the early modern period. See id. 
 258 Id at 508. “Poetry,” as a variant on the Greek poiésis, was not limited to rhyming 
or other verse as it is today. Poiésis was the much broader concept of “producing” any 
entirely new thing in the world, closer to the broad definition of “invention” that includes 
the creation of new devices in language, logic, or mathematics (as well as the creation of 
new machines or objects). See id at 504 (noting that music and dance were treated as 
“parts of poetry” and not as “separate arts”). 
 259 Id at 504, citing Aristotle, Metaphysics, in 8 The Works of Aristotle 981b(17)  
(Oxford 1908) (J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross, trans). 
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“beauty” on ancient writings in order to make it appear that the 
aesthetics-based fine arts concept existed in classical times.260 
“Science” likewise has origins in antiquity. Scientia was the 
nominal form of scire (“to know”). 261  While modern English 
translations of ancient Greek writings often translate epistemé 
to “science,” this can be misleading.262 Scientia is not synony-
mous with the modern sense of “science”; rather, it simply 
meant “knowledge,” as opposed to “belief” or “opinion.” Similar 
to ars, scientia was a Latin translation of a Greek term—in this 
case, epistemé.263 This may be part of the origin of the “learning 
in general” sense of “science” used in some of the IP Clause lit-
erature. However, the use of scientia changed significantly over 
the centuries. 
By late antiquity, the notion of seven definitive liberal arts 
was established, including grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arith-
metic, geometry, astronomy, and music.264 Medicine and archi-
tecture were sometimes mentioned, but they were too close to 
the mechanical arts and were often practiced by slaves or low-
status men. Sometimes the liberal arts were referred to as sci-
ences.265 But this distinction simply signified the role of the field 
as “subject” or “object” for a given purpose. When practiced to 
 
 260 The term “beauty” centered on moral good for the ancients, as in “beautiful hab-
its of the soul and [ ] beautiful cognitions.” Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 499 (cited in 
note 238). Think of terms like “beatify” and “beatific,” related to saintly behavior. See id. 
 261 Scire arose from the much earlier Proto-Indo-European root skei (“to cut, divide, 
or otherwise separate or distinguish”). See The American Heritage Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language, archived at http://perma.cc/3C9S-MXZ4. 
 262 See Stephen F. Brown, Theology and Philosophy, in F.A.C. Mantello and A.G. 
Riggs, eds, Medieval Latin: An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide 267, 280 (Catho-
lic 1996) (referring to “scientia” as “Aristotle’s episteme”). 
 263 See id at 280. Epistemé had a strong version and a weaker version in Greek phi-
losophy. The strong version included only statements that could be demonstrated to be 
necessarily true (such as logical or mathematical propositions deducible from axioms) or 
that were believed to be invariably true (such as “laws of nature”). See Richard Parry, 
Episteme and Techne (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Oct 28, 2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L9C8-NCKB. The weaker version could include contingently true state-
ments based on inductive probabilities. See id. 
 264 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 505 (cited in note 238). Originally preliminary 
studies, the liberal arts became the sole curriculum for monastic and cathedral schools in 
the tumultuous times after the fall of Rome. See id at 507. Capella’s On the Marriage of 
Philology and Mercury became the standard text for teaching the liberal arts through 
the Middle Ages. See William Harris Stahl, 1 Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal 
Arts 22 (Columbia 1971) (referring to Capella’s text as “perhaps the most widely used 
schoolbook of the Middle Ages”). 
 265 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 514 (cited in note 238) (noting that, even in Re-
naissance Italy, “it was still apparent that the liberal arts were primarily sciences or 
teachable knowledge”).  
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achieve practical ends, the liberal arts were a subject and an 
“art.” When contemplated as part of systematic study, the liber-
al arts were an object and a “science.”266 
In the Carolingian period, relative order and stability were 
restored, learning increased, and the liberal arts were split into 
the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic) and the quadrivi-
um (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music).267 The rein-
troduction of Aristotle’s writings from the Islamic world in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries led scholars to revise the liberal 
arts to accommodate both philosophy (logic, ethics, and physics) 
and Aristotle’s divisions of knowledge.268 The new universities 
introduced medicine, jurisprudence, and theology as subjects 
outside the liberal arts. 269  Hugo of St. Victor introduced a 
scheme of seven mechanical arts to correspond to the seven lib-
eral arts.270 These subjects, however, were not taught within the 
universities.271 
Artisans who had traditionally been illiterate began receiv-
ing basic education and could now write descriptive accounts of 
their art.272 For example, the twelfth-century Benedictine monk 
Theophilus gave a comprehensive treatment of the manner of 
preparing materials and working them into various artifacts in 
 
 266 This mapped onto the pre-scientific-revolution sense of science as any kind of 
systematic study of human activity or natural phenomena. See note 277 and accompany-
ing text. 
 267 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 507–10 (cited in note 238); Edward Grant, The 
Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and 
Intellectual Contexts 33–43 (Cambridge 1996). 
 268 See Grant, Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages at 43 (cited in  
note 267). 
 269 See id at 35–37; Hannam, God’s Philosophers at 75 (cited in note 18). In fact, the 
first university, in Bologna, Italy, was exclusively a school of law. See id at 74–75.  
 270 These consisted of lanificium (the working and weaving of wool), armatura (the 
making of arms and armor), navigatio (navigation), agricultura (agriculture), venatio 
(hunting), medicina (medicine), and theatrica (theater or drama). Architecture, sculp-
ture, and painting were listed as subdivisions, or lesser arts (alternately, minor arts), 
within the mechanical art of armatura. See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 520 & nn 126–
29 (cited in note 238). The visual arts remained in the artisans’ guilds. See id at 508. 
Painters were often associated with the druggists who prepared the paints, sculptors 
with goldsmiths, and architects with masons and carpenters. See id at 507–08.  
 271 This is curious, because the origin of the universities was as the universitas (the 
“whole” or “entirety”), denoting the collection of all artisans practicing a certain art or 
trade within a free city. See Grant, Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages at 
34–36 (cited in note 267). 
 272 The rise of the monastic traditions and their emphasis on artisanal activities 
provided another source of literate artisans. See Pamela O. Long, Openness, Secrecy, Au-
thorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge from Antiquity to the Renaissance 
78–88 (Johns Hopkins 2001). 
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On Divers Arts.273 But rather than provide principles that treat-
ed these techniques as techné, he described only their practical 
application.274 His work is translated as referring to these me-
chanical arts as “useful arts.”275 These developments coincided 
with the first “scientific revolution,” in which a kind of observa-
tional “experimentation” on natural phenomena was explored by 
Roger Bacon and others.276 
Throughout the Middle Ages, “art” retained the broad mean-
ing of any human activity.277 But it lost its techné sense and de-
noted any skills or techniques (procedural knowledge) used to 
manipulate mental or physical objects. The term artista 
emerged, but it meant simply the craftsman or the student of 
liberal arts.278 The notion of aesthetics had still not developed; 
beauty continued to be a measure only of moral goodness. 
Also throughout the Middle Ages, “science” effectively re-
verted to its older Proto-Indo-European root’s meaning of “to 
cut/divide/distinguish” (skei).279 It became a general term mean-
ing the knowledge that came from studying, observing, and ana-
lyzing—defined as dividing into constituent parts—a phenome-
non or activity.280 “Science” was a reflective enterprise in which 
the inquirer sought to understand the phenomenon through 
analysis, without seeking to change or manipulate it. One could 
“make a science of” anything, including human activity. 281  
 
 273 See generally Theophilus, On Divers Arts: The Treatise of Theophilus (Chicago 
1963) (John G. Hawthorne and Cyril Stanley Smith, trans). 
 274 Twentieth-century translators and editors of the Treatise interchangeably refer 
to the work as describing “art” and “technology.” See id at xxvii–xxviii. But neither the 
term “technology” nor the concept existed during the period in which Theophilus wrote. 
See Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship at 2 (cited in note 272). 
 275 It is rewarding “to expend your efforts on the practice of divers useful arts.”  
Theophilus, On Divers Arts at 47 (cited in note 273). See also Long, Openness, Secrecy, 
Authorship at 86 (cited in note 272). 
 276 See Hannam, God’s Philosophers at 148–51 (cited in note 18). 
 277 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 508 (cited in note 238). 
 278 See id.  
 279 See note 247. 
 280 See Aristotle, The Great Ethics of Aristotle 119 n 1 (Transaction 2014) (Peter L.P. 
Simpson, trans). This could be a taxonomic enterprise that involved demarcation deci-
sions about what the phenomenon was and how it could be distinguished from other 
phenomena. 
 281 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 508–09 (cited in note 238) (describing Thomas 
Aquinas’s belief that “shoemaking, cooking, and juggling, grammar and arithmetic” are 
no less artes than the visual arts). For example, one could make a science of an art by 
reflectively studying the art and its practice in a manner that generated contemplative 
knowledge (scientia) of the art. This would also lead to a notion of the social sciences as 
reflective, systematic studies of human activity. 
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Scientia relied on the application of one or more Aristotelian 
“phases” of inquiry: resolutive,282 compositive,283 divisional,284 and 
definitional.285 The goal was to bring order to the various bits of 
knowledge and methods known or practiced by those in the field, 
not to inquire deeply into root causes. The result was generally a 
treatise. This was also the origin of the various “-ologies” that 
would emerge.286 
By the Renaissance and early modern period, many arts re-
turned to techné status.287 These periods also produced a new kind 
of “architect-engineer”: the literate ingeniator who used “genius” 
(an increasingly secularized version of divine madness) 288  to  
 
 282 The resolutive phase traces observed phenomena back through their causes to 
the first principles of the subject matter being studied (similar to analysis and a posteri-
ori reasoning). See Sean Martin O’Connor, Regressus and the Scientific Revolution: A 
Defense of Zabarella’s Contribution to Scientific Methodology *4, 9–10 (unpublished MA 
thesis, Arizona State University, 1995) (on file with author). 
 283 The compositive phase begins with first principles and then deduces effects, in-
cluding observed phenomena, from those principles (similar to synthesis and a priori 
reasoning). See id at *9–10, 12. 
 284 The divisional phase uses dichotomous distinctions, such as “living/non-living,” 
to ascertain the status of the object under inquiry. See id at *9. 
 285 The definitional phase explicates the definition of an object in order to get at its 
essential properties. See id. 
 286 An “x-ology” is the objective, contemplative, and systematic study of a phenome-
non or activity. When it studies a human activity, the activity has a different name that 
signifies the practice of the activity or the “art” of doing the activity. For example, “theol-
ogy” is the study of gods, divinity, and religion, while “religion” is the practice of a faith’s 
directives. 
 287 See Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual Property,” and the 
Origin of Patents: Notes toward a Conceptual History, 32 Tech & Culture 846, 870–75 
(1991). For example, Venetian glassmakers possessed multiple types of valuable infor-
mation that contributed to the production of what was considered to be the finest glass 
in Europe. These included: recipes and ingredient lists that could be written down; 
know-how that consisted of processes, observations, and handling of materials that 
might be beyond codification; and plans and know-how for constructing important relat-
ed devices such as furnaces. See id at 872–73. Thus, the master glassmakers possessed 
systematic and rigorous declarative and procedural knowledge that elevated their craft 
to techné art. See id. 
 288 During the secularizing Italian Renaissance, the term “divine madness” lost 
most of its supernatural aspect. Professor Martha Woodmansee makes this point for au-
thors, but not explicitly for inventors. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the 
Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’, 17 Eight-
eenth-Century Stud 425, 426–27 (1984). This legitimized “genius” beyond earlier suspect 
linkages with those possessed by demons or otherwise insane. “Genius” became the mys-
terious—but not necessarily supernatural—font of creative imagination. “Genius” 
seemed to be a native talent, and thus unteachable, which put it at odds with the tradi-
tional model of the techné artisan. Yet its value for innovation in all manner of arts was 
clear. See Long, 32 Tech & Culture at 881–83 (cited in note 287). See also Françoise 
Meltzer, Hot Property: The Stakes and Claims of Literary Originality 12 (Chicago 1994) 
(distinguishing historical understandings of “genius” as attributable to demons, muses, 
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invent and reduce to practice new buildings, machines, and pub-
lic works projects.289 The ingeniator promoted his works through 
writings and direct conversations with powerful patrons.290 But 
even as the techné sense of “art” reemerged, it was modified by 
allowing “irrational” genius into the otherwise-rule-based de-
sign-and-production process.291 
The reintroduction of Plato’s writings to the West in the 
second half of the fifteenth century (and the humanism that fol-
lowed) elevated the visual arts. 292  Platonic mysticism further 
emphasized the role of “genius.”293 Humanism helped secularize 
the role of “genius,” while also promoting a new individualism.294 
Arts in which individual “genius” was expressed gained favor. 
Poetry, long in the shadow of grammar and rhetoric as a liberal 
art, became privileged because of this new perspective.295 By the 
 
and other supernatural forces from the more modern characterization of “genius” as an 
internal capacity to be fostered). 
 289 See Sunny Y. Auyang, Engineering—An Endless Frontier 14–15 (Harvard 2004); 
Long, 32 Tech and Culture at 881–83 (cited in note 287). See also generally Bertrand 
Gille, Engineers of the Renaissance (MIT 1966) (tracing trends in engineering and its ap-
plication from the pre-Renaissance through the end of the Renaissance, particularly 
through the study of Leonardo da Vinci’s contributions to the field). This was a form of 
Aristotelian poiésis that was foreign to the traditional notion of purely rational techné. 
The terms used—ingeniator, ingénieurs, ingegnere, and “genius”—all derived from the 
root geni, which also gives us genie. Plato’s divine madness and the term “inspiration” 
(literally “taking in spirits”) are variants on this. See Lannom Smith, Howells and the 
Battle of Words over “Genius”, 13 Am Literary Realism, 1870–1910 101, 101–03 (1980). 
The ingeniator could be “inspired” with ideas of entirely new things. The term ingenium 
was in use at least since Vitruvius’s De architectura in Ancient Rome and was applied as 
ingeniator to the new architect-engineers as early as the twelfth century. See Auyang, 
Engineering at 14 (identifying Ailnoth, who worked on the Tower of London in the 
twelfth century, as one of the first to be called an ingeniator). Later, in seventeenth-
century France, ingeniator would become ingénieur and signify educated technical offic-
ers. It was ultimately adopted as “engineer” in English. See id at 14–15. The related 
term “engine” originally meant “genius and ingenuity” before becoming confused as the 
name for certain products or processes of ingenuity, such as the external and internal 
combustion “engines.” Id at 14. This is a bit like the term “Frankenstein” becoming used 
for Dr. Frankenstein’s creation during the twentieth century. 
 290 See, for example, Gille, Engineers of the Renaissance at 124–26 (cited in note 
289) (detailing the professional networking activities of Leonardo da Vinci with Duke 
Ludovico Sforza). This powerful patronage permitted Leonardo da Vinci to adopt the ti-
tles of ingeniarius ducalis and Ingegnere Generale. See id at 126. See also Auyang, Engi-
neering at 14 (cited in note 289). 
 291 See Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright at 426–27 (cited in note 288). 
 292 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 510–11 (cited in note 238). While excluding log-
ic, the new “humanities” system added history, Greek, and moral philosophy to the es-
tablished trivium. See id at 510. 
 293 See id at 511. 
 294 See id at 510–11. 
 295 See id at 510. 
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sixteenth century, numerous Italian “academies” had opened 
their doors to the study of contemporary vernacular poetry, 
which had become as prestigious as classical Latin literature.296 
The expressive “genius” in the visual arts of painting, sculpture, 
and architecture distinguished these forms of creation from the 
other mechanical arts. While still not as prestigious as the liber-
al arts, the visual and literary arts occupied a new space be-
tween the liberal and mechanical arts.297 
In the late sixteenth century, the notions of “imitative arts” 
and “arts of pleasure” were revived.298 Music and poetry were 
united as the new art of opera.299 Dance was considered by some 
to be part of music (and hence a liberal art).300 The “amateur 
tradition” expanded the role of the liberal arts from basic educa-
tion to something that developed refined tastes and pursuits for 
courtiers, gentlemen, and princes.301 In turn, “taste” and “senti-
ment” emerged as things not strictly rational, yet not entirely 
arbitrary.302 One could have good or bad taste, and it could be 
improved through training.303 A new class of journalists argued 
for including the visual arts in the liberal arts.304 Giorgio Vasari 
coined the phrase Arti del disegno, likely leading to the term 
“beaux arts.”305 Visual artists left their craft guilds in Italy to 
join new academies of design and drawing.306 
The shifting importance of visual arts and the relatively 
high status of ingeniators fueled the debates over what consti-
tuted “art” versus “science.”307 Heikki Mikkeli has summarized 
 
 296 Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 511 (cited in note 238). 
 297 See id at 513. This new understanding was memorialized in fresco on the Cam-
panile of Florence, where painting, sculpture, and architecture are grouped by them-
selves between representations of liberal arts, on the one hand, and mechanical arts, on 
the other. See id. 
 298 See id at 504. 
 299 See id at 512–13. 
 300 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 511 (cited in note 238). 
 301 Id at 517. 
 302 See id at 496–97 
 303 See, for example, Dabney Townsend, Hume’s Aesthetic Theory 52–57 (Routledge 
2001). 
 304 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 514 (cited in note 238). 
 305 See id. 
 306 See id (observing that the Academy curriculum replaced the guild-workshop tra-
dition with a more systematic, epistemé-based education that included geometry and 
anatomy). 
 307 The perceived prestige of a field was as important as how it was classified, re-
sulting in numerous conflicting classification systems. See id at 519–21 & nn 123–30. A 
fascinating project would be to collect these systems into one resource for reference and 
comparison. Theology was the “Queen of the Sciences,” but natural philosophy was her 
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the typical view of the time, held by Paduan professor Jacopo 
Zabarella (an instructor of Galileo):308 
Science deals with what already exists, but art is concerned 
with creation. The subject-matter of a science is immutable, 
but the subject-matter of an art is the formation of things as 
yet non-existent, but which can be made by man. The con-
templative philosopher is not interested in initiating any-
thing, but rather wants to comprehend and arrange the 
forms of existing, eternal things. Moreover, the ultimate 
purpose of the contemplative sciences is the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake, but in the productive arts the 
end-result is an actual product.309 
Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the basic 
ideas of “art” and “science” were entrenched. “Science” meant 
the “systematic study” of anything.310 “Art” meant the manipula-
tion of changeable aspects of the world.311 Sometimes art pro-
duced something other than itself, such as bricks, boats, or 
buildings; other times its “doing” was the end itself, such as a 
musical or dance performance.312 The belief that a field had to be 
one or the other complicated classification. No one seemed to 
acknowledge that fields could have both art and science compo-
nents. For example, one could “make a science” of mathematics 
by studying it as an object of contemplation, or one could use 
 
handmaiden. Math and other liberal arts were often classified as sciences. The mechani-
cal arts sat at the bottom. See Jetze Touber, Law, Medicine, and Engineering in the Cult 
of the Saints in Counter-reformation Rome: The Hagiographical Works of Antonio Gal-
lonio, 1556–1605 23 (Brill 2014) (Peter Longbottom, trans). Medicine and jurisprudence 
occupied widely varying positions. See George W. McClure, The Culture of Profession in 
Late Renaissance Italy 15–20 (Toronto 2004); Coulter, 34 J Patent Office Society at Part 
III at 734–35 (cited in note 128). 
 308 Some scholars attribute the initial development of the hypothetico-deductive 
“scientific method” to Zabarella. See, for example, O’Connor, Regressus and the Scientific 
Revolution at *10, 15–17 (cited in note 282). 
 309 Heikki Mikkeli, The Foundation of an Autonomous Natural Philosophy: Zabarel-
la on the Classification of Arts and Sciences, in Daniel A. Di Liscia, Eckhard Kessler, and 
Charlotte Methuen, eds, Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The 
Aristotle Commentary Tradition 211, 213 (Ashgate 1997). 
 310 The Greek sense of epistemé as the inquiry into necessary and unchanging truths 
about the cosmos was considered part of natural philosophy (philosophia). See Brown, 
Theology and Philosophy at 279–80 (cited in note 262). 
 311 See id. 
 312 “Art” also included the manipulation of mental concepts, such as numbers, for 
practical ends. See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 504–05 (cited in note 238). 
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mathematics to perform the calculations needed to design and 
build a house.313 
B. Origins and Scope of the Enlightenment “Progress Project” 
In the seventeenth century, “the cultural leadership of Eu-
rope passed from Italy to France.”314 The changes occurring in 
France during this period largely mirrored those of the Italian 
Renaissance.315 The term “beaux arts” came into use, first for the 
visual arts alone, but then for poetry and music as well.316 Still, 
there was no unifying theme for the fine arts, and as such there 
was still no clear sense that they constituted a special group.317 
The rest of the mechanical arts and the sciences were un-
dergoing equally momentous changes. Francis Bacon in Eng-
land, Galileo Galilei in Italy, and René Descartes in France were 
creating the intellectual framework for the “new sciences” that 
revived the rigor of the ancient techné arts.318 While Bacon and 
Galileo clothed their new enterprise in the mantle of natural 
philosophy—likely for the prestige that this brought—they 
sought a new hybrid between arts and sciences.319 Inspired by 
the successes of the ingeniators, the new scientists used innova-
tive instruments—such as the telescope and microscope—to dis-
cover and explain the workings of nature with mathematical 
precision through carefully designed experimental inquiry. 320 
But the new sciences diverged from traditional natural philoso-
phy in that epistemé was not the sole end of their endeavors. Ra-
ther, they sought to create practical-art applications both for the 
betterment of the human condition and, ostensibly, to demon-
strate the correctness of the principles that they discovered.321 
 
 313 Coulter, 34 J Patent Office Society at Part III at 735 (cited in note 128). 
 314 Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 521 (cited in note 238). 
 315 See id. 
 316 Id at 524. 
 317 See id at 526. 
 318 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 516, 520, 525 & n 161 (cited in note 238). Un-
derscoring the robust dialogue and crossover between “science” and “art,” Galileo partic-
ipated in the debates over the nature and relative status of painting and poetry. Id at 
516. Bacon contemplated the role of imagination in poetry. Id at 520. 
 319 See Dear, 96 Isis at 394–95 (cited in note 246) (“Bacon [ ] attempted to represent 
natural philosophy . . . as necessarily having a practical or utilitarian dimension.”). 
 320 See O’Connor, Method+ology at *21–22 (cited in note 58); Yeo, Encyclopaedic Vi-
sions at 146–48, 166 (cited in note 16). For an overview of scientific development in the 
seventeenth century, see Dear, 96 Isis at 393–95 (cited in note 246). 
 321 See Peter Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambi-
tions, 1500–1700 55–60, 66–72 (Princeton 2001); Dear, 96 Isis at 394–96 (cited in note 
246); d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse (cited in note 19). This conflation of contemplation 
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The success of the new sciences led to a critical turning 
point for “art” and “science” in the form of the Querelle des An-
ciens et Modernes.322 Taking place in England and France during 
the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Querelle pitted 
those advocating a new notion of “progress” (in which contempo-
rary Europeans had advanced, and would continue advancing, 
beyond the knowledge and authority of classical antiquity) 
against those arguing that the intellectual and artistic heritage 
of antiquity was still supreme.323 While starting as a literary 
controversy, the Querelle became a “systematic comparison be-
tween the achievements of antiquity and of modern times.”324 
This led to novel systems of classifying knowledge, arts, scienc-
es, and culture that transcended those of medieval academics or 
Italian Renaissance commentators.325 A key insight was that, in 
fields using mathematical calculation and accumulated 
knowledge, the progress of the moderns could be clearly  
demonstrated.326 Fields relying on individual talent, genius, and 
the “taste” or “sentiment” of the critic and the public, by con-
trast, could not be shown to have progressed.327 
A secondary insight arises from the Querelle’s attempted 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative fields. While 
present-day scholars may be tempted to classify “science” as 
quantitative and “art” as qualitative, most disciplines have both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. This was especially true 
for the arts as traditionally understood. Fields in the mechanical 
arts that had quantitative “progress” components also had sig-
nificant qualitative aspects.328 
Following the Querelle, notions of taste, sentiment, and aes-
thetics took center stage in the discourse of educated persons in 
 
and production is the root of the current lack of clarity as to where science ends and 
technology (as the successor to techné arts) begins. 
 322 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 525–26 (cited in note 238). 
 323 See id. 
 324 Id at 525. 
 325 See id. 
 326 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 525 (cited in note 238). In other words, in fields 
in which the artifacts or performances could be measurably shown to be better—that is, 
faster, stronger, and so on—or in which specific problems could be shown to have been 
solved, quantifiable progress could be held to occur. See id. See also Yeo, Encyclopaedic 
Visions at 148 (cited in note 16). 
 327 Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 526–27 (cited in note 238). 
 328 See id at 507–08 (listing seven mechanical arts that demanded both qualitative 
and quantitative skill). 
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London and Paris.329 This led to the creation of aesthetics, value 
theory, and the final separation of the fine arts from the other 
arts and sciences. The first codification of the fine arts as a uni-
fied field developed in the eighteenth century through the work 
of Abbé Charles Batteux.330 But while the Querelle had liberated 
quantitative fields from this requirement of grounding in the 
thinking of the ancients and allowed those fields to “progress,” it 
had not done the same for purely qualitative fields.331 Thus, the 
fine arts, based on taste and sentiment, could not be said to 
“progress.” Some might prefer the work of the ancients; some 
might prefer the work of the moderns. Neither could be proved 
“better,” and thus there could be no arrow of progress.332 
C. The Encyclopédie as a “Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences, 
Arts, and Trades” 
The Enlightenment as the “Age of Reason” emerged from 
humanism, the new sciences, and the Querelle’s notion of pro-
gress. The British may have taken the early lead through the 
writings of Isaac Newton and John Locke, but by the mid-
eighteenth century, the epicenter of the Enlightenment was 
France.333 In particular, the Encyclopédie was “almost synony-
mous with Enlightenment.” 334  Its editors—Diderot and 
d’Alembert—and their contributors created the “most influential 
 
 329 See Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History 
of Aesthetics Part II, 13 J Hist Ideas 17, 17 (1952). 
 330 See id at 21–22. Batteux relied on the poetic theories of Aristotle and Horace to 
update ancient notions of imitative arts and arts of pleasure. Thus, Batteux asserted 
that music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and dance were all arts that attempted to imi-
tate beautiful aspects of nature, with pleasure as their end. See id. By contrast, the me-
chanical arts were practical applications that had function and utility, with the satisfac-
tion of human necessities as their end. Interestingly, he also created a third major 
division of arts that combined pleasure and usefulness as ends, placing eloquence and 
architecture in this category. See id at 21. He also specially mentioned theater as a com-
bination of all the other beaux arts. Batteux’s system was highly influential in France, 
England, Germany, and beyond. See id at 20–21. While it was criticized for its reliance 
on the notion of imitative arts—which really did not seem to capture everything that the 
fine arts cover—this reliance was likely necessary, as it was the only principled means to 
ground the system in the still-authoritative writers of classical antiquity. See id at 21. 
 331 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 525 (cited in note 238). 
 332 See id. 
 333 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 6–7 (cited in note 17). 
 334 See text accompanying note 77. Another commentator notes, “With all its imper-
fections, the Encyclopédie was the greatest achievement of its kind, and the most potent 
influence on the Age of Enlightenment.” Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Phi-
losophy in the Eighteenth Century at 39 (cited in note 17). 
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work published in the eighteenth century,”335 which represented 
an intellectual achievement beyond even the dictionaries of arts 
and sciences that had come into vogue.336 These philosophes cre-
ated an integrated intellectual worldview that became the 
handbook for the Enlightenment.337 While arranged alphabeti-
cally, the Encyclopédie used a clever system of cross-
references—described as a print version of hypertext—that al-
lowed readers to find unexpected linkages among entries. 338 
Many of these linkages suggested provocative views on im-
portant issues of the day.339 With a print distribution of over 
twenty thousand copies, half of which were outside France,340 
the Encyclopédie was not only an intellectual milestone among 
elites, but also a broadly impactful work even to ordinary, lit-
erate, middle-class individuals.341 
In the Preliminary Discourse, which served as an introduc-
tion to the work, d’Alembert set out the ambitious scope of the 
Encyclopédie as a comprehensive system to “set forth . . . the or-
der and connection of the parts of human knowledge.” 342  
 
 335 Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century 
at 38 (cited in note 17). 
 336 See text accompanying notes 67–73. Preceding the Encyclopédie were John Har-
ris’s Lexicon Technicum (1704) and Ephraim Chambers’s Encyclopaedia (1728). The 
French Encyclopédie project expressly started out as an effort to make a French version 
of the Encyclopaedia but quickly outstripped Chambers’s work in scope, ambition, and 
quality of contributors. See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 125 (cited in note 16); Wolf, A 
History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century at 38 (cited in 
note 17). 
 337 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 126–27 (cited in note 16). 
 338 See Christopher Werth, At 300, Encyclopedia Pioneer May Yet Get a Hero’s Buri-
al, Weekend Edition Saturday (NPR, Oct 5, 2013), transcript archived at 
http://perma.cc/W9TS-YPLK. 
 339 See id (quoting Caroline Warman’s account of how the entry for “apricot” leads 
one to an apricot-jam recipe by Diderot himself, then to the entry on sucrerie—which in-
cludes instructions on how to set up a sugar plantation and manage slaves—and then to 
an entry on slavery that contains “the most impassioned diatribe against the use of 
slaves”). Diderot and d’Alembert may have been indebted to Chambers for an earlier 
version of the cross-reference system. See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 126–27 (cited in 
note 16). 
 340 See John Lough, The Encyclopédie 38 (McKay 1989). 
 341 See Werth, At 300, Encyclopedia Pioneer May Yet Get a Hero’s Burial (cited in 
note 338) (citing Professor Andrew Curran, an expert on Diderot at Wesleyan University, 
and Philippe Marcerou, the director of the Sorbonne Library, on the Encyclopédie’s sta-
tus as one of the most widely distributed and influential books of the era). 
 342 D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 4 (cited in note 19) (emphasis added). This 
distinguishes it from modern encyclopedias, which are usually just alphabetical se-
quences of entries on various topics of declarative knowledge. D’Alembert authored the 
first two sections of the Preliminary Discourse; the third section was an updated version 
of Diderot’s Prospectus, used to solicit interest in the project. 
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Accompanying the Encyclopédie was a “Map of the System of 
Human Knowledge” (the “Map”), reproduced below.343  
 
 343 Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Map of the System of Human Knowledge (Systéme 
Figurè des Connoissances Humaines), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collab-
orative Translation Project (Michigan) (Benjamin Heller, trans), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6YBB-B26N. This figure was graciously provided by Benjamin Heller. 
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FIGURE 1.  THE MAP 
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Following Bacon, the Encyclopédie separated all human 
“knowledge” into three major divisions: memory, reason, and 
imagination.344 But the Encyclopédie sought to create “a gram-
mar of the arts” that would effectively convey procedural 
knowledge of the arts as well as codifiable declarative 
knowledge of arts and sciences. It was a “Reasoned Dictionary of 
the Sciences, Arts, and Trades . . . to contain the general princi-
ples that form the basis of each science and each art, liberal or 
mechanical, and the most essential facts that make up the body 
and substance of each.”345  
For d’Alembert, the arts and sciences were connected and 
focused on “discoveries.”346 But this was not just “discovery” in 
the modern sense of “uncovering” something already existing—
for example, “discover a new land” or “discover a law of nature.” 
Instead, “discoveries” were a kind of invention. In particular, 
they were the most important inventions, distinguishable from 
ordinary inventions by being “curious, useful, and difficult to 
find, [ ] which, consequently[,] ha[ve] a certain degree of im-
portance.”347 “Discoveries” could be any newly created physical 
 
 344 D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 50–52 (cited in note 19). However, while 
Bacon put “imagination” as the first type of mental activity that humans undertake, the 
encyclopédistes placed “memory” first. See id at 25 n 34, 50–52. This may be due to their 
Lockean view of human nature as proceeding from direct sense impressions to reflective 
manipulations of the resulting mental ideas. See id at 7–8 nn 10–12. The encyclopédistes 
rejected Descartes’s rationalist account that we begin from innate ideas and move out-
ward to the world. See id. See also id at 79–82.  
 345 Id at 4. By “Reasoned Dictionary,” d’Alembert meant a “[s]ystematic” diction-
ary—that is, one based on a rational system and not simply an alphabetized sequence of 
definitions. Id at 4 n 6. 
 346 Id at 5 (“If one reflects somewhat upon the connection that discoveries have with 
one another, it is readily apparent that the sciences and the arts are mutually support-
ing, and that consequently there is a chain that binds them together.”). 
 347 D’Alembert, Discovery (cited in note 28): 
In general this name [discovery] can be given to everything that is newly found 
in the Arts and the Sciences; however, it is scarcely applied, and ought not to 
be applied, except to that which is not only new, but also curious, useful, and 
difficult to find, and which, consequently has a certain degree of importance. 
The less important discoveries are simply called inventions.  
 D’Alembert distinguished this sense of “discovery” (used as a noun) from what we 
might think of as an early version of our modern sense by providing a separate entry for 
“discover, find” (used as a verb). Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Discover, Find (Decouvrir, 
Trouver), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project 
(Michigan, 2013) (Dena Goodman, trans), archived at http://perma.cc/8VLG-EPYY. I am 
deeply indebted to Professor Dena Goodman, a director of the Translation Project and 
professor at the University of Michigan, for providing me with an advance translation of 
this entry that was not yet available to the public at the time of this writing. 
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artifacts or processes, as well as newly invented mental process-
es or objects such as calculus or a mathematical concept.348 
D’Alembert speculated that “arts”—as the manipulation of 
naturally occurring materials to satisfy human needs or wants—
developed before other kinds of knowledge because such skills 
were necessary for human survival (for example, healing and 
agriculture).349 Equally important was the social capacity of hu-
mans to learn artisanal skills from one another.350 While such 
skills may have originally developed on a trial and error basis, 
over time they became rooted in systems of rigorous and princi-
pled rules—essentially techné.351 
Once humans had mastered their environment enough to al-
low for more leisure time, d’Alembert further hypothesized, they 
could engage in “idle speculations” in order to better understand 
the “less evident properties” of the world around them.352 This 
matured into the broad, early sense of “science” as any activity 
in which “the object of a discipline is only contemplated from dif-
ferent approaches, the technical collection and disposition of ob-
servations relative to that object are called ‘science.’” 353 
 
 348 See Louis de Jaucourt, Invention (Invention), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & 
d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2003) (Nelly S. Hoyt and Thom-
as Cassirer, trans), archived at http://perma.cc/W7RW-U2CR. D’Alembert praised Des-
cartes’s “inventive genius” and referred to Newton as having “invent[ed] calculus,” in the 
same way as d’Alembert referred to the inventions of the wristwatch and the telescope. 
D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 32, 51–52 (cited in note 19) (“Imagination acts no 
less in a geometer who creates than in a poet who invents.”). 
 349 D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 14 (cited in note 19). 
 350 See id:  
[From the beginning, man had to preserve his physical body by] . . . preventing 
the evils that threaten it or . . . remedying those that have attacked it. We try 
to satisfy these needs by two means: by our own discoveries and by the investi-
gations of other men, which our social intercourse puts us in a position to en-
joy. Whence must have come the birth of agriculture and medicine first, and 
then all the most absolutely necessary arts. 
 351 See id at 40–41:  
In general the name Art may be given to any system of knowledge which can 
be reduced to positive and invariable rules independent of caprice or opinion. 
. . . But just as there are rules for the operations of the mind or soul, there are 
also rules for those of the body: that is, for those operations which, applying ex-
clusively to external bodies, can be executed by hand alone. 
 352 Id at 14–15. This is similar to Condorcet’s “first combining” approach to how 
practical or useful arts developed first. Id at 15 n 23, citing Marie Jean-Antoine-Nicolas 
de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the 
Human Mind 15–16 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1955) (June Barraclough, trans). 
 353 D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 4 n 5, 40 (cited in note 19) (noting that sci-
ences are activities “of a purely speculative nature” that “are limited to the examination 
of their object and the contemplation of its properties”). D’Alembert’s sense of “science” 
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D’Alembert also acknowledged a new set of inventions that “de-
rive practical use from the speculative study of their object.”354 
In other words, such inventions (or “discoveries,” if they were 
important enough) applied insights obtained from systematic, 
contemplative study of certain phenomena (“science”) to solve 
practical problems (“art”). This suggests the then-emerging con-
cept of “technology,” but the term “technology” was not yet wide-
ly used, and d’Alembert neither used its French cognate nor fur-
ther explored the concept. 
The arts were not a unitary field, however, and d’Alembert 
classified them into categories, each of which was placed within 
one of the major divisions of human knowledge—memory, rea-
son, and imagination. The mechanical arts minus the emerging 
fine arts became the “useful arts,” classified within memory as 
procedural knowledge handed down from artisan to artisan.355 In 
the Map, the useful arts can be found within the division of 
memory, underneath the subdivision of “Natural History,” in the 
section “Uses of Nature.” The new class of fine arts was placed 
under imagination—the reflective capacity by which existing 
ideas are combined into new ones.356 The arts of “thinking,” “re-
membering,” and “communicating” were classified within the di-
vision of reason, under the “Science of Man” subdivision in  
the Map. 
 
conforms to the broader sense that originated in late antiquity. See text accompanying 
note 353. An artisan could “make a science” of his or her art by stepping outside its prac-
tice to contemplate it as object rather than as subject. D’Alembert arguably anticipated 
Auguste Comte’s assertion that every science is born from an art. See D’Alembert, Pre-
liminary Discourse at 8 n 23 (cited in note 19). For more on Comte’s views in this regard, 
see L. Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte 62 (G.P. Putnam 1903) (Kathleen de 
Beaumont-Klein, trans). Like earlier thinkers, d’Alembert was confounded by disciplines 
that seemed to be both an “art” and a “science.” He suggested that these disciplines could 
be “simultaneously” an “art” and a “science,” even though it would be more precise to 
identify different aspects of a field as “art” or “science.” D’Alembert, Preliminary Dis-
course at 40 & n 49 (cited in note 19) (“[We could say] that several of our sciences are 
arts when they are viewed from their practical side.”). Thus, the use of logic in reasoning 
is logic as art; the study of logic as an object is logic as science. See id at 19. But it would 
be a mistake to equate “art” with “practice,” and “science” with “theory.” There are theo-
retical and practical elements of each “art” and each “science.” Peter Dear explicates this 
nicely when discussing the theorica and practica of any given field. Theorica was the ap-
paratus of a field—such as tools and methods—and the study of them; practica was the ac-
tual use of these tools to achieve a specific goal. See Dear, 96 Isis at 393 (cited in note 246). 
 354 D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 40 (cited in note 19). 
 355 See id at 50–52. 
 356 See id at 37 (claiming that imagination “consists of the ideas which we create for 
ourselves by imagining and putting together beings similar to those which are the object 
of our direct ideas”). 
03 O'CONNOR_ART_FINAL (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:16 AM 
2015] The Overlooked French Influence on the IP Clause 795 
 
“Genius” was a key part of imagination for the philosophes, 
and it signified a capacity to respond immediately and intuitive-
ly to one’s environment.357 The “genius” was a deeply sensitive 
individual inclined to flights of fancy that generated more sub-
lime truths than those produced by careful, rational thinkers 
(albeit with many more errors). In this way, the modern popular 
sense of “genius” as someone of high intelligence is tangential, 
at best, to the philosophes’ usage. While the Enlightenment is 
sometimes referred to as the “age of reason,” it would be a mis-
take to infer that imagination and intuition were disfavored. 
Like the philosophes’ reverence for uncodifiable artisanal skill, 
their respect for the irrational “genius” was obvious in their 
writings. 358  Each aptitude had its place in a well-functioning  
society.359 
This sense of “genius” may have led to the later Romantic 
notion of the author as a passionate seer guided by inspiration 
and intuition to find greater truths than is possible through in-
cremental, rational analysis.360 The “genius” artist must also pos-
sess skills allowing implementation of his or her vision, and these 
were a teachable part of the overall art. But “genius” was not 
teachable, and thus it was at odds with the traditional techné 
 
 357 See Jean-François de Saint-Lambert, Genius (Génie), The Encyclopedia of Dide-
rot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2007) (John S.D. Glaus, 
trans), archived at http://perma.cc/5LDP-D89N. D’Alembert occasionally used an older 
sense of “genius” in his entries that signified an “excellent quality” as well as a sense 
that “genius” is a “feeling that creates.” D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 31 n 39 
(cited in note 19). 
 358 See, for example, de Saint-Lambert, Genius (cited in note 357) (“There are few 
errors in Locke and too few truths in Shaftsbury; the former however has nothing but 
expansive intellect, penetrating and correct; but the latter is a genius of the first order. 
Locke has seen; Shaftsbury has created, constructed, strengthened.”). 
 359 For example, the “genius” was great at pioneering bold new ideas and acting on 
the fly but was accordingly prone to error and poor at managing projects already under-
way, especially those with many detailed moving parts. “Men of genius . . . [are] better 
made to overthrow and establish states and to maintain or re-establish order than to fol-
low it.” Id. In this way, “geniuses” resemble the modern notion of the entrepreneur. They 
were also better suited for philosophy and the fine arts than for government, as errors in 
the latter could directly harm others. See id. 
 360 This is likely no accident, because Rousseau was originally a contributor to the 
Encyclopédie before breaking off from the philosophes due to ideological disagreement 
over this very point. See d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 103 n 61 (cited in note 19). 
See also Robert Nisbet, Genius, 6 Wilson Q 98, 98–99 (1982) (noting that the German 
Romantics were involved, along with the French philosophes, in transforming the mean-
ing of “genius” from “special talent” to “a person of greatness who achieves solely 
through the ‘genius’ that is endowed in him by God or by nature”). 
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sense of art.361 The Romantic prioritization of “genius” in the fine 
arts, however, may have led to the modern sense that such arts 
are unteachable and purely intuitive. 
Similarly, works of fine art were assessed qualitatively 
through taste, sentiment, and the emerging field of aesthetics, 
and thus the philosophes could not place them into a “progress” 
narrative.362 Epitomized by the fashion saying “hemlines go up; 
hemlines go down,” there was no arrow of progress for taste-
based fields. Or, as economists often say: there is no accounting 
for taste—it is simply an inherent starting point for personal 
preferences. This taste-or-sentiment basis for the fine arts 
seemed to lead d’Alembert to avoid merging them into the liber-
al arts, the other established category of arts distinguished from 
the mechanical arts. For d’Alembert, the liberal arts were as 
rule based and practical for mental operations (such as logic and 
mathematics) as the mechanical arts were for physical opera-
tions. The fine arts thus needed their own category—they were 
for pleasure only and centered on “genius” and taste. 
Diderot matched and extended d’Alembert’s views on the 
arts, especially the useful arts. Diderot’s entry on “art” was con-
sidered so important that it was also published in a separate 
monograph. At the same time, the fine arts were not even ad-
dressed in the original entry, but a paragraph was appended in 
the second edition to briefly overview them. Diderot also discussed 
 
 361 The eighteenth-century poet Edward Young summarized this contrast: “[A]n 
original may be said to be of a vegetable nature, it rises spontaneously from the vital 
root of genius; it grows, it is not made: imitations are often a sort of manufacture 
wrought up by those mechanics, art and labour, out of pre-existent materials not their 
own.” Edward Young, Conjecture on Original Composition, in The Complete Works,  
Poetry and Prose, of the Rev. Edward Young 549, 552 (Tegg 1854). 
 362 D’Alembert follows J.P. de Crousaz, who is considered to have written the first 
French treatise on aesthetics, Beauty, in 1714. See Kristeller, 13 J Hist Ideas at 17 (cited 
in note 329). Professor Barton Beebe has argued for a notion of “aesthetic progress” in 
the eighteenth century that influenced the Framers as well as early statutes and case 
law. Barton Beebe, Design Protection and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress in Intellectu-
al Property Law (unpublished presentation, IPR University Center, Helsinki, Finland, 
May 23, 2013) (on file with author). I disagree. While the Encyclopédie entry on “taste,” 
for example, argues that taste can be refined in persons, this is a matter of established 
“high” versus “low” taste, not a matter of limitless measurable potential in the way that 
“progress” in quantifiable fields was described. See Jean le Rond d’Alembert, et al, Taste 
(Goût), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project 
(Michigan, 2003) (Nelly S. Hoyt and Thomas Cassirer, trans), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JHP4-PLSU. 
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the useful arts at length in his section of the Prospectus.363 While 
some artisans were mere craftsmen who did not understand why 
their craft worked, others were masters who knew both the 
principles and practice of their art.364 Diderot criticized earlier 
authors for not actually observing or experiencing artisanal 
practices; by contrast, he and other Encyclopédie authors not on-
ly visited the shops but also tried the various arts and crafts 
with their own hands.365 He also explored the shorthand lan-
guage that experienced artisans used to communicate with one 
another, but it is important to understand that such shorthand 
codified tacit knowledge, or “know-how,” in that it did not enable 
those completely unskilled in the art to understand or learn the 
described technique.366 
Diderot’s “art” also mapped onto the traditional notion of 
techné.367 He distinguished “art” from “science” by asking whether 
there was a subject of action or an object of contemplation.368 A 
useful art was that which transformed a natural material by hand 
or by machine into something satisfying a practical human 
need.369 For each art to be covered by an entry in the Encyclopédie, 
 
 363 The Prospectus reviewed here is the amended version appearing as Part III of 
the Preliminary Discourse. See generally Denis Diderot, Prospectus, in d’Alembert, Pre-
liminary Discourse at 106 (cited in note 19). 
 364 See id at 106, 122–23. This distinction echoed Aristotle’s separation of chiero-
technité from technité. See Angier, Techné in Aristotle’s Ethics at 38 (cited in note 239). 
Further, Diderot was the son of an artisan and was fascinated with craft operations. See 
id at 123 n 26. An unattributed Encyclopédie entry on “craft” likewise seeks to dignify 
the craftsman above the lowly position that society had placed him in. See Craft 
[abridged] (Metier [abridged]), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative 
Translation Project (Michigan, 2009) (Stephen J. Gendzier, trans), archived at 
http://perma.cc/22PG-W4KS. 
 365 Diderot particularly criticized Ephraim Chambers and the English Encyclopedia. 
See Diderot, Prospectus at 109–12 (cited in note 364); Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 126–
27 (cited in note 16). 
 366 See Diderot, Prospectus at 123–24 (cited in note 19).  
 367 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23) (noting that “art” is the name given to the 
“center or focal point to which [people] linked the observations they had made, in order 
to create a system of instruments, or of rules which were all directed toward the same 
object”). The entry was classified as “Applied Natural History,” linking it to the useful-
arts section of the Map. 
 368 Id (“If the object leads to action, we give the name of ‘art’ to the compendium of 
the rules governing its use and to their technical order. If the object is merely contem-
plated under different aspects, the compendium and technical order of the observations 
concerning this object are called ‘science.’”). This also maps onto Dear’s exposition of 
both arts and sciences as having theorica and practica components. See Dear, 96 Isis at 
393 (cited in note 246). 
 369 See Diderot, Prospectus at 124 (cited in note 364). This suggests an early root for 
the “machine or transformation” test that the Federal Circuit relied on in In re Bilski, 
545 F3d 943, 961 (Fed Cir 2008). While the Supreme Court rejected this test as the sole 
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the author would document in text and illustrations: (1) the de-
tails of the material to be worked and the processes to transform 
it; (2) the principal things to be made from it, and the manner of 
making them; (3) the details of the tools and machines used; (4) 
the steps of workmanship; and (5) the terms of the art.370 While 
Diderot’s discussion and the various entries seem to focus on the 
manipulation of natural materials, his favorable reference to 
Captain Thomas Savery’s patented steam engine as an “art” 
(without tying it to the manipulation of natural materials) sug-
gests that Diderot also viewed manipulations of natural forces 
as “arts.”371 
Unlike d’Alembert’s apparent view that each activity must 
be either “art” or “science,” Diderot articulated the subtlety that 
each art included theorica and practica elements.372 The former 
elements are the contemplative set of principles for the field, 
while the latter are the application of those principles by the ar-
tisan in the practice of his or her craft.373 Both must interact for 
progress to occur in an art.374 
Like d’Alembert, Diderot elevated the useful arts by calling 
for a new kind of artisan-scientist who could use scientific in-
sights to develop entirely new arts, rather than just incremental 
 
test for patent eligibility, Bilski v Kappos, 561 US 593, 602–05 (2010), the test captured 
a long-standing attribute of useful arts (and hence patent-eligible inventions). 
 370 See Diderot, Prospectus at 124 (cited in note 364). 
 371 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23) (referring to the steam engine as “raising wa-
ter by fire”). Savery developed a steam pump that could raise water vertically. It had no 
pistons and could move only the water that it was connected to. But Savery was able to 
obtain a fourteen-year British patent on it in 1698, which was extended for twenty-one 
additional years under Parliament’s Fire Engine Act in 1699. See generally Captain 
Thomas Savery, The Miner’s Friend; Or, an Engine to Raise Water by Fire, Described 
(Clowes 1702). See also An Act for the Encouragement of a New Invention by Thomas 
Savery, for Raising Water, and Occasioning Motion to All Sorts of Mill-Work, by the Im-
pellent Force of Fire, 10 & 11 Will 3, ch 31 (1698). 
 372 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23) (“[I]t is evident that every art has its specula-
tive and its practical aspect: the former consists in knowing the principles of an art, 
without their being applied, the latter in their habitual and unthinking application.”). 
See also Denis Diderot, Encyclopedia (Encyclopédie), The Encyclopedia of Diderot & 
d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2002) (Philip Stewart, trans), 
archived at http://perma.cc/SBJ3-ZN8L (“[E]ach art has its metaphysics. This aspect is 
always abstract, lofty, and difficult.”). 
 373 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23) (“In every art there are many particulars con-
cerning its material, its instruments, and its application which can only be learned 
through practice.”). 
 374 See id (“It is difficult if not impossible to go far in the practice of an art without 
speculation, and, conversely, to have a thorough knowledge of the speculative aspects of 
an art without being versed in its practice.”). 
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improvements in existing ones.375 In some ways, this was just an 
update of the Renaissance ingeniator. But one can also perceive 
an anticipation of the nineteenth-century conceptualization of 
“technology” in the work of both Diderot and d’Alembert. 
Notwithstanding the encyclopédistes’ primary interest in the 
useful and liberal arts, they also ushered in the modern fine arts 
system by amending Batteux’s system to replace dance with ar-
chitecture and by moving the conceptual framework away from 
the troubled imitative arts to the emerging fields of aesthetics 
and value theory.376 This group—painting, architecture, sculp-
ture, music, and poetry—has constituted the core of the fine arts 
ever since. 377  Professor Paul Kristeller argues that the ency-
clopédistes solidified the modern system of the arts because they 
identified this group as those arts that are informed mainly by 
“genius,” “taste,” and “sentiment,” rather than by the five 
measures of the traditional techné arts (teachability, certifiabil-
ity, exactitude, control, and reliability). 378  In the eighteenth  
 
 375 See id (explaining how those familiar with wheels, pulleys, levers, counter-
weights, and so forth could scarcely predict or comprehend the destructive potential of 
gunpowder, because its effects were not incremental to catapults and the like, but orders 
of magnitude greater). He admonished “learned men” to not so quickly dismiss bold new 
experimental avenues just because the earliest demonstrations were less than impres-
sive. For example, the essayist Michel de Montaigne prematurely wrote off firearms be-
cause the early incarnations were so ineffective. See Michel de Montaigne, On War Hors-
es, in Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays 314, 325 (Penguin 2003) (M.A. Screech, 
trans). 
 376 See Kristeller, 13 J Hist Ideas at 22–23 (cited in note 329). The Encyclopédie en-
try on “taste,” for example, seems to take the notion of the fine arts for granted, while 
the entry on “beautiful” discusses the fine arts and explicitly references Batteux. The 
entry on “taste” consists of three separate parts written by three different authors: Vol-
taire, Montesquieu, and Diderot. See generally d’Alembert, et al, Taste (cited in note 
362). In the entry on “beautiful,” Diderot criticizes Batteux for failing to define “beautiful 
nature” clearly and explicitly enough. Denis Diderot, Beautiful (Beau), The Encyclopedia 
of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 2006) (Philippe 
Bonin, trans), archived at http://perma.cc/6NWQ-LEZE. At the same time, there is a dis-
crepancy between d’Alembert’s listing of the fine arts (the modern five) and those listed 
on the Map. See Figure 1. The latter adds engraving and elevates poetry to the overarching 
subdivision of imagination, within which all the other fine arts are subordinated.  
See Figure 1. 
 377 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 497 (cited in note 238). 
 378 For a historical overview of how this system formed, see Kristeller, 13 J Hist 
Ideas at 17–23 (cited in note 329); Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 496–98 (cited in note 
238). D’Alembert, for example, described eloquence as an art governed by taste or senti-
ment—which cannot be taught—rather than skill or art. See D’Alembert, Preliminary 
Discourse at 33–34 (cited in note 19). Thus, eloquent speakers are born, not made, and 
those who aspire to eloquence can only emulate those who have it. 
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century, the term “aesthetics” would come into currency as the 
name for this essential attribute of the fine arts.379 
The Encyclopédie was also “the greatest publishing venture” 
of the eighteenth century and an ambitious undertaking in the 
relatively new world of print capitalism.380 The sheer number of 
volumes and the costly illustration plates required significant 
financing to produce.381 Partly because it was a work that would 
be produced over time, the publishers initiated a subscription 
system for its volumes as they were released. This was also de-
signed to create a sense of community among subscribers in the 
emerging “Republic of Letters.” 382  Reportedly, the publishers 
made substantial profits despite initial censorship and the other 
challenges of publication and distribution.383 
 Likely in tandem with the rise of readership, as relative 
prosperity, urbanity, and education became common among the 
cosmopolitan middle class, the debates over literary property 
heated up. Diderot was an active participant in these debates. In 
his Letter on the Book Trade, he succinctly set out a natural-
rights position for literary property that predates and sounds 
suspiciously like the preambles to some of the American state 
copyright statutes and constitutions: 
Indeed, what can a man possess, if a product of the mind, 
the unique fruit of his education, his study, his efforts, his 
time, his research, his observation; if the finest hours, the 
finest moments of his life; if his own thoughts, the feelings 
of his heart, the most precious part of himself, that part 
which does not perish, that which immortalises him, cannot 
be said to belong to him? What comparison can there be be-
tween a man, the very substance of a man, his soul, and a 
field, a meadow, a tree or a vine which, at the beginning of 
time, nature offered equally to all men, and which the indi-
vidual claimed for himself only by cultivation, the first legit-
imate means of possession? Who has more right than the 
author to use his goods by giving or selling them? . . . . 
 
 379 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 496–97 (cited in note 238). 
 380 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 20–21 (cited in note 16); Spurlin, The French 
Enlightenment in America at 116–18 (cited in note 17). 
 381 See John Lough, The Encyclopédie 34 (McKay 1989). 
 382 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 46–58 (cited in note 17). 
 383 See Robert Darnton, The Encyclopédie Wars of Prerevolutionary France, 78 Am 
Hist Rev 1331, 1332 (1973).  
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 [T]he author is the master of his work, or nobody in soci-
ety is the master of his possessions.384 
Similarly, Michel-Antoine David’s Encyclopédie entry on “copy-
right” gives a natural-rights argument for copyright and literary 
property: “If there is on earth any state of freedom it is assured-
ly that of men of letters: if Nature contains anything whose 
ownership cannot be disputed with those who possess it, it must 
be these products of the mind.”385 
This also sounds suspiciously like Lockean labor theory. In 
fact, Locke may have advocated for literary property outside his 
major writings.386 In any event, even if an eighteenth-century 
American knew only of Locke’s physical-property labor theory, 
and not of his comments arguably advocating literary property, 
there was no necessary inference from Locke’s actual theory to a 
labor theory of intangibles such as literature. By contrast, Dide-
rot’s Letter on the Book Trade and David’s “copyright” entry explic-
itly tied Locke’s labor theory for tangibles to intangible writings. 
An open question, however, is what Diderot and the ency-
clopédistes thought about patents and other exclusive rights for 
inventors in the mechanical arts. While the encyclopédistes 
seemed to suggest that sovereigns should grant some sort of pay 
or exclusive rights to inventors of valuable discoveries,387 the en-
cyclopédistes also seemed to indicate that honor and attribu-
tion—formal or informal—could be sufficient. 388  At the same 
 
 384 Frédéric Rideau, Commentary on Diderot’s Letter on the Book Trade (1763) (Copy-
right History, 2008) (L. Bently and M. Kretschmer, eds), archived at http://perma.cc/97FD 
-QWCD. 
 385 David, Copyright (cited in note 125). David was equally concerned with publish-
ers’ rights, so he also gave a labor-theory account of those rights:  
[The printing privilege granted by the sovereign] is no doubt an act of grace 
from the prince but it changes nothing about the nature of ownership: on the 
contrary it is founded on the justice of putting the . . . proprietor in a position 
to reap the fruits of his labour and his outlay. 
Id. 
 386 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L J 
287, 300–02 (1988). 
 387 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23) (“The liberal arts must free the mechanical 
arts from the degradation in which these have so long been held by prejudice, while royal 
protection must save them from the indigent state in which they still languish.”) (empha-
sis added). 
 388 See d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 101–02 (cited in note 19): 
Witness England, a country to which the sciences owe so much, although their 
government does nothing for them. It is true that the English nation is not ne-
glectful of the sciences, that it even respects them, and this kind of reward, su-
perior to all others, is doubtless the surest means of making the sciences and 
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time, Diderot had harsh words for those artisan-inventors who 
would keep their discoveries secret.389 Diderot was clearly fo-
cused on secrecy, so one might infer that he would find the “open-
letters” disclosure system of patent rights acceptable. He also had 
interesting thoughts on the incremental nature of innovation and 
the phenomenon of parallel innovators essentially inventing con-
temporaneously. 390  At the same time, the encyclopédistes’  
 
arts flourish; because while the government distributes offices, it is the public 
which bestows esteem.  
This seems to ignore the patent system, however. More directly:  
After this we need not be astonished that inventors are sensitive to the honor 
of being discoverers. It is the last thing of which a man would want to divest 
himself. After Thales discovered the relationship between the sun’s diameter 
and the circle this star describes around the earth, he communicated this dis-
covery to someone who offered him anything he would desire for it. Thales 
asked only to be allowed to keep the honor of the discovery. This wise man of 
Greece, poor and old, was left untouched by the thought of money or profit or 
any kind of advantage, but he feared the injustice that might deprive him of 
his deserved glory. 
Jaucourt, Invention (cited in note 348). 
 389 In his entry on “art,” Diderot describes the social cost of secrecy: 
[W]e invite the artists to take counsel with learned men and not to allow their 
discoveries to perish with them. The artists should know that to lock up a use-
ful secret is to render oneself guilty of theft from society. It is just as despicable 
to prefer the interest of one individual to the common welfare in this case as in 
a hundred others where the artists themselves would not hesitate to decide for 
the common good. If they communicate their discoveries they will be freed of 
several preconceptions and especially of the illusion, which almost all of them 
hold, that their art has reached its ultimate perfection. Because they have so 
little learning they are often inclined to blame the nature of things for a defect 
that exists only in themselves. Obstacles seem insuperable to them whenever 
they do not know the means of overcoming them. Let them carry out experi-
ments and let everyone make his contribution to these experiments: the artist 
should contribute his work, the academician his knowledge and advice, the rich 
man the cost of materials, labor, and time; soon our arts and our manufactures 
will be as superior as we could wish to those of other countries. 
Diderot, Art (cited in note 23). See also Diderot, Encyclopedia (cited in note 372): 
But the origin and progress of an art are not like the origin and progress of a 
science. Scientists converse; they write; they put forward their discoveries; 
they refute; they are refuted. Such contestations manifest the facts and fix the 
dates. Artists on the contrary live unknown, hidden, isolated; they do every-
thing for their interests, and almost nothing for their glory. There are inven-
tions that are kept within a family for centuries: they pass from fathers to 
sons, are improved or atrophy, without anyone knowing either by whom or 
when the discovery can be said to have been made. . . . 
 The government ought to allow entry to its manufactures to watch the men 
work, ask them questions, make drawings of their instruments, machines, and 
even the premises. 
 390 See Diderot, Encyclopedia (cited in note 372): 
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reverence for Bacon could possibly have influenced their view of 
patents—Bacon was a strong advocate of both Elizabeth’s and 
James’s prerogative power in their official positions in the Brit-
ish government.391 
III.  THE FRENCH ENCYCLOPÉDISTES’ INFLUENCE ON MADISON, 
JEFFERSON, AND FRANKLIN 
While it is well established that the Encyclopédie was the 
“greatest achievement” and the “most influential work”392 of the 
Enlightenment, this in itself does not prove that it influenced 
the Framers. Books and ideas traveled slowly to the colonies and 
early states. In fact, in his 1976 book The Enlightenment in 
America, Professor Henry May was quite skeptical about the 
availability of, and readership for, the Encyclopédie.393 He and 
others also focused on the declining popularity of the philoso-
phes and French thought generally in the early nineteenth cen-
tury.394 But more-recent scholarship has shown specific links be-
tween the Encyclopédie and individual Framers and other key 
Founding Fathers, as well as evidence that the Encyclopédie was 
more widely available than May believed. Further, the evidence 
of the declining influence of the philosophes in early nineteenth-
century America may actually help explain why early IP Clause 
interpretations—which did not even begin until this period—
ignored what should have been an obvious part of the Framers’ 
intellectual worldview. This Part argues that key Framers 
 
Chance commonly suggests the first attempts; they bear no fruit and remain 
buried; another tries again: he has a partial success, but not the kind people 
talk about; a third walks in the second’s footsteps; a fourth in the third’s; and 
so on, until the end product of these experiments is excellent: and this product 
is the only one that creates a sensation. It also occurs that an idea has barely 
blossomed in a workshop before it gets out and about. Work goes on in several 
places at once: each man operates separately; and the same invention, claimed 
at the same time by several, properly belongs to none of them, or is only at-
tributed to the one it makes rich. If the invention has come from abroad, na-
tional jealousy mutes the inventor’s name, and it remains unknown. 
 391 See Federico, 11 J Patent Office Society at 298, 300 (cited in note 124). 
 392 Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century 
at 38–39 (cited in note 17). 
 393 See Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America 114 (Oxford 1976). See also 
Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 112 (cited in note 16) (noting that the Encyclopédie was 
not widely disseminated in the colonies). 
 394 See, for example, May, The Enlightenment in America at 358–62 (cited in  
note 393). 
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owned and endorsed the Encyclopédie—suggesting that it 
strongly influenced the IP Clause. 
Most directly relevant, Madison owned a copy of the Ency-
clopédie that he received from Thomas Jefferson in 1785, while 
Jefferson was minister to France.395  It appears that Madison 
asked Jefferson to purchase and ship the Encyclopédie, along 
with a number of other books.396 Madison had no difficulty read-
ing French, as underscored by his request of over forty French 
titles from Jefferson (multiplied by the various volumes in many 
titles, such as the Encyclopédie). Among the requested titles was 
a collection of other works by Diderot.397 Beyond this, one com-
mentator has also asserted that “[t]here is evidence that [Madi-
son] was thoroughly familiar with the works of . . . Diderot.”398 
Evidence that the Encyclopédie was no mere trophy addition to 
his library are Madison’s multiple citations to it for historical 
points in his memorandum “Of Ancient & Modern Confedera-
cies,” written around 1787.399 Thus, Madison was actively using 
the Encyclopédie the same year that he was working on the IP 
Clause. 400  Madison was also a supporter of the publisher 
 
 395 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, with a List of Books (Sept 1, 
1785), in Douglas L. Wilson and Lucia Stanton, eds, Jefferson Abroad 24, 27 (Random 
House 1999). See also Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 117 (cited in 
note 17). 
 396 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison at 25 (cited in note 395): 
I have at length made up the purchase of books for you, as far as it can be done 
for the present. The objects which I have not yet been able to get, I shall con-
tinue to seek for. Those purchased, are packed this morning in two trunks, and 
you have the catalogue and prices herein inclosed. 
The Encyclopédie is included in the list attached to the letter as “13. first livraisons of 
the Encyclopedie 47. vols. 4to. (being 48f less than subscription).” Id at 27. 
 397 It was listed as “Diderot sur les sourds and muets [On the Deaf and Dumb] 
12mo. 3fl2. sur les aveugles [On the Blind] 3f. sur la nature [On Nature] 3f. sur la mo-
rale [On Morals] 3fl5.” Id at 29. 
 398 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 111 (cited in note 17), quoting 
Edward MacNall Burns, James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution 187 (Rutgers 
1938). 
 399 While some “Id.” citations in this memorandum have unclear prior referents, the 
Encyclopédie is directly cited five times. If some or all of the “Id.” citations do indeed re-
fer to the Encyclopédie, then this increases the total number of citations to up to nine. 
See generally James Madison, Of Ancient & Modern Confederacies, in Galliard Hunt, ed, 
2 The Writings of James Madison (1783–1787) 369 (Putnam 1900). Others concur with 
the assessment of five citations. See, for example, Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in 
America at 117 (cited in note 17), citing George R. Havens, James Madison et la Pensée 
Française, 3 Revue de literature compare 604, 610–11 (1923). 
 400 I could not find an exact date for “Of Ancient & Modern Confederacies.” It is pos-
sible that Madison read and cited the Encyclopédie later in 1787, after the convention. 
However, as he had received the Encyclopédie in 1785 and may well have been preparing 
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Charles-Joseph Panckoucke’s rearrangement and reworking of 
the Encyclopédie in the Encyclopédie méthodique, ou par ordre 
de matières, which was similarly published and distributed un-
der a subscription plan beginning in 1782.401 Madison called it “a 
compleat scientific Library.” 402 Moreover, Madison, together 
with Hugh Williamson and Thomas Mifflin, listed Ency-
clopédie méthodique first on a list of books recommended for a 
congressional library they proposed to the Continental Congress 
in 1783.403 
Many other Founding Fathers and Framers owned or had 
access to copies of the Encyclopédie. Jefferson, a noted Franco-
phile, not only sent a set of Encyclopédie volumes to Madison (as 
mentioned above) but also bought a set for public use in 1781 
while he was governor of Virginia.404 Benjamin Franklin also 
owned a copy.405 John Adams, who actually had animus toward 
the philosophes because of their perceived atheism and radical-
ism, nonetheless paid 360 livres to a Parisian bookseller for a 
thirty-nine-volume edition.406 John Quincy Adams translated or 
paraphrased the first twenty pages of the Preliminary Discourse 
 
the memorandum for the convention, it seems far more likely that he had at least looked 
at the Encyclopédie before the convention. It is reasonable to speculate that the Ency-
clopédie was in fact fresh in his mind while he participated in the convention. 
 401 See Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 109, 119 (cited in note 17), 
citing George B. Watts, The “Encyclopédie Méthodique”, 73 Pubs Mod Lang Assn 348 
(1958), Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the En-
cyclopédie, 1775–1800 (Harvard 1979); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 
(Nov 11, 1784), in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 7 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 503, 507 (Prince-
ton 1953); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar 27, 1786), in Julian P. 
Boyd, ed, 9 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 355, 357 (Princeton 1954); Letter from Fran-
cis Hopkinson to Thomas Jefferson (May 1, 1786), in Boyd, ed, 9 The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson 439, 439; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson (May 9, 1786), in 
Boyd, ed, 9 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 482, 482. 
 402 Letter from James Madison (Apr 15, 1783), in William T. Hutchinson and Wil-
liam M.E. Rachal, eds, 6 The Papers of James Madison 463, 464 (Chicago 1969). 
 403 See Loren Eugene Smith, The Library List of 1783 121 (unpublished PhD disser-
tation, Claremont Graduate School, 1969), archived at http://perma.cc/2K9B-7UMU. 
 404 See Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 117 (cited in note 17). Jef-
ferson apparently paid for the volumes with tobacco notes. See Letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to John Fitzgerald (Feb 27, 1781), in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 5 The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson 15, 15 (Princeton 1952).  
 405 See Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 117 (cited in note 17), cit-
ing Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Chambers, and the Other Gentlemen of 
Chambersburgh (Sept 20, 1788), in Albert Henry Smyth, ed, 9 The Writings of Benjamin 
Franklin 664, 664 (Macmillan 1906). 
 406 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 117 (cited in note 17), citing 
John Adams, Mar 20, 1780, in L.H. Butterfield, ed, 2 Diary and Autobiography of John 
Adams 436, 437 (Belknap 1961). 
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in the margins of one set.407 Alexander Hamilton quoted from the 
Encyclopédie’s entry on “empire” in Federalist 22.408 
Other notable Americans of the time were familiar with the 
Encyclopédie. Copies were held in the libraries of William Short 
and John Randolph.409 Joel Barlow was acquainted with it.410 
Charles Brockden Brown had read it.411 And Benjamin Rush, a 
signer of the Declaration of Independence, had actually met Di-
derot in person.412 
The Encyclopédie was also in major institutional libraries. 
Harvard’s library held it, and its librarian—Thaddeus Mason 
Harris—adopted the principles of classification set out “by the 
immortal Bacon and since illustrated and enlarged by the 
learned D’Alembert” in his own book A Selected Catalogue of 
Some of the Most Esteemed Publications in the English Lan-
guage, Proper to Form a Social Library, with an Introduction 
upon the Choice of Books.413 The Charleston Library Society or-
dered the Encyclopédie in 1773.414 A set was also held by the 
New York Society Library.415 This evidence supports my conten-
tion that educated persons in America during the Founding era 
viewed British scientific and Enlightenment thought through 
the lens of the more current philosophes and the Encyclopédie. 
Accordingly, the Encyclopédie was available to many of the 
American leaders and intellectuals at the time of the Founding. 
Particularly relevant is Madison, because of his role in drafting 
the IP Clause. At the same time, some American conservatives 
were alarmed by the antireligious views (and possibly all-out 
atheism) contained in the Encyclopédie, while others held a dim 
view of French culture as decadent. This was especially true, for 
 
 407 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 117 (cited in note 17). 
 408 Id. See also Federalist 22 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 135, 137 (cited in  
note 87). 
 409 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 117 (cited in note 17). 
 410 Id. 
 411 Id at 117–18, citing David Lee Clark, Introduction, in Charles Brockden Brown, 
ed, Edgar Huntly or Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker v, viii (MacMillan 1928) (originally pub-
lished in 1799). 
 412 Benjamin Rush, Travels through Life: An Account of Sundry Incidents & Events 
in the Life of Benjamin Rush, in George W. Corner, ed, The Autobiography of Benjamin 
Rush 69, 69 (Greenwood 1970). 
 413 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 118 (cited in note 17), citing 
Jesse H. Shera, Foundations of the Public Library: The Origins of the Public Library 
Movement in New England 1629–1855 112–13 (Chicago 1949). 
 414 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 118 (cited in note 17). 
 415 Id, citing A Catalogue of the Books Belonging to the New-York Society Library, 
Together with the Charter and By-laws of the Same 137 (Van Winkle 1813). 
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example, of President Timothy Dwight IV of Yale College and 
the Reverend Samuel Miller.416 However, even those opposed to 
the atheistic and radical tendencies of the Encyclopédie may still 
have appreciated its many other entries. Further, some who op-
posed the religious and social aspects of the Encyclopédie may 
have been more open to the reworked Encyclopédie méthodique, 
which focused on the scientific method aspects of the Ency-
clopédie.417 Beyond Madison and Franklin, Francis Hopkinson, 
James Monroe, and the College of William and Mary were sub-
scribers.418 And again, despite religious and conservative opposi-
tion, the Encyclopédie has been claimed as an influence on Revo-
lutionary War–era views on the rights of man and on the 
Declaration of Independence.419 
Having established the Encyclopédie’s general influence on 
key Founding Fathers, the question remains as to why this has 
not been raised before in the IP Clause literature. I provided one 
answer in Part I: The early cases and commentaries on patent 
and copyright law were fixated on interpreting the statutes 
passed by Congress and not the IP Clause itself. This set a con-
text and tone for later cases and commentary, which then as-
sumed that the Anglocentric approach of earlier documents was 
relevant to interpreting the IP Clause itself. In the alternative, 
the early Anglocentric accounts simply limited the thinking of 
later writers who might have considered other influences if pre-
sented with a truly blank interpretive slate. 
But accounts of the philosophes’ waxing and waning reputa-
tion in this Part suggest an additional cause. At its peak in the 
1780s, a number of key Founders fully embraced the Encyclopédie 
and the philosophes’ worldviews. But the controversial aftermath 
of the French Revolution turned many against not only those 
Frenchmen who committed various atrocities but also the philos-
ophes whose radical thinking seemed to have empowered the 
 
 416 See Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 118–19 (cited in note 17). 
 417 See, for example, Samuel Miller, 2 A Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century 
268 (John Swords 1803): 
It is scarcely necessary to say that [the Encyclopédie méthodique], executed by 
many of the persons who were engaged in the [Encyclopédie], bears, like that, 
an anti-religious complexion; and that, while it displays much genius, learning, 
industry, and perseverance, its general tendency is highly unfavourable to the 
interests of virtue and piety. 
 418 Spurlin, The French Enlightenment in America at 119 (cited in note 17). 
 419 I am grateful to Professor Geoff Turnovsky for reminding me of this connection. 
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darker sides of the Revolution.420 Thus, by the time that the first 
IP cases and treatises emerged under the new US federal sys-
tem, not only were the philosophes out of vogue, but their views 
were also considered downright dangerous and possibly sedi-
tious. As English author Frances Trollope stated in her 1832 
book Domestic Manners of the Americans, Diderot, Rousseau, 
and Voltaire “were read by the old federalists; but now they 
seem known more as naughty words than as great names.”421 
This intellectual retrenchment could also have been concom-
itant with the changing political and social attitudes toward 
both England and France. Whereas the Americans were at war 
with the British in the 1770s and 1780s due to the policies and 
perceived oppression of the British government, they were grate-
ful for the crucial military and other support of the French.422 
Naturally, one would expect favorable inclinations toward the 
French and unfavorable ones toward the British during this 
time period. But after the Revolutionary War, debates arose as 
to how closely to maintain connections with the French.423 Fur-
ther, the more natural cultural affinity to all things British 
would reasonably exert a gravitational tug once direct hostilities 
ceased. This is supported by statements made as early as the 
1790s that demonstrated concern over French culture and in-
creasingly favorable attitudes toward the British. The early 
nineteenth century reinforced this cultural shift back toward 
Britain as the Napoleonic Empire seemed to be anathema to the 
liberal democratic ideals shared by the Americans and the Brit-
ish.424 Even the War of 1812 did not fully reverse this trend. 
Thus, when the IP Clause was beginning to be considered in 
cases and commentaries, the Founding generation’s close con-
nection to French culture and thought—at least among a signifi-
cant contingent—was likely a distant memory. 
 
 
 420 See Donald H. Meyer, The Democratic Enlightenment 177–79 (Putnam 1976). 
 421 Frances Trollope, Domestic Manners of the Americans 254 (Bentley 5th ed 1839). 
 422 See Noam Chomsky, Book Review, The Rule of Force in International Affairs, 80 
Yale L J 1456, 1488–89 (1971). 
 423 See generally Lawrence S. Kaplan, Book Review, The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution: The Perspective from France, 4 Rev Am Hist 385 (1976). 
 424 See Bradford Perkins, 1 The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: 
The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865 84–85 (Cambridge 1993) (contrasting 
increasingly positive American views of Great Britain with anti-French sentiment en-
gendered by the French Revolution and Napoleon’s “tyranny”). 
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IV.  VIEWING THE IP CLAUSE THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 
ENCYCLOPÉDIE SOLVES NUMEROUS INTERPRETIVE PUZZLES 
It is fascinating how many puzzles raised by the IP Clause 
literature can be solved by using the Encyclopédie to decipher 
the Clause’s key terms. The Clause shifts from a cryptic sphinx 
that requires sleight of hand substitution of alternate terms to 
understand, to a coherent and sensible limited grant of power 
that can be interpreted via its own terms. This outcome alone 
suggests that the Encyclopédie influenced the Framers—
especially those drafting the IP Clause. But combined with the 
Encyclopédie’s demonstrable prestige and influence on Enlight-
enment thinkers generally—and Madison and other Founders in 
particular—the situation shifts from possibly coincidental to 
quite possible. 
Further, as a groundbreaking new kind of dictionary of arts 
and sciences, the Encyclopédie would almost certainly have been 
considered more reliable and authoritative on fundamental 
terms and concepts than Johnson’s hard-word language diction-
ary. Thus, it actually makes more sense to use the Encyclopédie 
to understand the contemporaneous meaning of terms in the 
Constitution—especially for the educated Enlightenment Fram-
ers—than to look to Johnson’s Dictionary. It is true that the En-
cyclopédie was in French, but terms were routinely shifted be-
tween English and French at this time—the important point 
was the concept underlying the language variants.425 This Part 
applies Encyclopédie meanings to key terms in the IP Clause to 
demonstrate that it can be interpreted as a compelling, limited 
grant of power that allows the federal government to grant addi-
tional, temporary protections for the sake of advancing im-
portant substantive knowledge that might also be protected at 
the state level. 
Looking at the IP Clause’s structure, it is important to note 
the Encyclopédie’s fundamental distinction between “art” and 
“science.” Even more critical is the fact that the emerging fine 
arts were cabined off into a separate place within imagination.426 
By contrast, other arts and sciences were spread across the 
 
 425 For example, entrepreneur, a French term, was translated literally as “undertak-
er” (as in engaging in an undertaking, not the American sense of a funeral director). 
Both the English and French terms were used interchangeably in English writings, such 
as Cantillon’s seminal works on entrepreneurship. See generally, for example, Richard 
Cantillon, Essai sur la nature du commerce en général (Gyles 1755). 
 426 See d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse at 37–39, 51 (cited in note 19). 
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three “knowledge” categories of memory, reason, and imagina-
tion.427 Combined with the clear distinction made by the philoso-
phes, and seemingly also by Madison in Federalist 43—between 
literary property and rights in artisanal inventions—this points 
to the balanced-sentence interpretation of the IP Clause.428 Like 
Professor Solum, though, I wonder whether it is better called 
“parallel construction.”429 A “balanced sentence” is one that has 
two roughly equal parts on either side of punctuation, such as a 
comma or a semicolon.430 The IP Clause is better described as 
having a parallel construction that threads throughout the 
whole text.431 
Turning to the Clause’s first term, “promote,” I adopt Gold-
stein’s account that “to promote” was “synonymous with the 
words ‘to stimulate,’ ‘to encourage,’ or ‘to induce.’”432 While this 
does not come from the Encyclopédie per se, it is entirely con-
sistent with the Encyclopédie’s usage, especially with regard to 
“progress.” While Professor Pollack claims that “promote” means 
“advance,” this is to support her argument that “progress” must 
mean only dissemination or diffusion. It allows her to argue 
that, if “progress” means “advance,” then the preamble is redun-
dant, as it essentially says “to advance the advance of . . .”433 No 
one other than Pollack has adopted this reading. 
“Progress,” as used in the Encyclopédie, seems to denote not 
just a vague sense of “advancement” or “improvement,” but ra-
ther the sense that originated in the Querelle. Progress could be 
shown only in those fields that could be assessed quantitatively. 
Fields based on taste or sentiment could not be shown to “pro-
gress.” 434  This was not a negative indictment of these latter 
fields. It just put them outside the progress narrative. An an-
cient taste- or sentiment-based work could be as valuable as the 
most modern work in that field. By contrast, for example, an 
older machine made of wood was simply not as valuable as a 
 
 427 See id at 60 n 1. 
 428 See Lutz, 18 Geo Wash L Rev at 51 (cited in note 33); Federalist 43 (Madison) at 
288 (cited in note 87). 
 429 Solum, 36 Loyola LA L Rev at 11 (cited in note 198). 
 430 One example is the old ad slogan, “If you’ve got the time, we’ve got the beer.” 
 431 More research needs to be done to determine from where, if anywhere, De Wolf 
obtained his information that this structure was popular among the “colonial worthies” 
of the time and to evaluate how valid this point is. See De Wolf, An Outline of Copyright 
Law at 15 (cited in note 121). 
 432 Goldstein, 412 US at 555. 
 433 Pollack, 80 Neb L Rev at 788–89 (cited in note 12). 
 434 See text accompanying notes 326–28. 
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newer one made of iron—other than perhaps for historical or 
aesthetic purposes. But for a machine qua machine, one can 
generally be objectively assessed as measurably better than the 
other. Thus, fields within both science and the useful arts were 
“progress” fields, while those in the fine arts were not. This has 
important implications for the likely intended scope of Con-
gress’s power under the IP Clause. 
“Science” meant the systematic study or contemplation of a 
field. It did not mean “knowledge in general” or “learning in 
general.” Professors Ng and Snow are some of the few IP Clause 
scholars to pick up on this well-established historical meaning. 
“Science” certainly would not have included works of pure enter-
tainment or creative expression.435 One could “make a science” of 
those things by studying them and perhaps writing a treatise on 
the subject. But the works of entertainment themselves would 
be the object of the study. An important concomitant is that the 
output of “science” was written works—not machines, processes, 
or any other operational object or method. Prime examples were 
Newton’s Principia and Locke’s Two Treatises, as well as other 
information-based works. Creative works could possibly have 
been part of “science” for the encyclopédistes, such as when liter-
ary fiction or dramatic works were written as a kind of allegori-
cal study of politics, society, or similarly weighty topics. Vol-
taire’s Candide comes to mind.436 The issue then becomes one of 
line drawing. Who is to decide what fiction or dramatic work 
conveys a substantial message or is instead stylized “fluff”? 
“Useful arts” does not directly appear in the Encyclopédie. 
But in some ways, it did not need to. The original entry on “art” 
was about only the useful or mechanical arts.437 It was not until 
the second edition that an addendum to the entry on “art” brief-
ly discussed the fine arts.438 This perspective was not limited to 
the Encyclopédie. The other contemporaneous dictionaries of 
arts and sciences covered primarily the “sciences” and mechani-
cal or artisanal practices.439 In part, this was because of the very 
liberation of the fine arts that had begun a century earlier. They 
were being discussed in their own circles and publications. 
 
 435 See Ng, Copyright Law and the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts at 24–25 
(cited in note 211). 
 436 At the same time, d’Alembert referred to Voltaire as a belletrist and not a sub-
stantive “author.” See text accompanying notes 458–61. 
 437 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23). 
 438 See Kristeller, 13 J Hist Ideas at 24 (cited in note 329). 
 439 See Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions at 20–21 (cited in note 16). 
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But by the end of the eighteenth century, those practicing 
the beaux arts were beginning to refer to them simply as the 
“arts.”440 In a way this was accurate, as at least the visual arts 
had always been part of the “arts” construed broadly. The prob-
lem was that this created an ambiguity: Did “art” mean all arts, 
or just the beaux arts? As documented in Part II, this question 
would create much confusion among nineteenth- and twentieth-
century courts and commentators. The problem was only partly 
resolved by substituting “technology” for the mechanical/useful 
arts.441 But, in the meantime, the mechanical/useful arts had no 
generally accepted term to differentiate them from the beaux 
arts, because traditionally one had not been needed. 
My theory is that “useful arts” was a neologism created in 
the seventeenth century and increasingly adopted throughout 
the eighteenth century to address this exact lacuna in the lan-
guage. First, the term’s actual usage at the time captured exact-
ly this set of mechanical-minus-fine arts.442  Second, the term 
 
 440 See Kristeller, 12 J Hist Ideas at 497–98 (cited in note 238) (noting a convergence 
of “art,” in the modern sense, and “fine arts” or “beaux arts” in the eighteenth century). 
 441 The problem was only partly resolved because “technology” omits many im-
portant artisanal practices and implies only those arts that are based in scientific 
knowledge. See notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 442 One contemporary example of this usage was the Pennsylvania Society for the 
Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts. The Society’s purpose was to pro-
mote manufacturing in Pennsylvania. In discussing this aim, the Society cited the fact 
that the people of Pennsylvania “possess[ed] within [them]selves the materials of the 
useful arts, and articles of consumption and commerce.” The Plan of the Pennsylvania 
Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts 4 (Aitken & Son 
1787). See also Tench Coxe, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American Man-
ufacturers 7 (Aitken & Son 1787) (referring to “citizens, who are expert at manufactures 
and the useful arts”). Also in 1787, E.A.W. Zimmerman helped introduce one of the early 
senses of “technology” as the study of “useful arts and manufactures.” E.A.W. Zimmer-
man, A Political Survey of the Present State of Europe iii (London 1787). Zimmerman’s 
linguistically appropriate implication that this was the “study of” (“ology”) useful arts 
and manufactures did not become the dominant meaning of “technology” from the late 
nineteenth century on, when the term became more closely associated with the processes 
and objects created through the practical application of insights and knowledge devel-
oped in the new sciences. Earlier appearances of “useful arts” going all the way back to 
1627 tend to support my theory as well. However, as with the emergence of the modern 
system of fine arts, an emerging sense of “useful arts” went through many permutations 
before apparently settling on the mechanical arts minus the fine arts. See generally Bat-
ty Langley, Practical Geometry: Applied to the Useful ARTS of Building, Surveying, Gar-
dening and Mensuration (London 2d ed 1726); Daniel Defoe, A General History of Dis-
coveries and Improvements, in Useful ARTS, Particularly in the Great Branches of 
COMMERCE, NAVIGATION, and PLANTATION, in All Parts of the Known WORLD 
(London 1725); Publius Vergilius Virgil, The Works of Virgil: Containing His Pastorals, 
Georgics and Aeneis (London 1697) (John Dryden, trans). See also Samuel Sewall, Some 
Few Lines towards a Description of the New Heaven as It Makes to Those Who Stand  
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perfectly described its contents, especially in light of the Ency-
clopédie worldview. “Useful” meant “practical,” and that is ex-
actly what distinguished these arts from those created (solely) 
for aesthetic purposes.443 This could not be clearer in the Map, in 
which the useful arts are grouped under memory as the nonex-
clusive list of techniques for manipulating natural materials 
designated as “uses of x,” and the beaux arts are grouped under 
imagination. 444  An open question, discussed in Part III, is 
whether manipulation of natural forces would be included in the 
useful arts. I think that they would be—again based on Dide-
rot’s approving discussion of Savery’s steam engine, which was 
as much about harnessing steam as it was about the particular 
mechanical objects used to do so.445 
The Clause’s next term is “securing.” I will not rehash all 
the literary-property debates over common-law copyright and 
“securing.”446 And there is nothing directly on point in the Ency-
clopédie. But at least Diderot and David clearly supported natu-
ral rights to one’s literary productions. 447  Further, Madison 
claimed in Federalist 43 that common-law copyright was “sol-
emnly adjudged” to exist. 448  He implicitly acknowledged that 
there may be no legally cognizable cognate for inventions.449 A 
number of state copyright laws also supported a natural right to 
one’s literary productions.450 
 
upon New Earth 5 (Boston 1697) (“They who remove from one Land to another, there to 
dwell; that settlement of theirs is call’d a Plantation. Especially, when a land, before 
rude and unfurnish’d, is by the New-comers replenished with usefull Arts, Vegetables, 
Animals.”). 
 443 This tidy distinction would become blurred in the late nineteenth century with 
the advent of mass-produced commercial art and useful products designed with aesthet-
ic, ornamental flourishes, such as those that the Supreme Court grappled with in Perry. 
See Perry, 146 US at 74. 
 444 This raises the question of how innovation could occur in processes cabined un-
der memory. My only suggestion is that the encyclopédistes may have had some kind of 
Socratic “remembering” of things that one does not currently know (for example, the pro-
cess of anamnesis discussed in the Meno and Phaedo dialogues). Or perhaps they envi-
sioned some other hybrid process of memory and imagination—possibly mediated by 
reason. 
 445 See Diderot, Art (cited in note 23). 
 446 See, for example, Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective at 194–95 (cited 
in note 85); Walterscheid, 48 J Copyright Society USA at 781 n 277 (cited in note 2). 
 447 See Prager, 26 J Patent Office Society at 733–34, 736 (cited in note 125). 
 448 Federalist 43 (Madison) at 288 (cited in note 87). 
 449 See id. 
 450 The Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 1783 literary-
property/copyright statutes all contained identical preambles echoing the encyclopédistes’ 
natural law justifications for copyright. See Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Enactments of 
the United States, 1783–1906 14 (Government Printing Office 1906): 
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I suggest a new theory: the genius of the Framer’s use of 
“securing” is that it covers both preexisting rights and newly 
created ones. On the one hand, “securing” is used in other parts 
of the Constitution and core documents—such as the Declara-
tion of Independence—to mean “securing” existing rights. And 
the normal term for creating new rights would have been 
“grant” or “issue.” On the other hand, I think that those who ar-
gue that “securing” can also mean “to secure” newly created 
rights have a point.451 At the same time, it is hard to believe that 
the Framers would have used “securing” if they only meant new-
ly created rights. In that case, “grant” or “issue” would have 
been the much more obvious and correct choice. But what if the 
Framers knew that the question of preexisting or natural rights 
was unsettled? Again, even Madison could not claim that it was 
settled for inventions, and he argued only that these rights 
should be treated similarly.452 Thus, in the face of uncertainty, 
why not use the term that covers both scenarios? Let the courts 
hash out the underlying rights questions—whichever way they 
 
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the public 
weal of the community, and the advancement of human happiness, greatly de-
pend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in the various arts and 
sciences: As the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great 
and beneficial exertions of this nature, must exist in the legal security of the 
fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such security is one of 
the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man's 
own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind.  
North Carolina’s 1785 statute contained the same sentiment: 
Whereas nothing is more strictly a man's own than the fruit of his study, and it 
is proper that men should be encouraged to pursue useful knowledge by the 
hope of reward; and as the security of literary property must greatly tend to 
encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries, and to the general extension 
of arts and commerce. 
Id at 25. New York’s 1786 statute referenced “natural justice” as the basis for copyright:  
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natural equity and justice, 
that every author should be secured in receiving the profits that may arise 
from the sale of his works, and such security may encourage men of learning 
and genius to publish their writings; which may do honor to their country, and 
service to mankind. 
Id at 11. 
 451 See, for example, Walterscheid, 19 Hamline L Rev at 94–95 (cited in note 172) 
(discussing the meaning of the word “secure” and concluding that “all that [the IP 
Clause] does is authorize the Congress to create and protect an exclusive right for au-
thors and inventors . . . in their writings and discoveries for a limited time”); Wheaton, 
33 US at 661 (stating that the word “secure” in the IP Clause is used not in reference to 
“the protection of an acknowledged legal right” but rather to “a future right”). 
 452 See Federalist 43 (Madison) at 288 (cited in note 87). 
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decide, the IP Clause will still work. In other words, “securing” 
should be read as follows: To the extent that there are preexist-
ing rights, Congress can secure them by providing extra protec-
tions. If there are none, then Congress can “secure” the rights 
that it creates. 
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ concerns in Eldred v Ash-
croft 453  and Golan v Holder, 454  “limited Times” seems fairly 
straightforward, at least in terms of the encyclopédistes’ and the 
Framers’ thinking. The question is, assuming that Madison and 
others believed in common-law copyright—which was usually 
held to be perpetual—why allow Congress to secure exclusive 
rights for only limited times? Those who oppose arguments that 
the Framers supported perpetual common-law copyrights some-
times use the “limited Times” provision as evidence.455 But the 
Framers could have both believed in perpetual common-law cop-
yrights—which would be enforced under state common law—and 
felt that the federal government should be authorized to create 
only an enhanced national system for enforcing these rights for 
limited times. This would make sense, especially in the face of 
concerns over the balance of federal and state power. Certainly 
some cross-state rights system was needed—as Madison 
acknowledged in Federalist 43, “[t]he States cannot separately 
make effectual provision” for copyrights (or patents, for that 
matter).456 But it might have been too risky to allow the untested 
federal government to enforce or create exclusive, perpetual IP 
rights. This point is underscored by Madison’s statement that 
perhaps the government should be given a power to buy the 
rights back even during the limited term.457 
For courts and commentators that have argued for limits on 
IP subject matter based on the terms “authors,” “writings,” or 
“discoveries,” the Encyclopédie provides some interesting sup-
port. In the entry “writer, author” (ecrivain, auteur), d’Alembert 
distinguished between the two. 458  “Writers” were belletrists  
 
 453 537 US 186, 208–12 (2003). 
 454 132 S Ct 873, 885 (2012). 
 455 See, for example, De Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law at 14 (cited in note 84). 
 456 Federalist 43 (Madison) at 288 (cited in note 87).  
 457 Madison, in discussing how the negative consequences of monopolies might be 
limited in the IP context, suggested that it might “suffice to reserve in all cases a right to 
the public to abolish the privilege [of monopoly] at a price to be specified in the grant of 
it.” Walterscheid, 19 Hamline L Rev at 90 (cited in note 172), quoting Letter from James 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct 17, 1788), in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 14 The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson 21, 21 (Princeton 1958).  
 458 See d'Alembert, Writer, Author (cited in note 29). 
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concerned primarily with producing aesthetically appealing 
verse or text—they wrote as craft and focused on style, not sub-
stance.459 By contrast, “authors” wrote to convey substantive—
usually scientific—content and wrote mechanically, without un-
due concern for style. “Racine and Voltaire are excellent writers 
whereas Corneille is an excellent author. Descartes and Newton 
are famous authors.”460 While this makes sense, one wonders 
whether d’Alembert was dealing backhanded compliments to 
these various individuals: Did Racine and Voltaire have nothing 
serious to say? Were Descartes and Newton clumsy in the 
presentation of their ideas? This concern is underscored by one 
person who apparently rated both terms: “The author of ‘La  
Recherche de la vérité’ is a first-class writer.”461 
Because the IP Clause authorizes Congress to grant exclu-
sive rights to “authors” for their “writings,” the latter term 
might be limited to substantive or information-based works. 
Ideally, these would be obviously scientific works such as trea-
tises and other scholarship. But, just as in the subject matter of 
the 1790 Copyright Act, other works of systematic study (“sci-
ence”) such as maps and charts could be protected as well. This 
substantive, information-based scope accords well with Profes-
sor Ginsburg’s research on the nature of copyrighted materials 
in the first decades of the federal copyright system.462 But, as she 
shows, copyright was not limited exclusively to what might be 
considered purely informational or scientific works.463 Some lit-
erary fiction and dramatic works may have been protected as 
well. As mentioned above, however, there is evidence that the 
philosophes supported the use of fiction, dramatic works, and 
even music as ways of conveying substantive concepts.464 This 
was even truer for the generation of intellectuals that supported 
 
 459 Oddly, this distinction echoed all the way into the twentieth century. Pulp detec-
tive novelist Mickey Spillane always took pride in saying that he was a “writer,” not an 
“author.” And he distinguished the terms by saying that writers are paid for basically 
churning out product, not highbrow ideas. See Michael Carlson, Interview with Mickey 
Spillane, CrimeTime (Oldcastle Books ), archived at http://perma.cc/Q52K-VMJN. 
 460 D’Alembert, Writer, Author (cited in note 29). 
 461 Nicolas Malebranche is the individual in question. See id. 
 462 See, for example, Ginsburg, 64 Tulane L Rev at 1015 (cited in note 167). Profes-
sor Snow also notes that some well-known magazine stories on seduction were not regis-
tered for copyright in the aftermath of the 1790 Copyright Act, suggesting a sense among 
authors and publishers that such nonsubstantive works were not copyrightable. See 
Snow, 2013 BYU L Rev at 264 n 18 (cited in note 220). 
 463 See Ginsburg, 64 Tulane L Rev at 1016 (cited in note 167). 
 464 See text accompanying notes 435–36. 
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the French Revolution.465  But while a work such as Candide 
might seem to be just such a work of fiction, d’Alembert actually 
used its author, Voltaire, as an example of a “writer” or bellet-
rist, as contrasted with an “author.” Of course, one cannot ex-
pect uniform thought and statements from all the philosophes. 
Thus, while some line drawing may have to be done, one can say 
that “writings” should be works conveying substance, not merely 
expressing style. At the same time, because they are “writings,” 
they must be fixed expressions (as opposed to ideas). 
“Inventors” are not accorded an entry in the Encyclopédie, 
but they are discussed. As some recent scholars have noted, in 
American and British writings of the late eighteenth century, 
the terms “inventor” and “author” are sometimes used inter-
changeably.466 This is because “inventions” could include any-
thing newly created, including a book. Similarly, the Ency-
clopédie describes Leibniz “inventing” calculus. 467  Likewise, 
someone could “author” an invention, because the term could be 
used in the broad sense, adopted later by Burrow-Giles, of the 
originator of anything, or the authority under which something 
was done.468 The Encyclopédie entries sometimes used this broad 
sense of “author” too. Given the potential interchangeability of 
these terms, as well as their distinct meanings (especially “au-
thor”), the Framers may well have included both terms in the 
parallel structure of the IP Clause to signal their narrower 
meanings. One could surmise the opposite as well: the Framers 
used both because the terms were overlapping and the Framers 
did not want to potentially limit the IP Clause to the narrower 
version of the one used. But if this were the case, one would ex-
pect them to use the disjunctive form: “to authors or inventors.” 
And if the Framers believed that the terms were completely in-
terchangeable, then they would have used only one.469 
 
 465 For example, works such as Voltaire’s Candide were used to enlighten readers 
about serious social and political issues through a fictional vehicle that might not pre-
sent as much political risk to the author in tumultuous times. Likewise, Romantic com-
posers such as Wagner were seen by some as engaged in a kind of cultural education of 
the public. 
 466 See, for example, Oliar, 57 UCLA L Rev at 469 (cited in note 46). 
 467 See Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Differential Equation (Equation différentielle), 
The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project (Michigan, 
2012) (Gregory Bringman, trans), archived at http://perma.cc/ABQ4-YWMD. 
 468 See Burrow-Giles, 111 US at 57–58. 
 469 It seems too much of a stretch to assume that not only did the Framers want to 
preserve parallel construction in the IP Clause and so needed two terms at this point in 
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Finally, “discoveries” in the Encyclopédie solves the biggest 
puzzle in the IP Clause. Courts and commentators have tradi-
tionally tried to substitute in “inventions,” even as they find a 
primary sense of “uncovering” for “discoveries” (especially scien-
tific or geographic ones).470 An attempt to explain the term “dis-
cover” as meaning to “uncover” the principle of a new invention 
does not really work either, as the French, British, and Ameri-
can systems would not allow patenting of a principle.471 Walter-
scheid found an intriguing use of “discover” with regard to dis-
closing (“discovering”) one’s invention to the patent office to seek 
a patent, in a passage from a 1790 Senate report.472 However, 
the context of the passage dissuaded him from claiming it as a 
possible meaning of the IP Clause. 473  In contrast to these 
strained meanings, the Encyclopédie definition as “not only new, 
but also curious, useful, and difficult to find” perfectly and natu-
rally fits the context of the IP Clause, as well as the early devel-
opment of the American patent system.474 It also is consistent 
with Jefferson’s views, even though those were not directly rele-
vant in drafting the IP Clause and early IP statutes.475 
Plugging these definitions into the IP Clause results in a 
coherent and unstrained interpretation that is indeed a kind of 
 
the text, but they also did not want to repeat the same term (first in the science power, 
then in the useful-arts power). 
 470 See, for example, Eldred, 537 US at 223–24 (assuming that the term “discover-
ies” in the IP Clause refers to inventions); Walker, Text-Book of the Patent Laws of the 
United States of America at 2 (cited in note 102) (“The word discovery does not have, ei-
ther in the Constitution or the statute, its broadest signification. It means invention, in 
those documents, and in them it means nothing else.”). 
 471 At the same time, the notion of a “principle”—especially as used by nineteenth-
century patent courts and commentators—is complicated. It might have included: (1) a 
“scientific” principle akin to a law of nature, for example, E = mc2 (not patentable); (2) a 
practical or “technological” principle, for example, properly controlled and channeled, 
steam can push a piston, which can be used to power mechanical operations (generally 
not patentable, as it is either too broad or has no practical application); (3) a legal princi-
ple (not even considered for patentability in the cases, but courts were sometimes un-
clear when using the term “principle” about whether they were referring to a legal prin-
ciple or one of the science/art/technology principles under consideration); or (4) the 
“principle of the machine” or “principle of the invention,” for example, a description of 
how the invention operates or generates utility (patentable if limited to an enabled prac-
tical application). See Merwin, The Patentability of Inventions at 3–9, 14, 716 (cited in 
note 102). 
 472 See Walterscheid, 75 J Patent & Trademark Office Society at 703 n 67 (cited in 
note 177). 
 473 See id at 703–04. 
 474 D’Alembert, Discovery (cited in note 28). 
 475 See text accompanying note 147. 
03 O'CONNOR_ART_FINAL (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:16 AM 
2015] The Overlooked French Influence on the IP Clause 819 
 
“progress project,” as Professors Chon, Oliar, and others ar-
gue.476 The Clause reads as two intertwined parts: 
(i) Congress can promote the advancement of systematic 
study of any manner of things by providing enhanced, na-
tionally enforceable positive law rights to existing natural 
or common-law–literary-property rights, to the extent that 
they exist, or to new rights that it creates, but not in perpe-
tuity or unbounded terms, covering the fixed expressions of 
those who seek to convey substantive content related to 
such systematic studies (and not for those fixed expressions 
created simply for style or entertainment); and 
(ii) Congress can promote the advancement of practical ma-
nipulations of natural materials or forces by providing en-
hanced, nationally enforceable positive law rights to exist-
ing natural or common-law exclusive rights, to the extent 
that they exist, or to new rights that it creates, but not in 
perpetuity or unbounded terms, covering the most im-
portant inventions (those that are “curious, useful, and[/or] 
difficult to find”).477 
A few important implications result. First, this is a federal-
ist system that allows for concurrent federal-state rights. Early 
judicial interpretations support this concurrent-powers interpre-
tation, so long as state law does not interfere with areas of fed-
eral interest or powers (such as interstate commerce).478 Second, 
this interpretation is consistent with a limited-government ap-
proach that focuses on authorizing Congress and the executive 
to do only those things of true national interest. Not everything 
 
 476 See, for example, Chon, 43 DePaul L Rev at 102 (cited in note 38); Oliar, 94 
Georgetown L J at 1810–16 (cited in note 204). 
 477 See D’Alembert, Discovery (cited in note 28). 
 478 See, for example, Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US 1, 78–79 (1824) (“[T]he State law may 
be suffered to operate, in whole or in part, so far as it may, without actual conflict with 
the constitution or laws of the United States.”). Of course, this proviso could swallow the 
whole concurrent powers if Congress and the courts read federal interests or powers ex-
pansively. But that is a line-drawing and policy issue that the IP Clause accommo-
dates—it does not mandate Congress to exercise the delegated powers to any particular 
degree, or even at all. Further, there was in fact a concurrent system of copyright until 
1976: sound recordings were left to the states until 1973, and unpublished works until 
1976. Only in the 1976 Act did Congress expressly preempt the field for copyright. See 
Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, 10 Vand J Enter & Tech L 1, 7–9 (2007). Although a bit murkier, there ap-
pears to have been a de facto concurrent patent system at least in the late eighteenth 
century, and possibly extending into the early nineteenth century. See Camilla A. Hrdy, 
State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 Berkeley Tech L J 45, 76–81 (2013). 
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that might get protected by patent, copyright, monopoly, or priv-
ilege systems in England or Europe should be within the federal 
government’s power to regulate.479 This would interfere too much 
with states’ rights. Third, the limitation of congressional powers 
to grant exclusive rights to “progress” fields was easily justifia-
ble, as these were exactly the sorts of fields that directly affected 
the new nation’s ability to grow, prosper, and even determine its 
boundaries and interior. There had in fact been powers proposed 
to directly fund or create institutions to facilitate these goals 
(Madison’s and Pinckney’s “encouragement” proposals), but the 
simple expedient of a debt-ridden new government, as well as 
concerns over central control, made these proposals impracti-
cal.480 Exclusive rights, on the other hand, had been extolled by 
Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham exactly because of those 
rights’ clever ability to incentivize activity without a major, im-
mediate outlay of governmental funds.481 
By contrast, under this concurrent-powers interpretation, 
taste-and-sentiment fields were excluded from the IP Clause. 
This need be neither a negative assessment of such rights by the 
Framers, nor a rejection of exclusive rights for creations in those 
fields. Rather, federal protection could not be justified at that 
time, given the task of creating a limited government focused on 
direct national interests.482 Further, the subjective and nonquan-
tifiable nature of the taste-and-sentiment fields could lead to 
 
 479 This supports those who argue that the Framers intentionally omitted terms 
such as “copyright” and “patent” (and for that matter, “privilege” and “monopoly”) be-
cause they did not want to either authorize or limit Congress according to the particular 
parameters of those terms in English or European usage. See, for example, Pollack, 18 
Seattle U L Rev at 290–91 & n 161 (cited in note 179). 
 480 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Originalism and the IP Clause: A Commentary on 
Professor Oliar’s “New Reading”, 58 UCLA L Rev Discourse 113, 117 & n 26 (2010). 
 481 For any bureaucracy created, the only costs would be administrative, and they 
would impact the judicial system only with respect to enforcement. See Jeremy Bentham, 
Manual of Political Economy, in John Bowring, ed, 9 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 33, 71–
72 (William Tait 1889) (“[A]n exclusive privilege is of all rewards the best proportioned, the 
most natural, and the least burthensome. It produces an infinite effect, and it costs noth-
ing.”); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 82–83 (Oxford 1978) (R.L. Meeks, D.D. 
Raphael, and Peter Stein, eds) (“[Patents] are a reward for [an inventor’s] ingenuity, and it 
is probable that this is as equal an one as could be fallen on. For if the legislature should 
appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventor of new machines, etc., they would hardly ever 
be so precisely proportioned to the merit of the invention as this is.”). 
 482 Note that the question whether the federal government could even create a na-
tional bank was highly contested in the early years of the Republic. See generally 
M‘Culloch v Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819). 
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impossible value judgments for granting exclusive rights.483 Giv-
en the Querelle and the Enlightenment ideal of progress as ex-
emplified by the Encyclopédie and elsewhere, it seems more 
natural and coherent to read the IP Clause as promoting only 
progress fields. This also makes sense because Congress (and 
any system that it authorized) could then grant exclusive rights 
only for things that are an advancement over existing 
knowledge (in any of the progress fields, whether art or science). 
This could be objective and defensible. By contrast, a reading of 
the IP Clause that allows Congress to grant exclusive rights in 
the nonprogress fields—which are grounded in taste or senti-
ment—may be incoherent because (in a literal sense) there is 
simply no progress in those fields. Thus, how can their progress 
be promoted (either by the system as a whole or by individual 
works within it)? 
In the concurrent system suggested here, the states could 
decide whether and how to protect creations in the nonprogress 
fields. This would be no worse than the pre-Constitution situa-
tion in which nothing was protected at the national level. In-
deed, the United States continues to have concurrent systems in 
areas including trademark laws484 and securities laws.485 As not-
ed above, the nation had a kind of concurrent copyright system 
until the 1970s, in which certain areas (sound recordings and 
unpublished works) were left to the states.486 And Professor Ca-
milla Hrdy has argued for the important role that a de facto con-
current patent system played in the immediate post-ratification 
period.487 Concurrent systems present challenges, including the 
fragmented or piecemeal rights across different states that 
prompted Madison and others to propose at least some national 
rights for progress fields. Thus, I do not argue that a concurrent 
IP system for taste-based fields is necessarily optimal. But the 
Framers may well have viewed Congress granting exclusive 
rights across subjectively valued fields as too high a price to pay 
 
 483 Professor Beebe has suggested a notion of “aesthetic progress” on the part of the 
Framers. See generally Beebe, Aesthetic Progress in Intellectual Property Law (cited in 
note 362). But that seems to be driven by an assumption that the taste-and-sentiment 
fields have to be part of the “progress of science” (or progress of something) and therefore 
within the scope of the IP Clause. Given that assumption, his efforts are a reasonable 
approach to retrofit nonprogress fields into a progress narrative.  
 484 See 28 USC § 1338(a). 
 485 See 15 USC § 77v(a). 
 486 See Goldstein, 412 US at 546 & n 22. 
 487 See Hrdy, 28 Berkeley Tech L J at 67–76 (cited in note 478). 
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for the benefits of uniformity. Statements from some Founders 
who wanted to develop a culture that was equal to that of Eu-
rope do not directly translate into evidence that the Framers de-
cided to authorize protection of any and all creations. If they had 
so decided, they might have used language such as “to promote 
culture” or even “to promote the arts and sciences.” But they did 
not. “Useful” cannot be read out as a qualifier of “arts.” Nor can 
“progress” be ignored. Given the Enlightenment-era intellectual 
worldview and the role of “progress” within it, “promoting the 
progress” of something is quite different from simply “promot-
ing” that thing. 
Another objection may be that the law does in fact protect 
taste-based fields under copyright. Beginning later in the nine-
teenth century, copyrightable subject matter was expanded to 
include visual artwork.488 It had earlier been expanded to in-
clude musical compositions. But protection for written scores 
could arguably fit under the progress of science, because musi-
cians use scores to study their field. Thus, such scores play a 
dual role: they of course capture the aesthetic creation, but they 
also provide a core text or tool for musical analysis and study. 
Most relevant, the Copyright Act of 1831,489 which added 
musical compositions as copyrightable subject matter, gave ex-
clusive rights only for reproduction of the printed score.490 It did 
not provide performance or display rights. This fits neatly into 
my account. The idea may have been to protect only scores qua 
“science”: devices for the conveyance and study of musical ideas 
or theory. 
This may have been the proverbial camel’s nose under the 
tent. Once music was protected, why not other liberal or fine 
arts? Europe was protecting these categories. But most im-
portant were the changing senses of “science” and “art.” Case 
law and historical popular use indicate that, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, “art” was being reduced to only the fine 
arts. “Science” was being limited to the mathematics-based sci-
ences that we think of today (physics, chemistry, biology, and so 
 
 488 See Judith B. Prowda, Application of Copyright and Trademark Law in the Pro-
tection of Style in the Visual Arts, 19 Colum J L & Arts 269, 269 n 3 (1995). 
 489 Ch 16, 4 Stat 36, reprinted in Stephen D. Law, ed, Copyright and Patent Laws of 
the United States, 1790 to 1870 26–42 (Baker, Voorhis 1870). 
 490 See Goldstein, 412 US at 564. 
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on).491 There was also confusion in court decisions about what 
exactly “science” and “(useful) arts” were in the IP Clause.492 
Thus, although the scope of copyrightable subject matter 
might have been extended under the argument that a variety of 
creative works in the liberal or fine arts were actually the lan-
guage of the study of that field, any such extension was likely 
eclipsed by the sea change in the meanings of “science” and 
“art.” Further, as the Querelle and the Enlightenment receded 
into history during the Romantic period and beyond, the “pro-
gress project” may simply have been lost.493 Taste, sentiment, 
and creative expression of the individual became paramount and 
increasingly commercially valuable. So who was keeping sight 
of, or even understood, the antiquated “progress project” of the 
Framers? 
The implications of my interpretation for patents are less 
dramatic but still important. First, the scope of patent-eligible 
subject matter should be cabined to the practical uses of natural 
materials or forces. This is exemplified, but not limited to, the 
useful arts listed on the Map under the category of memory.494 
Thus, my interpretation does not limit patent-eligible subject 
matter to those artisanal activities that the Framers knew or 
would have understood. Instead, such subject matter extends to 
any work or use of natural materials (and forces) then known or 
later discovered. In other words, this is a structural principle, 
not an exclusive list of specific subject matter categories. Second, 
interpreting the IP Clause in light of the Encyclopédie gives rise 
to a requirement of “importance” of patent-eligible subject mat-
ter. Following the Encyclopédie, this importance could be shown 
by demonstrating that an invention is “curious, useful, and[/or] 
difficult to find.”495 This helps explain the “importance” require-
ment in the early statutes, the judicial development of a re-
quirement of nonobviousness, and ultimately the quest for a 
standard of invention.496 And third, the “useful arts” are not lim-
ited to technology or science-based inventions. They include any 
 
 491 See Solum, 36 Loyola LA L Rev at 50 (cited in note 198) (providing examples of 
nineteenth-century definitions of “science” as “Natural and Physical Science”). 
 492 See Part I.B. 
 493 See Chon, 43 DePaul L Rev at 122–34 (cited in note 38). 
 494 See Figure 1. That list is not exclusive; note that the last entry is “Work and uses 
etc.,” which signifies that the practical “work and use” of any natural material should be 
included there as well. 
 495 D’Alembert, Discovery (cited in note 28). 
 496 See Parts II.A, II.B. 
03 O'CONNOR_ART_FINAL (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:16 AM 
824  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:733 
   
artisanal manipulation of natural materials or forces for practi-
cal ends, whether discovered by rigorous experiment or simply 
by trial and error. 
While I adopt a fully distributive reading of the IP Clause, 
my interpretation is consistent with a unitary reading of the 
preamble. Authors’ writings would still signify fixed expressions 
conveying substantive meaning—and not simply belle lettres 
style. But the exclusive rights could be even more clearly grant-
ed for writings that promote the progress of useful arts by, for 
example, describing or teaching advances in such an art. Follow-
ing Baker, one might be wary of exclusive rights for fixed ex-
pression that prevents the practice of a useful art.497 But note 
that the performance right for musical compositions that was 
added in an 1897 amendment to the Copyright Act already ar-
guably breached Baker’s rule. Similarly, inventors’ discoveries 
could promote the progress of science in exactly the way that the 
new scientists of the seventeenth century began using sophisti-
cated devices and instruments to test their hypotheses. In fact, 
many research tools are patented.498 
My interpretation also assumes some British influence on 
the Framers. It would seem odd to reject an Anglocentric narra-
tive only to replace it with a Franco-centric one. The Framers 
had diverse opinions, and the influence of British ideas was 
clearly strong in the new nation. The mileage that I get out of 
the Encyclopédie terms in many ways just allows one to choose 
from among the elements of interpretations that have been gen-
erated by the Anglocentric narrative. My interpretation does no 
violence even to the early patent and copyright acts. In fact, it 
seems to better support them. 
While my interpretation does mean that parts of copyright 
and patent law might not have withstood a constitutional chal-
lenge brought when the various changes were made—with the 
consequence that our resultant systems might be at odds with 
the current notion of copyright as the means to protect (Roman-
tic) creative expression—this is not an argument against my in-
terpretation. The Framers appeared to be trying something new 
 
 497 See Baker, 101 US at 100–05 (1879). See also text accompanying notes 113–14. 
 498 See generally, for example, Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Li-
censing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innova-
tion, 38 U Mich J L Reform 141 (2004) (examining the trade-offs of patenting biomedical 
research tools). This has not been without controversy, however, especially for patents on 
research methods. See id at 148–50, 174–80 (noting that scientists disagree as to wheth-
er research tools should be freely distributed or remain patentable). 
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in the IP Clause, not simply authorizing Congress to replicate 
existing British or Continental patent and copyright systems. Of 
course, this is directly in line with the tenor of the Constitution 
overall, which created a fairly radical new form of government. I 
am not the only one to argue that Congress has added elements 
that might not withstand constitutional scrutiny to copyright or 
patent law over time.499 Under my interpretation, such problems 
could go quite far back. But this position is no different from 
those advanced by Walterscheid, Solum, and others, who would 
roll back parts of copyright law to the nineteenth century. 
At the same time, my interpretation clears up many myster-
ies and may be the only way to create a coherent, compelling ac-
count of the IP Clause. But it means that parts of our patent 
and copyright laws may be ultra vires under the IP Clause. The 
question is what to do. There are two options: amend copyright 
and patent law to bring them back within that scope, or amend 
the IP Clause. Neither of these seems likely. The only other pos-
sibility is to do what we do now: largely ignore the IP Clause, 
mentioning it only when convenient. We could continue thus and 
chalk it up to the “living” Constitution as an evolving document 
that should not be interpreted according to the original intent or 
original understanding of those who ratified it. Or perhaps we 
could take some of the meaning and insights developed under 
the Encyclopédie interpretation to help guide us in law and poli-
cy decisions for our patent and copyright systems. 
Finally, a word on the nature of copyright and patent rights: 
It is true that the IP Clause authorizes Congress to secure only 
existing rights, or whatever new rights that it creates. But this 
does not mean that the Framers rejected a natural-rights per-
spective of IP. In fact, it seems as if Madison supported a natural-
rights view of copyright as embodied in common-law literary 
property (and perhaps for patents as well).500 Such rights are 
 
 499 See, for example, Walterscheid, 48 J Copyright Society USA at 773–74 & n 248 
(cited in note 2); Solum, 36 Loyola LA L Rev at 56–57, 66–74 (cited in note 198). 
 500 See Federalist 43 at 288 (cited in note 87) (Madison). For more arguments on 
how a natural-rights theory underlies US IP law, see generally Adam Mossoff, Saving 
Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 Soc Phi-
losophy & Pol 283 (2012); Kenneth Einar Himma, Toward a Lockean Moral Justification 
of Legal Protection of Intellectual Property, 49 San Diego L Rev 1105 (2012); Eric R. 
Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and Property in IP): A Review of Justifying Intel-
lectual Property, 49 San Diego L Rev 1033 (2012); Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellec-
tual Property (Harvard 2011); Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the 
Administrative State, 157 U Pa L Rev 2001 (2009); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative 
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L Rev 1839 (2007); Mossoff, 92 Cornell 
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supported especially when considered from the perspective of 
“publication,” in the sense of “to make public.” Thus, in my in-
terpretation, it is critical that the Framers authorized a concur-
rent system. Natural property rights would arise at the state 
level, largely through common law. This would accord well with 
assertions of literary property rights in the Founding era, as 
well as with Professor Robinson’s later claim that patent law 
could be derived from common law.501 But such natural property 
rights would arise predominantly from the common-law rights of 
individuals to keep things private or secret. A man could not be 
forced to make public his writings or his trade secrets and in-
ventions (except possibly in rare, limited circumstances).502 But 
from this very right to withhold—especially to keep ideas within 
one’s own brain—arises the property right. You cannot make me 
disclose, and if you try to do so by force, I have a cause of action 
against you.503 You cannot misappropriate either my writings or 
my inventions. Of course, once I make them public through pub-
lication, my writings or inventions are fair game unless I can 
somehow condition my publication or disclosure on obtaining 
positive rights from the state. Accordingly, in my view, the IP 
Clause is predicated on this notion of a common law of property, 
privacy, and secrecy. Thus, just because the IP Clause does not 
cover the robust range of subject matter subsumed by current 
copyright and patent law does not mean that the same should 
not, or cannot, be protected under state law. 
CONCLUSION 
The IP Clause has been an enigma for courts and commen-
tators. While the literature interpreting the Constitution is vast, 
until recently, surprisingly few constitutional law experts paid 
much attention to the IP Clause. Intellectual property experts 
 
L Rev 953 (cited in note 147); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as 
Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St L J 517 (1990). 
 501 See Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions at v–vi (cited in  
note 102). 
 502 Such circumstances might include papers seized under a lawful search order 
(although this still might not include full public disclosure) or testimony compelled in a 
judicial proceeding on pain of contempt of court. 
 503 Even before Justice Louis Brandeis wrote about a right to privacy, the British 
courts had fashioned a privacy-based remedy for the unauthorized disclosure of drawings 
by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. See Prince Albert v Strange, 64 Eng Rep 293, 311–
13 (Ch 1849). See also generally Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193 (1890). 
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have a longer history of interpreting the Clause, but they often 
had fewer tools and less expertise. In the past two decades, 
there has been a welcome increase in constitutional law experts 
looking at IP, and IP experts looking at constitutional law. 
Both IP historians and constitutional law experts may be 
hindered, however, by the Anglocentric account of the IP Clause. 
This narrative is deeply entrenched in the IP Clause literature. 
It originated in the earliest cases and commentary on the IP 
Clause in the early Republic.504 Upon closer inspection, the ref-
erences to British antecedents for American patent and copy-
right systems were directed only to the first statutes, not to the 
IP Clause.505 But later courts and commentators appear to have 
assumed that these references included the IP Clause itself. 
Thus, throughout the three waves of IP Clause literature that I 
identified in Part I, the Anglocentric account was reinforced and 
deepened, with few attempts to look beyond it. 
The Anglocentric account has not generated a coherent or 
compelling interpretation of the IP Clause. In part, this is due to 
the significantly changed meanings in key terms such as “sci-
ence,” “(useful) arts,” and “discoveries” since the constitutional 
convention. Beginning especially in the late nineteenth century, 
courts and commentators have flipped the respective connec-
tions of “science” and “useful arts” in the IP Clause as to writ-
ings and “discoveries.” Even more confusingly, successive courts 
and commentators have flipped these back and forth—that is, 
the reversal has not been uniform. One response to the confu-
sion has been to simply treat these terms as part of a unitary 
preamble that identifies a collective area of “science and the use-
ful arts.” A problem with this interpretation is that it still does 
not cover the fine arts (unless one improperly reads out the word 
“useful”). Perhaps most importantly, presentist accounts of the 
IP Clause lead to the most confusion, as neither modern scien-
tific research results nor discoveries (usually thought of as sci-
entific or geographic in nature today) are covered by either  
patents or copyrights. Write-ups of either can be protected under 
copyright, of course, which should hint at the connection be-
tween the terms “science,” “authors,” and “writings” under the 
widespread balanced-sentence interpretation of the Clause.506 
 
 504 See text accompanying notes 92–96. 
 505 See text accompanying notes 97–98. 
 506 See De Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law at 15 (cited in note 84). 
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Those who have looked to the original senses of key IP 
Clause terms often make different kinds of presentist mistakes 
by consulting language dictionaries of the Founding era. But 
such “hard-word” dictionaries were not seen as satisfactory 
guides to the full or nuanced meanings of important terms—
especially in the sciences and arts.507 The more authoritative re-
sources were the dictionaries of arts and sciences that emerged 
(in a complicated way) from the encyclopedy tradition of educa-
tion,508 as I recounted in Part II. 
Once one acknowledges the importance of these dictionaries 
of arts and sciences, one should naturally consider what is wide-
ly regarded as the most important one—the French Ency-
clopédie. In fact, the Encyclopédie not only was the most influen-
tial dictionary of art and science but was also seen as the 
handbook of the Enlightenment. In an era when many educated 
persons in the West could read French, the Encyclopédie sold 
equal numbers of copies inside and outside France.509 Thus, its 
influence extended far beyond France and indeed resonated 
across the whole of the Enlightenment’s Republic of Letters. This 
complemented the acknowledged shift of Enlightenment leader-
ship from England to France in the mid-nineteenth century. 
As I examined in Part III, Madison and other Founding Fa-
thers in fact owned and approvingly cited the Encyclopédie. 
While the work was controversial on many levels—especially for 
its rejection of established religions and political systems—it 
was begrudgingly respected even by those Americans who op-
posed its revolutionary positions. At the same time, the evoca-
tive justifications for literary property espoused by Encyclopédie 
authors appeared to turn up in American state constitutions and 
copyright statutes adopted before the convention. The Ency-
clopédie’s focus on the useful arts matched the emerging focus 
on manufactures, useful arts, and commerce in the states. 
Accordingly, I proposed in Part IV that an interpretation of 
the IP Clause based on relevant Encyclopédie entries is war-
ranted. While my interpretation generally adopts the balanced-
sentence account based on the distinction between “science” and 
“(useful) arts” in the Encyclopédie, it is also compatible with a 
unitary-preamble account, as both “writings” and “discoveries” 
can advance both “science” and “useful arts.” Under either 
 
 507 See text accompanying notes 46–74. 
 508 See text accompanying notes 334–36. 
 509 See Darnton, 78 Am Hist Rev at 1345 (cited in note 383). 
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account, my interpretation centers on the Querelle’s distinction 
between progress and taste fields on the one hand, and senti-
ment fields on the other. Congress’s authority under the IP 
Clause is limited to fields and activities in which quantifiable 
progress can be demonstrated. Notably, this does not include the 
fine arts, and it therefore presents a challenge to modern copy-
right that seems to cover primarily works of subjective, creative 
expression. Instead, “authors” under my interpretation is lim-
ited to those who write to convey substance; it does not include 
“writers” acting as belletrists who are focused primarily on style. 
Equally important, the sense of “useful arts” that I glean from 
the intellectual worldview epitomized by the Encyclopédie limits 
patent-eligible subject matter to those processes or artifacts that 
manipulate natural materials or forces for practical human ben-
efit. At the same time, my interpretation’s adoption of the Ency-
clopédie’s sense of “discovery” supports those who have argued 
for a standard of invention higher than mere novelty. This all 
indicates a coherent federal “progress project” that secures 
rights through federal statutory grants for demonstrable ad-
vances in codified or tacit knowledge. Concerns over the power 
of the federal government proposed in the Constitution could al-
so have led to the limitation of both the temporal scope and the 
subject matter of the IP Clause. 
Yet an understandable desire to limit a new federal power 
does not necessarily mean that the Framers were generally op-
posed to broader sets of rights for new creations at the state lev-
el. The primary question for different or broader state-based 
rights would be whether they conflict with federal interests, es-
pecially with regard to commerce among the states. Those that 
do not conflict could be allowed and enforced at the state level 
under positive law (where enacted) or relevant common-law doc-
trines. The United States currently has concurrent securities-
law and trademark-law systems with the states, and thus there 
is no overarching constitutional reason why there could not be 
concurrent copyright or patent systems (as in fact existed after 
the Constitution’s ratification). 
Ultimately, this is an academic project in that I do not ex-
pect Congress or the courts to dramatically change the scope of 
copyright or patents on the basis of my proposed IP Clause in-
terpretation. Further, the very different global world that we 
inhabit today might be incompatible with the sort of concurrent 
system that my interpretation suggests. But I do believe that 
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this project illuminates current practical debates over IP law 
and the IP Clause. It also gives us another avenue to craft a co-
herent and compelling account of the IP Clause that reduces its 
enigmatic quality and capacity to be a nose of wax, twisted to fit 
any pro- or anti-IP argument that arises. 
